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preface
What contribution could Byzantine philosophy provide to current Actor-
Network Theory? What would be a sociological contribution to the field 
of cultural studies and questions of cultural change? These two questions 
mark the starting point of Le Sujet de l’Acteur, and from there the next 
step was to draw on the relation of human and non-human actors. How 
do we describe the relation between ‘intentional history’ and subliminal 
processes of transition, deformation, or recontextualization? 
In the past few years, the Actor-Network Theory of French philoso-
pher and sociologist Bruno Latour has become a hotly debated topic in 
the humanities. From a philosophical perspective, his theory of things 
keeps being reevaluated: is it possible for ‘Human and Non-Human Ac-
tors’ (Latour) to be analyzed as equally important actors? Does Latour’s 
theory of a simultaneous ‘agency’ of things and concepts indeed move 
beyond a subject-object relation? If it does, how far does it in fact go? 
Is it possible to develop a common new ontology that combines things, 
humans, and concepts, by moving away from the notion of substance, 
and instead reducing the entities to what they reveal in the course of 
their (inter)action?
Such questions, seemingly at odds with more common traditions of 
thought, are the centerpiece of research at the Morphomata Center for 
Advanced Studies. The Center is dedicated to the study of change inher-
ent in, and the comparative aspects of, cultural figurations—the particular 
objects, things and artifacts created by and in a given culture—as well 
as the potency of these figurations throughout history. Questions such 
as how these concrete artifacts and the quotations and borrowings they 
engender shape social acts, and how transmitted cultural forms can be 
reinterpreted, are of special interest at Morphomata. 
Thus, the contributions to Le Sujet de l’Acteur were looking for in-
terferences between the idea of ‘agency’ and Morphomata’s interest in 
cultural dynamics. How can we relate questions of (social) action with 
those of cultural manifestations? Can the questions of intention and 
phenomenality be correlated with the resistance of things and their 
forms? Thus, the volume focuses on questions of symmetry or dis-
symmetry between the world of ‘things’ and ‘human beings,’ including 
contributions from the fields of social studies, literary studies, and phi-
losophy. Although the contents are categorized in systematic and histori-
cal aspects, all contributions draw on the importance of case studies for 
the theoretical framework, either starting with systematic questions that 
are then answered exemplary, or starting from historical cases as well as 
theoretical options. In this way, our conceptual thinking on the agency 
of cultural forms is broadened and enhanced.
The idea to draw the intention of Morphomata’s work on the his-
tory and dynamics of cultural figurations towards the agency of ‘things’ 
in comparison to the agency of ‘humans’ came while Georgi Kapriev 
was fellow at the Morphomata Center. The discussions between Georgi 
Kapriev and Martin Roussel were followed by a workshop in June 2013, 
including Ivan Tchalakov as true expert in the field of ANT. We would 
like to thank the participants and contributors to this volume for their 
open-minded thinking. Furthermore, our thanks go to Günter Blamberger 
and Dietrich Boschung for publishing the results in their “Morphomata” 
book series. Many thanks for discussions to everyone at Morphomata 
and especially to Hanjo Berressem, Marian Feldman and Torsten Hahn. 
Finally, we’re thankful to Björn Moll for his corrections to the manuscript 
of Le Sujet de l’Acteur.
Georgi Kapriev, martin roussel and ivan Tchalakov
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marT in  roussel
‘agency’ of forM and  
the deLegation of the huMan
Outline and Introductory Remarks 
Le Sujet de l’Acteur deals with issues relating to the Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) brought to prominence by French sociologist Bruno Latour. What 
we are aiming for, however, is not a discussion of specific issues of net-
work theory or of the anthropological field, but a reflection on ANT with 
regard to some aspects linking back to questions raised in the last 200 
years, the anthropological era, and even way beyond to the Byzantine era 
and its interpretation of the Aristotelian hypokeímenon, which eventually 
became the Cartesian subject—notably despite of its literal meaning 
as ‘underlying thing.’ Georgi Kapriev and Ivan Tchalakov have already 
coined this debate with a number of articles focusing on the dichotomies 
of symmetry/asymmetry as well as of axiomatics/exchange.1 Likewise, in 
a genealogical sense, Kapriev’s article on “The Byzantine Trace” should 
be taken as a starting point for this volume’s juxtaposition of ANT and 
anthropological issues. For a more profound acquaintance with ANT, 
Ivan Tchalakov discusses ANT’s terminology with a focus on recent dis-
cussions in sociology and the role of the amateur’s action for a ‘pragmatics 
of taste’ (Hennion). For my part I would like to add some philosophical 
remarks on the more general issue of the relatedness, if not dependency 
1 Cf. Georgi Kapriev and Ivan Tchalakov, “Actor-Network Theory and 
Byzantine Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Action: Three Points of 
Possible Dialogue,” Yearbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Sci-
ence, Technology and Society 57 (2009): 207–38; Ivan Tchalakov and Georgi 
Kapriev, “The Limits of Causal Action: Actor-Network Theory Notion of 
Translation and Aristotle’s Notion of Action,” Yearbook of the Institute for 
Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society 47 (2005): 389–433. 
of the Human and the Non-Human as it comes into view from a history 
of cultural figurations and, in that respect, the ‘agency’ of form.2
aGency  and  The  quesT ion  oF  Form
In opposition to classical action-theoretical conceptions of ‘agency,’ 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory is concerned with the analysis of 
social networks as decentralized and mutually influential entities. While 
philosophy from Hegel to Marx had already tended to depersonalize 
the agent of social action and accentuated i.e. the agency of groups, i.e. 
of social classes, a philosophy of mind such as Hegel’s will exclude any 
‘Unspiritual’ from agency. Things, however, are more complicated in 
Marx. For him,
the wood remains wooden when it is made into a table: it is then “an 
ordinary, sensuous thing [ein ordinäres, sinnliches Ding ].” It is quite 
different when it becomes a commodity, when the curtain goes up 
on the market and the table plays actor and character at the same 
time, when the commodity-table, says Marx, comes on stage (auftritt), 
begins to walk around and to put itself forward as a market value. 
Coup de théâtre : the ordinary, sensuous thing is transfigured (verwan-
delt sich), it becomes someone, it assumes a figure. This woody and 
headstrong denseness is metamorphosed into a supernatural thing, a 
sensuous non-sensuous thing, sensuous but non-sensuous, sensuously 
2 The premise is that cultural forms become effective in history not as 
absolute, but within negotiations, and therefore within a continuous 
displacement, commentary and reassignment of its concrete figure. “The 
corrective should be sought,” following Adorno, “in the relationship of the 
content, including the intellectual content, to the form. […] In contrast to 
the crude textbook separation of content and form, contemporary poetology 
[Adorno adds with regard to Hölderlin’s poetry] has insisted on their unity. 
[…] Such a unity can be conceived only as a unity across its moments.” 
Theodor W. Adorno, “Parataxis. On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry,” in Notes to 
Literature, vol. 2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 128. Agency (Agens) obtains 
its historical vector, i.e. its efficacy, while being “transformed into a work 
[…] in exhaustive interaction with other moments: the subject matter, the 
immanent law of the work” (110).
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supersensible (verwandelt er sich in ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding). 
[…] The commodity thus haunts the thing, its specter is at work in 
use-value. This haunting displaces itself like an anonymous silhou-
ette or the figure of an extra [figurante] who might be the principal 
or capital character.3
Across capitalist and critical positions, these dynamizations of the mate-
rial as commodity can, according to Adorno, more generally be under-
stood as an “agency of form” (“Agens der Form”):4 Formalization is the 
fundamental process which grants agency. Formalization as opposed to 
abstract form (as opposed to matter) thereby includes the index of the 
concrete. In formalization, the concrete given receives a temporal vector. 
That this isn’t tantamount to universality is emphasized by an anecdote 
recounted by Hegel: 
After all I remember how in my youth I heard a mayor lament that 
writers of books were going too far and sought to extirpate Christian-
ity and righteousness altogether; somebody had written a defense of 
suicide; terrible, really too terrible!—Further questions revealed that 
The Sufferings of Werther were meant.
This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the 
abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human es-
sence in him with this simple quality.5
Formalization bears the question of a persistence of origin and the ques-
tion of semantic change,6 that is of misunderstanding, recontextualization 
or dynamization of knowledge. Alfred Gell’s Art and Agency still considers 
3 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the State of Debt, the Work of Mourning 
and the New International (New York et al.: Routledge, 2006), 188–189.
4 Theodor W. Adorno, “Parataxis,” 114. Cf. the comment on the phrase 
“Agens der Form” in: Martin Roussel, “Agens der Form. Kontingenz und 
Konkretion kultureller Figurationen,” in Morphomata. Kulturelle Figurati-
onen: Genese, Dynamik und Medialität, ed. Günter Blamberger and Dietrich 
Boschung (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2011), 147–174.
5 Walter Kaufmann, ed. and trans., Hegel. Texts and Commentary (Garden 
City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 115.
6 Cf. Dietrich Boschung und Ludwig Jäger, eds., Formkonstanz und Bedeu-
tungswandel. Archäologische Fallstudien und medienwissenschaftliche Reflexio nen 
(Paderborn: Fink, 2014).
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itself An Anthropological Theory which, while granting agency to works 
of art, reflects them within an anthropological paradigm.7 This is all the 
more surprising as there have been, in sociological theories of the last 
decades, a number of attempts to unhinge the sociological moment from 
anthropocentrism and to think social action in terms of alternative key 
concepts, such as ‘communication’ in Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. 
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, belonging to this context, has 
largely caused a stir by promoting—unlike Luhmann, for example—a 
strictly symmetrical anthropology placing human and non-human actors 
not in a humanistic matrix, but in a network of agencies that require 
configuration. The original edition of his most prominent work, Nous 
n’avons jamais été modernes (1991) is designated as an Essai d’anthropologie 
symétrique.8 Latour has put his argument of a symmetrical anthropology 
to the test in a number of discursive fields, among others the field of poli-
tics with an account of Parliament of Things 9 or in regards to the relation 
between religion and science with an “argument in ecotheology” leading 
up to the trenchant question: “Will non-humans be saved?”10
TranscendenTal  subjecT  and  Th inG  in  i TselF
With the question “What is the Human Being?,” Immanuel Kant gives 
us—in his own words, surprisingly—the core of his transcendental 
philosophy. But how does this question relate to the three leading ques-
tions of his three Critiques, The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of 
Practical Reason, and The Critique of Judgment? In his transcendental 
project, Kant follows these questions: “What can I know? What ought I 
to do? What may I hope?” Following an argument developed in Michel 
Foucault’s The Order of Things (Les mots et les choses), this does not mean 
that the core of Kant’s criticism basically is anthropology. In fact, Kant’s 
7 Cf. Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1998).
8 Engl. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
9 Cf. Bruno Latour, “De l’acteur-réseau au parlement des choses,” M (Men-
suel, marxiste, mouvement) numéro 75 (1995), spécial sur Sciences, Cultures, 
Pouvoirs (interview J.C. Gaudillère): 31–38.
10 Bruno Latour, “Will Non-humans Be Saved? An Argument in Ecotheol-
ogy,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 15 (2009): 459–75.
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criticism may be taken as a means to understand the central position of 
this question: “What is the Human Being?” This question, the fourth 
and comprehensive one, marks a crucial point that otherwise remains as 
abstract as the target of another famous reference in Kant, which is the 
‘thing in itself ’ (Ding an sich): Why is there a requirement in Kant for a 
notion such as the ‘thing in itself ’? And why is there a requirement in 
Kant for something like a definition of the Human?
Following Jacques Derrida’s famous 1968 discussion of Foucault’s 
history of the humanities in a lecture titled “The Ends of Man,”11 we come 
to see the anthropological disciplines—what today is called Social An-
thropology—set widely apart from the Geisteswissenschaften and especially 
from Psychoanalysis and Philosophy—even though there is a German 
tradition of Philosophische Anthropologie in the line of Johann Gottfried 
Herder and Arnold Gehlen or Helmut Plessner. As Derrida argues in his 
lecture, there has been a critical discussion of Kant’s anthropological 
framework since Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that eventually leads 
to a fundamental rethinking of the Human in terms of a historization 
of the very notion of the Human. As followers of this line of thought, 
Derrida cites Husserl’s and Heidegger’s—especially in his 1946 Brief 
über den “Humanismus”—questioning of the metaphysical foundation of 
philosophy. In the German tradition, Odo Marquard understood this as 
a missing dialogue between Philosophische Anthropologie on the one hand 
and Geschichtsphilosophie in the Hegelian meaning on the other hand, that 
is between an ontological concept of the human being and its inclusion 
in a dialectical or phenomenal understanding of history.12
To draw a simple conclusion from this enormous debate in the 20th 
century: What makes it possible to talk about human beings not as an 
object or a thing or even an animate being among others, but as a privi-
leged subject? And how do we speak of this subject without immediately 
being involved in the complexity of the psychoanalytic discourse on the 
unconscious? Foucault, with the 18th century in mind, once argued that 
the human being emerged as the effect of a shift between the French 
la physique and le physique, between the physical body and the specific 
11 Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans., 
with additional notes, by Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 109–136. 
12 Cf. Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘An-
thropologie’ seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Schwierigkeiten mit der 
Geschichtsphilosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982), 122–144.
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human body or constitution. To what extent are we able to distinguish two 
kinds of ‘bodies,’ the physical in general and the human in particular?13 
Kant’s “What is the Human Being?” opens the relation of these two very 
possibilities, but in this case the question is not yet the answer. Today, 
in the 21st century, the Kantian exposure finds itself transmitted to the 
field of a theory of action that does not start from the position of Kant’s 
transcendental freedom of will but within the world of resisting things, 
the bodies that matter:14 How can we talk about things as actors, of agents 
or actants of social activities? In Derrida’s argument, our understanding 
of ‘human being’ is enclosed by these two very possibilities in which our 
Dasein (human existence) comes to an end: being a ‘thing’ or a ‘being’ 
in the sense of the Kantian transcendental subject. Hence, what is the 
basis to separate the Human from the Non-Human? What is the basis 
for understanding ‘us’ as human instead of physical things? What allows 
us to see our humanity as a privilege separating the Human (as being 
unitary) from the Non-Human (which is always in plural)? Finally, the 
discourse of ‘we’ and ‘us’ leads Derrida to the question: “But who, we?”15 
an im ism, an imals , and  converGenT  perspecT i ves
In the last decade, there has been a lot of discussion in the social sciences 
about the rationality of social networks or the ‘social’ in general. One 
of the keywords of the debate became animism as a way of claiming an 
agency that is, in the words of Isabelle Stengers, “not ours:”
Reclaiming animism does not mean, then, that we have ever been 
animist. Nobody has ever been animist because one is never animist 
“in general,” only in terms of assemblages that generate metamorphic 
transformation in our capacity to affect and be affected—and also 
13 Cf. Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, trans. Arianna 
Bove (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2008). 
14 Seen from the point of Judith Butler’s Bodies that Matter: On the Dis-
cursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), one easily understands 
that le physique includes a normative dimension in the sense of gender 
politics, that is the privilege of a specific concept of the Human against the 
optionality of the body that should matter, but also as a normative matrix 
in general.
15 Jacques Derrida, “The Ends of Man,” 136.
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to feel, think, and imagine. Animism may, however, be a name for 
reclaiming these assemblages, since it lures us into feeling that their 
efficacy is not ours to claim. Against the insistent poisoned passion 
of dismembering and demystifying, it affirms that which they all re-
quire in order not to enslave us: that we are not alone in the world.16
The new interest in animism may be redefined as a questioning of the 
humanistic dichotomy of ‘human’ and ‘thing’ that we find analyzed in 
the Kantian thinking. Stenger’s argument suggests one take a look at the 
categories that subvert this dichotomy and those that go along with it, like 
rational/irrational, speculative/receptive, active/passive, etc. How shall we 
account for the forces that “generate metamorphic transformation in our 
capacity to affect and be affected”? 
In the following, I would like to discuss this possibility of transfor-
mation and exchange of capacity in regard to Derrida’s above mentioned 
question, “But who, we?” What is in question is, thus, the distinction 
between the singularity of human existence (which expresses itself in the 
singular of saying ‘I’) and the plurality of an ‘animate being’ that is not 
‘one,’ meaning no generalized voice and not traceable—or reducible—to 
an analytic kind of reason. Thirty years after his lecture on “The Ends 
of Man,” Derrida came back to those—one might say: animistic—ques-
tions when talking about animals, saying that there are only animals 
in the plural, while the Human Being is at one. If we thus speak of the 
human being as neither an essential or transcendental subject nor as a 
contingent thing, we are speaking of, as Derrida puts it, L’animal que donc 
je suis (The Animal That Therefore I Am).17 Speaking, on the on hand, of 
us as ‘animalistic,’ as well as on the other hand of things as being ‘ani-
mate,’ might open up the space of a convergent thinking that answers the 
question of who, or what, has agency. How does the human body matter 
when it comes to agency? How do we compare agents of such different 
16 Isabelle Stengers, “Reclaiming Animism,” e-flux 36 (July 2012), accessed 
July 3, 2014, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/reclaiming-animism/. Cf. the 
debate—which is not aimed at a rehabilitation of animism, but at a cri-
tique of the distinction between ‘animism’ and ‘modern science’ as coined 
and maintained by 19th century ethnology—about a detachment from the 
subject/object-schema: Irene Albers and Anselm Frank, eds., Animismus. 
Revisionen der Moderne (Zürich: diaphanes 2012).
17 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, 
trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press 2008).
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constitutions such as Human and Non-Human Beings? The question 
“But who, we?,” under the auspices of The Animal That Therefore I Am, 
thus is redirected to the distinction of men and animals as Derrida de-
scribes “the thesis of a limit as rupture or abyss between those who say 
‘we men,’ ‘I, a human,’ and what this man among men who say ‘we,’ what 
he calls the animal or animals.”18 
Let’s take a look at animals—in concrete terms—to answer this se-
ries of questions, which also question the symmetry or asymmetry in a 
network between different kinds of agents and actants.19 The animals I 
am thinking of, two of them, come to us by way of Heinrich von Kleist’s 
novella “Michael Kohlhaas,” published in 1810, in which Kleist tells his 
version of a Renaissance story. Crossing the border between Brandenburg 
and Saxony to sell horses, Kohlhaas is forced to leave two of the best 
among his herd of horses to the nobleman Wenzel von Tronka. Return-
ing on his way back to Brandenburg, Kohlhaas wants to pick up the two 
fabulous black horses that were left. Although he now knows about the 
nobleman’s illegal withhold, Kohlhaas still would be happy to retrieve his 
horses. “But how great was his astonishment,” writes Kleist, 
when he, instead of his curried and well-fed black horses, saw nothing 
but a pair of skinny, drawn old mares; bones like hooks to hang a 
load; manes and hair that were kneaded lacking any care and main-
tenance: the true image of misery in the animal world!20 
18 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 30. Here, Derrida fre-
quently uses the French neologism animots referring both to the animaux 
(animals) and the mots (words), the words to call animals as animals and 
the words animals are, that is the discourse on animals.
19 The relation between animals and the world of reason was discussed 
at the “XXII. Deutschen Kongress für Philosophie” in the section “Kollo-
quium 19: Do animals live in the space of reason? Action and decision in 
non-human animals”; Julian Nida-Rümelin and Elif Özmen, eds., Welt der 
Gründe (XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie. 11. – 15. September 2011 
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Kolloquienbeiträge. 
Hamburg: Meiner 2013, 885–923; cf. in particular Hans-Johann Glock’s 
article on “Animals: Agency, Reasons and Reasoning,” 900–913). 
20 My translation. German: “Wie groß war aber sein Erstaunen, als er, statt 
seiner zwei glatten und wohlgenährten Rappen, ein Paar dürre, abgehärmte 
Mähren erblickte; Knochen, denen man, wie Riegeln, hätte Sachen aufhän-
gen können; Mähnen und Haare, ohne Wartung und Pflege, zusammen-
geknetet: das wahre Bild des Elends im Tierreiche!” (Heinrich von Kleist: 
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In the words of the castle’s reeve, Kohlhaas should “thank God that his 
mares were, if at all, alive?”21 What follows is the story of Kohlhaas as 
one of “the most righteous and one of the most dreadful human beings 
of his time,”22 as is noted in the famous opening lines of the short novel. 
With his black horses barely alive, Kohlhaas would prefer sending them 
to the knacker’s yard or the cemetery rather than taking them home. 
Thus, the horse dealer’s request for an institutio in integrum, a total 
recovery, seems futile. The horses look like dead things—almost, one 
must add. Throughout most of the novella’s plot, nothing reminds the 
reader of these horses: neither Kohlhaas burning down the Tronkenburg 
nor him later burning down Luther’s town Wittenberg, leading his own 
war against the authorities. Nothing could be more afield from issues 
of agency than these horses that seem to even have slipped Kohlhaas’ 
mind. Seventy pages later we are informed that they have been sold to 
the swineheard of Hainichen and then to the knacker in Döbbeln (93). 
Here, the formerly classy horses stand on crooked legs with hanging 
heads, and even Kohlhaas agrees that they should be skinned (97). To 
make it blatantly obvious, Graf Kallheim responds to his master’s, the 
Kurfürst’s, question about a possible recovery: “‘Milord, they are dead: 
they are dead under constitutional law because they no longer have any 
value, and they will be physically dead before they might be saved from 
the bone yard.’”23 It doesn’t seem as if Kleist tells us a story about horses: 
instead, what the plot tells us is the story of Kohlhaas’ self-empowerment 
culminating in his impersonation of the archangel Michael. 
This, of course, proves to be an illusion, and somewhat illusionary 
is also what happens to be the last news on the black horses. Kohlhaas, 
eventually brought to the place of his execution—the punishment for 
murder and acts of arson—, has been granted his rights in the case of 
the two black horses, which suddenly appear at the place of execution, 
Sämtliche Werke und Briefe in vier Bänden. Vol. III: Erzählungen, Anekdoten, 
Gedichte, Schriften, ed. Klaus Müller-Salget (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 
1990), 23) Hereafter cited by page number.
21 My translation. German: “daß die Mähren überhaupt noch leben?” (23/25)
22 My translation. German: “einer der rechtschaffensten zugleich und ent-
setzlichsten Menschen seiner Zeit.” (13)
23 My translation. German: “‘gnädigster Herr, sie sind tot: sind in staats-
rechtlicher Bedeutung tot, weil sie keinen Wert haben, und warden es 
physisch sein, bevor man sie, aus der Abdeckerei, in die Ställe der Ritter 
gebracht hat […]’ ” (99–100).
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“gleaming in good health,” as it is said, “stomping around with their 
hooves.”24 In the enforcement of the judgment, the nobleman Wenzel 
von Tronka was ordered to feed the horses and return them to the horse 
dealer. Kohlhaas then dies with his neck under the scaffold, but not 
without first “tapping the horses’ fat necks”25 and donating them to his 
two sons (which had previously never been mentioned).
What is, thus, the agency of these black horses—almost dead, or 
indeed dead under constitutional law? They have none, one might say, 
as they are but a plaything in the game between Kohlhaas, Tronka, and 
others. But what this final twist of fate reminds us of is that the entire 
story of the horse dealer is all about the total recovery and that he may 
only have used the wrong means to defend his just and fair cause. Under 
the auspices of justice, these black horses cross the great divide between 
the dead thing that they become and the moral subject that proves to 
exist only in Kohlhaas’ final death. All that remains from these cross-
ing spheres, from the world of dead things and the world of the free, is 
Kohlhaas’ gift of death, meaning the gift he gives to his sons with his last 
will. What Kleist’s story of Michael Kohlhaas tells us, then, is a story of 
The Order of Things, as Foucault would say, a story that withdraws both, 
the subject and the object, and that this story, finally, can only be told 
through the emergence of animals, set in plural, without names but alive, 
well fed, and agleam. 
When Kleist’s “Michael Kohlhaas” sends us the black horses as a 
delegation of life, given in Kohlhaas’ gift of death, we are urged to un-
derstand the animals as a sign of life that itself has no voice. We might 
even hear through it the de-articulation of language in Kafka’s tale of 
Josefine, the singing mouse with her undefined whispering, and we also 
might hear Foucault’s constant noise of the discourse. All of this is in 
the delegation. Latour would probably take this as proof of our not be-
ing modern, rational, and totally enlightened, even in the sense of a total 
possible justice. There is nothing like a ‘thing in itself ’ (Ding an sich) 
as long as we speak of our networks of experience; likewise there is no 
presence of the Cogito that has agency without transmission, without 
processes of giving and taking shape. However, in the giving of form, 
humanization takes place, which also means that it misses the point 
of humanity, that it gets displaced and refigured in the face of things. 
24 My translation. German: “von Wohlsein glänzenden, die Erde mit ihren 
Hufen stampfenden Rappen.” (140)
25 My translation. German: “und klopfte ihren feisten Hals.” (140)
18
Thus, we talk about the giving, refiguration, and rethinking of form in 
the exteriority of culture. The Morphomata Center for Advanced Studies 
focuses on cultural figurations in the sense of the Greek word mórphoma, 
in the plural morphómata, that is the moulding and formation as well as 
the given form of things. Thus far, Morphomata understands cultural 
change as the proliferation given in the exchange of forms. Dealing with 
figurations instead of symbolic orders does not exclusively address work-
ing in the field of material culture but also a thinking about culture as 
nothing else but the process of delegating—and distracting—the human, 
or, to always study culture in a symbolic withdrawal. Put another way, we 
find that this corresponds to what Bruno Latour wrote about the shifting 
position of humans in in the context of a sociology of form: “The human 
is in the delegation itself, in the pass, in the sending, in the continuous 
exchange of forms.”26
A discussion of humanity not from a dogmatic point of view but within 
a history of defining and redefining only takes place as the history of an 
exchange of forms. One in this sense morphomatic aspect of Latour’s sen-
tence lies in the paradoxical impression that the continuity of this history 
is conveyed by an ongoing exchange that does not allow for an essential 
understanding of such terms as action, subjectivity or intentionality. This 
general outline of a field of research between Philosophische Anthropologie, 
the history of Humanisms, and Social Sciences is consulted regarding its 
advantages in describing social practices apart from the more political 
agenda of a critique of subjective autonomy as the core of our modern 
times. In this sense, Ivan Tchalakov’s opens a series of more systematic 
approaches in this volume with an analysis of the amateur’s action that 
is predestined as a paragon for Actor-Network Theory. With ‘resistance’ 
and ‘endurance,’ Tchalakov focuses in a discussion of Antoine Hennion’s 
‘pragmatics of taste’ on two aspects in research that call into play ‘things’ 
and ‘technical equipment’ as well as the possibility of ‘failure’ or the ‘lack 
of experience.’ Stoyan Tanev opens up the discussion to the genuine field 
of theory comparing issues of asymmetry in interactions between human 
and non-human agents within the range of Actor-Network or Activity 
Theory, the first supposing asymmetry, the second symmetry. Literature’s 
specific interest in those kinds of dysfunction is discussed in Charlotte 
26 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 138 (cf. 131, 137–138).
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Jaekel’s article “about Malfunction, Interference, and Waste” that engages 
in a subliminal knowledge of social action revealed in literature. This 
concern goes together with Michael Niehaus’ argument about “Wander-
ing Things,” showing how story-telling gives plenty of examples of the 
agency of things and how stories are told as a kind of enactment of things. 
The range of articles that assume a more historical approach reaches 
from Georgi Kapriev’s “Byzantine Trace” to reflections on contemporary 
social practices. All the same, these approaches contribute to the prob-
lematization of the relation between subjectivity and subject matter in 
actions, but allow for a historically deepened understanding. Although 
setting out from a historical starting point, Kapriev’s account traces the 
Byzantine version of an asymmetry between human and non-human 
agents that serves to expand the contemporary discussion mostly focused 
on social action and our understanding of the social. Whereas Kapriev 
brings in perspectives from the history of philosophy and even the histori-
cization of basic philosophical terms, Arthur Tatnall, Jonathan Tummons, 
and Marta Dopieralski discuss issues of Actor-Network Theory evolving 
from recent fields. Tatnall offers a perspective on the development of two 
Australian super computers and analyzes these stories as two case studies 
about success and failure in the history of computing. Tummons, on the 
other hand, doesn’t start within the field of technology but within the 
educational system of the United Kingdom. He understands his work as 
an “ethnographic research into the delivery of a teacher-training curricu-
lum across a network of colleges in England.” Marta Dopieralski argues 
that ANT’s postulate of a symmetry between human and non-human 
entities may be too simple and should be replaced by questions about 
the opposition between “monolithically, monocausally thought creative 
power and scenes of distributed agency. Technology is only an indication 
of such agency which results in the dispositif of the cinema in order to 
distinguish it from art forms such as painting or writing.”
The agency of form is found in the interplay of the human and the 
non-human. Thus, cultural forms crystallize (social) interaction. Forms in 
this sense may be regarded as interfaces for the exchange of data flows at 
the very moment of having agency. As practice, the Cultural Analysis 27 of 
the agency of form requires both an orientation towards case studies and an 
enhanced focus on the dynamics between form and information. Le Sujet 
27 Cf. Mieke Bal, ed., The Practice of Cultural Analysis: Exposing Interdisci-
plinary Interpretation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
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de l’Acteur contributes to this from varying disciplinary positions. With 
an emphasis on the continuously shifting process of knowledge formation, 
the contributors also follow—at least indirectly—the thought of French 
anthropologist Philippe Descola, e.g. towards a non-dualistic as well as non-
essential ontology that goes Beyond Nature and Culture. This even leaves 
behind questions of an either symmetrical or asymmetrical anthropology, 
but opens up a wide range of different kind of ontologies (of the human).28
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i v an  TchalaKov
the aMateur’S action in Science
Abstract: The paper analyzes science practices focusing on the rela-
tionships between scientists and the objects of their study. Two main 
types of these relationships are identified, which in a previous paper I 
provisionally named entrepreneurial (or Pasteur’s) type of science and 
other (enduring or McClintock’s) type of science. The main difference 
between the two stems from the ‘social statuses’ of the studied objects 
inside the relevant scientific community, the border case being when 
the community assumes these objects as non-existent or as considered 
under an irrelevant (erroneous) conceptual frame. The paper pays special 
attention to this case, assignable to the enduring science, because here 
the researchers require special character and endurance in order to over-
come the predominant disbeliefs and (negative) attitudes of their peers 
and fellow scientists. In previous papers, I have pointed out the emerg-
ing relationships of solidarity and mutuality between scientists and the 
objects of their study as key points, supporting the scientists’ resistance 
and endurance to the dominant scientific beliefs. Now I develop a new 
argument supporting this claim, based on a comparison of French soci-
ologist Antoine Hennion’s inspiring analysis of a sociology of taste with 
the studies of transition from ‘science as calling’ to ‘science as profession’ 
and the evolution of the amateurs in science as part of this process (Max 
Weber, Robert Merton), recently examined by Steven Shapin.
The  in i T i a l  impeTus  oF  Th is  sTudy
During a study of the life of optical scientists in a Bulgarian holographic 
laboratory that took place more than 15 years ago, I came across the in-
teresting case of Methodius—a leading researcher in the lab, one of its 
founding fathers, who was accused by his fellow colleagues of wasting 
his time and resources on studying phenomena whose non-existence had 
been proven mathematically.1 Methodius was inspired by the earlier works 
on holographic computer memory, where, in designing micro-optical sys-
tems, his team had run into immanent difficulties provoked by the very 
nature of linear and diffraction optics. Would it be possible to create an 
optical element combining the advantages and avoiding the shortcom-
ings of both? In 1988, Methodius established a working group funded 
by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, which researched this until then 
unknown optical element they called ‘deep-relief lens.’ However, things 
soon went wrong—a renowned Russian scientist from Saint Petersburg 
analyzed their results and found a miscount. According to him, what the 
group aimed at was simply an optical element of a high order of diffrac-
tion, their assertions hence groundless. A year later, both the PhD student 
and the software engineer in the group decided to withdraw,2 while the 
other colleagues in the lab became increasingly distrustful. Only his wife 
Rositza—also a colleague in the lab—supported him. 
Yet regardless of the others’ skepticism and the uncompromising 
mathematical evidence against their claim, they continued their work at 
the price of stringent hardships, often paying the research expenses out 
of their own pocket. The results of their research became clear almost 
ten years later, when in 1997 the Journal of Modern Optics published two 
articles of theirs. A year earlier there had been a conference in the United 
States and the publication of a paper by other colleagues working in the 
new field. Methodius gradually restored his reputation.
Working on the publication of these research findings, I learned 
about the even more compelling story of American cytologist Barbara 
1 Cf. Ivan Tchalakov, “The Object and the Other in Holographic Research 
—Approaching Passivity and Responsibility of Human Actors,” Science, 
Technology & Human Values 29/1 (2004): 193–215.
2 Methodius was accused of being ‘irresponsible’ by his collaborators 
for giving priority to this (yet) unborn optical element. The collaborators 
claimed that, being a prominent researcher, he was “responsible for his 
people” and had to use his reputation to secure projects that would help 
the scientists survive. This was in the early 1990s, when the government 
spending for science decreased by a factor of almost 10 and the average 
monthly salary of researchers approached $ 150 … Had Methodius agreed to 
follow the demands of his colleagues, this would have meant he’d abandon 
the “deep relief lenses” and leave them alone, withdrawing his ‘responsi-
bility’. Effectively, two types of responsibility clashed here—one towards 
fellow humans and one towards a ‘nonhuman entity,’ whose existence was 
not certain at all!
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McClintock, described by Evelyne Fox-Keller.3 During the 1930s, she 
became one of the leading American geneticists, even being elected a 
member of the Board of American Genetics Association. A few years 
later, McClintock introduced the idea of transposition, i.e. the ability of 
living organisms to control the reproduction of their genes. She claimed 
the genetic elements were subject to a system of regulation and control 
that involved their rearrangement. This was the period of time in which 
nuclear physicists, disciples of Niels Bohr, entered microbiology bringing 
in a completely new vision of how to conduct science (reductionism) and 
a new physical technology (the spectroscope instead of the microscope). 
Central to this ‘neo-Darwinist theory’ of molecular biologists in 1940s 
was the premise that whatever genetic variation does occur is random, 
whereas McClintock reported genetic changes that were under control 
of the organism! Claims such as hers did not fit in the standard frame 
of analysis and the prevailing notion of the gene as a fixed, unchang-
ing unit of heredity. Besides, to make matters worse, she worked in the 
old cytologists’ tradition of microscopic study of chromosomes, not 
applying the new spectroscopic methods. So when presenting her idea 
of the transposition of genes at conferences, she met fierce resistance: 
“I was surprised that I couldn’t communicate […] that I was being ridi-
culed, or being told that I was really mad,” she remembered during the 
interviews. A famous geneticist visiting her lab in Cold Spring Harbor 
openly announced: “I don’t want to hear a thing about what you are 
doing. It may be interesting, but I understand it’s kind of mad.” What 
followed were more than twenty years of lonely research. She withdrew 
further into her work, becoming increasingly worried about confronting 
potentially hostile audiences, and even about visits from unsympathetic 
colleagues. It was not until 1967 with the works of Watson and Crick in 
the US, and Jacques Monod in France, when the idea of the organism’s 
control over the genes re-emerged. In the 1970s, the transposition was 
rediscovered and McClintock regained her prestige, numerous awards 
followed before long.
How could these cases of scientists’ extraordinary insistence on their 
own line of research, of their resistance to the external pressure from the 
scientific community, and of their endurance to the hardships they faced 
be explained? What gave the scientists a point of support during these 
3 Cf. Evelyn Fox-Keller, A Feeling for the Organism (New York: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1983).
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long lonely years?—Myself an adherent of the Actor-Network Theory’s 
(ANT) approach in studying scientific practice, I faced a real challenge. 
The  ‘ enTrepreneur ial’ sc i ence  and  The  ForGoTTen  
oTher  Type  oF  ‘ endur inG ’ sc i ence
Since the early 1980s, a number of remarkable studies have been carried 
out, making Actor-Network Theory one of the leading approaches in the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Applying this theory since 
the early 1990s, I came to the conclusion that its success was partially 
based on a key feature of modern science—the emancipation and increase 
of a proper role of methods and techniques of study in the process of research. 
In this respect, Bruno Latour’s analysis of Louis Pasteur was especially 
revealing. Pasteur began his carrier as a crystallographer “who interested 
a dozen or so of his respectable peers” and, passing through several dis-
ciplines, “ended as the deified ‘Pasteur,’ the man of a century, the man 
who gave his name to streets all over France.”4 The type of research 
developed by Pasteur was far away from the gradual process of slow and 
uncertain acquaintance with unknown agents, where the appropriate re-
search methods too are to be elaborated. This process, traditionally named 
as ‘fundamental research,’ usually presupposes many years (sometimes 
decades) of work removed from public interest and popularity, and often 
ends—as Latour ironically put it—with a presentation in the Academy 
4 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), 81. After he abandoned crystallography, Pasteur “…
found himself, in the problem of ferments, at the heart of a famous quar-
rel among the chemists and also in the heart of the beer-, vinegar-, and 
vine-producing industries, whose economic weight was out of all propor-
tions to that of few colleagues in crystallography. Yet he did not abandon 
the laboratory methods acquired in crystallography. Above all, he transformed 
into a laboratory problem a crucial economic question and captured an 
entire industry that was concerned by his experiments. Yet he did not 
continue his work in micrography, leaving it to others. He moved right 
into the middle of a quarrel about spontaneous generation. There again 
he brought onto the laboratory terrain problems that had not previously 
been there and capitalized on the attention of an educated public that was 
already much larger than the industrial public. But he was not interested 
in developing a fundamental chemistry. He was put in charge with a new 
economic problem, that of the silk-worm industry.” (ibid., 68–69)
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saying “Here’s a new agent!” Many scientists never even reach this point, 
left only with the hopes that their colleagues or disciples will continue 
their work. As seen from Barbara McClintock’s case above, when in the 
mid 1940s the disciples of Niels Bohr invaded genetics and replaced the 
traditional field researches and microscopic methods with the spectroscopic 
analysis and experiments they had learned from nuclear physics, they did this 
very much the way Pasteur had succeeded almost a century ago.
Similar phenomena have been reported in a number of other ANT 
studies, such as Michel Callon’s study of a French fuel cells laboratory, 
where the different research backgrounds of the scientists and the cor-
responding differences in methods they dealt with was at the root of a 
rivalry in practically all spheres of the laboratory life: from setting the 
direction of research, the definition of what were considered relevant 
resources and how to distribute them, the definition of relevant partners 
outside the lab, to the way they legitimized their actions.5 My studies 
of research practices in the field of holography also support the claim of 
the increase of the proper role of research methods ‘emancipated’ and 
imported from other fields of science—holography was discovered in 1947 
by Denis Gabor, but the field remained almost unnoticed and out of the 
main stream of physics until the early 1960s, when the laser methods of 
research, developed in solid state physics, entered holographic research.6 
During the last forty years, this steady phenomenon re-emerged in 
most studies of scientific practice—the “strong link” is not in the ‘direct 
relationships’ between researchers and their research objects (the nonhu-
man agents they are taming), but between researchers and the technical arti-
facts, equipment and procedures they are using in this process. This, indeed, 
is a rather peculiar type of science, which I named ‘entrepreneurial ’—here, 
the mastery of a specific method (tool) and its transfer into a new area of 
research gives the newcomer a competitive advantage over the indigenes 
of the field, such as that which Pasteur found over the veterinarians in 
his studies of anthrax. Usually, ‘entrepreneurial’ scientists come to a 
field where the research problems are already articulated, the debates are 
going on and the interested parties identified. Arriving with their new 
methods and techniques, the scientists in fact transform (or translate) 
5 Cf. Michel Callon, La science et ses réseaux: genèse et circulation des faits 
scientifique (Paris: La Découverte, 1989), 173–213.
6 Cf. Ivan Tchalakov, “The History of Holographic Optical Storage at the 
Both Sides of the Iron Curtain—1969–1989,” ICON—The Journal of the 
International Committee for the History of Technology 11 (2005): 95–119.
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the old problems—‘translation’ always presupposes a text (or story) that 
is already available, an existing configuration of actors and interests.7
Just like the entrepreneurship in the capitalist economy described by 
Joseph Schumpeter and Israel Kirzner, this type of science does not consist 
of a ‘simple’ application of the method and re-formulation of the problem. 
The translation, i.e. the turning upside down the existing communities 
by introducing new methods of study, making new actors emerge out of 
nowhere or redefining the old ones, also requires “persistence, audacity, 
and precision” (Latour). As fascinating as it is, we are dealing with a 
rather peculiar type of research. It remained hidden from philosophers 
and historians of science for a long period of time, only to be identified 
today by ANT and other STS approaches as a dominant type of science.
It seems to me, however, that the cases outlined in the previous sec-
tion reveal another type of science we somehow have (almost) forgotten—a 
science guided by patient, laborious, and uncertain efforts for acquain-
tance of a new agent or unknown features of an existing agent and where 
the methods of study are secondary—often they need to be modified or even 
invented in order to ‘match’ the supposed properties of those unknown 
creatures. This is a science in which you continue probing into your study 
while the colleagues you are working with leave in despair or redirect their 
attention to other problems, some of them even setting out to prove that 
the elusive entities you are studying are nonexistent. This science may 
not be as successful as the ‘entrepreneurial’ one, but it is indispensable 
for the development of knowledge and for the evolution of human ways 
of engaging with the world. This was the science of Pasteur’s colleagues 
from the crystallographic lab that remained there, researching problems 
relevant to their tiny community only. And whose efforts made it pos-
sible for someone like Pasteur ‘to come and go,’ bringing with him the 
methods they had developed as well as the new entities they had discov-
ered and tamed. This science sometimes fails, but as the two cases above 
suggest, it was worth the long years of efforts. Eventually, they achieved 
what they had strived for and their opponents withdrew their critiques. 
7 Cf. Ivan Tchalakov and Georgi Kapriev, “The Limits of Causal Action: 
Actor-Network Theory Notion of Translation and Aristotle’s Notion of 
Action,” Yearkbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technol-
ogy and Society 47 (2005): 389–433; Georgi Kapriev and Ivan Tchalakov, 
“Actor-Network Theory and Byzantine Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory 
of Action: Three Points of Possible Dialogue,” Yearbook of the Institute for 
Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society 57 (2009): 207–38.
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This is, thus, not a marginal type of science, even though it has now been 
almost forgotten. Rather, it refers to research practices which have es-
caped the attention of mainstream STS and Actor-Network Theory in 
particular—maybe because they have been exploited too much by the old 
epistemology and history of science. 
The  m issed  l inK :  s Teven  shap in  on  sc ience  amaTeurs  and 
The  proFess ional i zaT ion  oF  sc ience 
The distinction between entrepreneurial (Pasteur’s) and enduring 
(McClintock’s) types of science reflects larger changes in the very way of 
doing science in modern society that took place over the last century. As 
Steven Shapin points out: 
From the early modern period through much of the XIX and even 
early XX century […] the natural philosopher or scientist [was 
conceived] as morally superior to other sorts of people […]. The 
eighteenth century Unitarian chemist Joseph Priestley wrote that “a 
Philosopher ought to be something greater and better than another 
man.” If the man of science was not already virtuous, then the “con-
templation of the works of God should give sublimity to his virtue, 
should expand his benevolence, extinguish everything meant, base, 
and selfish in his nature […].” In 1916, Sir Richard Gregory, physicist, 
and the editor of Nature magazine, articulated views of the sanctity of 
science, proceeding from the sanctity of objects, which differed little 
from those expressed by Herschel, Priestley, or even Boyle. The study 
of Nature elevated those who pursue it: “The conviction that devotion 
to the study of Nature exalts the Creator gives courage and power 
to those who possess it; it is the Divine afflatus which inspires and 
enables the highest work in science.” Given Nature so conceived as 
an object of inquiry, one might legitimately expect those who studied 
it to be better than the other people.8
In fact, for about two centuries, being a natural philosopher or scientist 
was a ‘calling’—in 1937, in an apparent reference to Max Weber’s famous 
8 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Life (Chicago, IL and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008), 24.
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essay, the young Robert Merton published a paper on a “Protestant Spur 
to Science,” where he described the favourable social and cultural envi-
ronment in 17th century England that helped young noblemen engage with 
difficult and uncertain long-term efforts in scientific endeavours which 
perfectly matched the protestant idea of ‘calling.’ 
These were lasting attitudes. A little more than a century ago there 
was the widespread conviction that a life in science was not the best 
way to material prosperity and a wealthy life. Steven Shapin cites the 
following address of an eminent American physician at a meeting of the 
Washington science society held in the late 1880s:
The man of science […] [is] a man whose life is dedicated to the 
advancement of knowledge for its own sake, and not for the sake of 
money or fame, or of professional position or advancement. He un-
dertakes scientific investigations exclusively or mainly because he loves 
the work itself and not with any reference to the probable utility of the 
results […]. There are some reasons for thinking that the maximum 
limit [of money the scientists make] is about $5000 per annum […]. 
The more they demonstrate their indifference to mere pecuniary con-
siderations, the more credible it is to them; so much all are agreed.9
There is no doubt that this specific perspective on doing science—the 
science as ‘calling’ dominated by curiosity and self-devotion—was in tune 
with the ‘enduring ’ type of science we outlined above. It created a favorable 
environment that helped scientists pursue their activity in spite of the 
hardships and external pressure to produce meaningful and useful results. 
By the turn of the 19th century, this was about to change. The increasing 
involvement of scientists in the institutional setting of government and 
industry had profound consequences for the very way of doing science. 
It not only turned science from a ‘calling’ into a ‘carrier,’ but profoundly 
redefined its very essence.
Steven Shapin recalls the almost forgotten fact that “[…] the early 
modern Speaker of Truth about Nature was, almost without exception, 
not a professional but amateur. He was understood to do it not because 
it was his job—but because, in some irreducible sense, he wanted to do 
it, or even because he was called to do it.”10 The figure of the man of 
9 Ibid., 45 (italics mine—I.Tch.).
10 Ibid., 35.
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science as an amateur, conducting inquiry without the expectation of a 
remunerated career did not disappear until the end of the 19th century. 
The most famous scientist of the century, Charles Darwin, “was never 
employed to produce scientific knowledge, nor was the knowledge he then 
produced designed to be of use to contemporary structures of power 
and profit […]. In Britain alone, the list of amateur-scientists in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century included some of the most influential 
figures in all sciences.”11
It is worth stressing this link—the close relationship between ‘sci-
ence as calling ’ and the status of the scientist as amateur. The key feature 
of the amateurs’ activity—today as much as two centuries ago—is that 
the focus, the scale and the scope of this activity are to a larger extent 
defined by the amateur’s commitment to the subject of his study and to 
his fellow community of amateurs. The increasing integration of science 
into institutions of the State and into organizational settings of industry 
changed this—it was the ability of scientists to provide useful knowledge 
and to solve the practical problems that most valued. 
It was the “embodied expertise” that the State and business was pay-
ing for. The social position of the “expert,” however, is quite a different 
position from that of the “amateur”—the expert is valued for the ‘tools’ 
he is equipped with to approach and solve problems, while the amateur 
is something under-defined, uncertain and even dangerous for the orderly 
institutional machine of modern corporations and government. 
The integration of science into structures of power and industry 
proceeded slowly. According to Shapin, much of the talk about “the 
professionalization of science” during the nineteenth century must be 
considered with caution and the increasing integration of science into 
State and commerce was not a smooth and unequivocal process:
[A]t the beginning of the twentieth century the identity of the scien-
tist was radically instable. To be a scientist was still something of a 
calling but it was becoming something of a job; it was still associated 
with the idea of social disengagement but increasingly recognized as 
a source of civically valued power and wealth; it was still associated 
with a notion of special personal virtue but it was on the crisp of 
moral ordinariness.12
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 41–42.
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This process gained momentum during the first decades of the 20th cen-
tury and especially after World War II, when, indeed, science became a 
mass profession. The ‘amateurs’ had nothing to do with it anymore, as 
did the idea of the scientist as ‘morally superior’ to ordinary people. The 
rise of classical sociology of science promoting the ‘moral equivalence principle’ 
was one of the key signs of this profound change.
Writing during the Second World War, with the existence of both 
liberal science and liberal society under threat, American sociologist 
Robert K. Merton (1910–2003) announced that there was nothing special 
about scientists as people: 
A passion for knowledge, idle curiosity, altruistic concern with the 
benefit to humanity, and a host of other special motives have been 
attributed to the scientists. The quest for distinctive motives appears 
to have been misdirected […]. [There is] no satisfactory evidence 
that scientists are recruited from the ranks of those who exhibit an 
unusual degree of moral integrity […]. The objectivity of scientific 
knowledge [does not] proceed from the personal qualities of scien-
tists.13
Instead of ‘personal qualities,’ he claimed, the institutional imperatives, the 
‘rules and mores’ of scientific institutions and their inherent mechanism 
of social control were what guaranteed the integrity of scientists:
[The scientific ethos] […] is that affectively toned complex of values 
and norms which is held to be found on the man of science. The 
norms are expressed in form of prescriptions, proscriptions, prefer-
ences and permissions. They are legitimized in terms of institutional 
values. These imperatives, transmitted by precept and example and 
reinforced by sanctions are in varying degree internalized by the 
scientists, thus fashioning scientific consciousness.14
Steven Shapin defines Merton’s works as “tactics in building an academic 
discipline,” that is of the establishment of sociology as a legitimate part 
13 Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations (Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1973), 267–78.
14 Ibid., 606.
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of the university curricula and securing a ‘market’ for sociological ex-
pertise in the public and private sphere against the competition of other 
disciplines such as psychology. At the same time, however, he considers 
Merton’s works as a sign and expression of the strong overall tendency in 
late modern culture that has already begun to manifest itself in the works 
of discerning writers, journalist, philosophers and other thinkers. Yet by 
introducing his principle of ‘moral equivalence of scientists’ and by stress-
ing the role of institutional control in science, Merton had the courage to 
stand against the still dominant mass beliefs and perceptions: 
The “moral equivalence” of scientists is now a commonplace, but it 
was not a commonplace at the time Merton begin to voice it […]. His 
1942 insistence upon the scientist’s moral equivalence had the char-
acter of an argument against persisting “vulgar error”. The knowing 
sociologists felt obliged to address the still well entrenched presump-
tion to the contrary […]. In doing so, Merton became a precursor of 
Foucault’s celebrated identification of the typical post-WW II figure 
of the “specific intellectual” who used to speak transcendent, eternal, 
and universal truth to power, but whose role was now defined by 
providing particular expert services to power.15
In the specific idiom of a sociology of knowledge (or rather ‘sociology of 
sociology’), we could consider Merton’s project as providing a new frame 
of reasoning about the ‘tectonic change’ that took place in modern science 
at the turn of the 19th century and as an important step in legitimating 
and establishing this change. Less than two decades later, Shapin recalls, 
the retiring American president Dwight D. Eisenhower will warningly 
assert in his 1961 “Farewell Address” that “the free university, histori-
cally the fountain of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced 
a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge cost 
involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intel-
lectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new 
electronics computers. The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars 
by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever 
present—and is gravely to be regarded.” 
Referring to a situation in his science in the early 1960s as a ‘crowd 
of mediocrity,’ the biologist Paul Weis wrote that 
15 Shapin, The Scientific Life, 22.
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through the phase of history which we have come to survey till very 
recently, to be a scientist was a calling, not a job. Scientists were men 
of science, not just men in science. They had come to science driven 
by an inner urge, curiosity, a quest for knowledge, and they knew, 
or learned, what it was all about. They were not drawn or lured intro 
science in masses by fascinating gadgets, public acclaim, manpower needs 
of industries and governments, or job security.16 
Biochemist Erwin Chargraff observed in 1987 that in the natural sci-
ences “passion […] has been replaced by ambition. Our young geniuses are 
passionately ambitious instead of being passionately passionate; and it has 
become very difficult to distinguish between what is an ardent search for 
truth and what is a vigorous promotion campaign.”17
Half a century after Merton’s initial writings, the situation in science 
was unequivocally established on the path of professionalization and, 
instead of presumption of curiosity and calling, there was the necessity 
of an apparatus of institutional surveillance. A report of the US National 
Science Foundation (NSF) has found that 
there are not many working scientist left who exert much spiritual 
power over their disciplines. However personally and professionally 
ethical prominent latter-day scientists may be, they have lost the halo 
of incorruptibility and unimpeachable integrity that many of their 
predecessors once projected. In fact, it seems pretentious nowadays 
for senior scientist to act as the exemplar of an admirable person 
worth emulating, when the role of arbiter of integrity and good man-
ners in scientific conduct has been taken over by impersonal organs 
such as the U.S. Public Health Service’s Office of Research Integrity.
The very existence of such ‘Offices of Research Integrity’ indicates how 
close fraud and misconduct had come to the center of the cultural con-
sciousness about science.
16 Paul Weis, Staatsangehörigkeit und Staatenlosigkeit im gegenwärtigen 
Völ ker recht (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962), 470. Cf. engl.: Nationality and State-
lessness in International Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff 
International Publishers B.V., 1979).
17 Cited in Shapin, The Scientific Life, p. 84
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The  ForGoTTen  ‘ endur inG ’ sc i ence  and  The  amaTeurs 
I concluded one of the preceding sections with the hypothesis that the 
distinction between what I called ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘enduring’ sciences 
has escaped the attention of the Actor-Network approach and STS in 
general because they have been exploited too much by the old epistemol-
ogy and history of science. However, the recent analysis of Steven Shapin 
we cited above revealed that there were more profound reasons for it 
and that the idea of science as ‘calling’ was not just outdated, but also in 
discord with the dominant tendency of its professionalization and of its 
engagement with institutions of power and commerce.
When I came to the case of Methodius and Barbara McClintock, how-
ever, it occurred to me that it still is possible to study the type of science 
they exemplify in tune with the achievements of Actor-Network Theory. 
In search for an appropriate frame of analysis I came to the concept of 
coupling to describe the ‘melting pot’ of laboratory life and to consider 
the relationships between researchers and nonhuman agents they are 
studying as ‘heterogeneous couples ’.18 The idea of a ‘coupling’ between 
humans and nonhumans invites us to no longer stick with the activist 
schemes considering actors only through their goals, plans, interests, 
trials of strength, etc., which has been sufficiently explored by students 
of ANT. Rather, I framed the ‘heterogeneous couples’ as elementary 
micro-communities, built on the specific relationships of intercorporeality 
between human and nonhuman actors,19 where the natural or techni-
cal object appears as kind of ‘Other.’ Man in a heterogeneous couple is 
often alone, but in intercorporeality with the fellow nonhuman, with the 
obscure, enigmatic, and evasive ‘object of knowledge.’
In several previously published papers, I have developed this line of 
reasoning by exploring the phenomenon of ‘coupling’ between human 
and nonhuman agents as based on solidarity and mutuality, where rela-
tionships of intercorporeality emerge as an outcome of the long years of 
18 Cf. Ivan Tchalakov, “Building Human/Nonhuman Communities: From 
Random Couples of Lonely Researchers to a Laboratory as Stabilized Heteroge-
neous Group,” paper presented at Joint EASTT/4S Conference, Bielefeld, Ger-
many, 1996; Tchalakov, “The Object and the Other in Holographic Research.”
19 Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960); Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Visible et Nonvisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964).
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‘apprenticeship’ in the lab, of the assimilation of the materiality of scien-
tific practice and the ‘materiality’ of scientific language in the particular 
area of research.20 These relationships lead scientists to take nonhumans 
as qualified ‘others,’ and thus to manifest the peculiar ‘humanism towards 
the Other’ Emmanuel Levinas is talking about (rather a ‘humanism 
towards the non-human Other’).21 In the relationships of solidarity and 
mutuality the research methods and procedures are secondary, they are 
‘a mere tool,’ staying at the back plane of research. 
In her studies of laboratory practices, Karin Knorr-Cetina has directed 
our attention to this type of phenomena engaging with ‘unity’ and ‘sharing’ 
as well as the ‘disappearance of self-consciousness’ and ‘subjective fusion’ 
of the researcher with her ‘knowledge objects.’22 She claims that the main 
characteristic of these objects is “a lack of completeness of being that takes 
away much of the wholeness, solidity and the think-like character they 
have in our everyday conception.”23 The ‘knowledge objects’ McClintock 
or Methodius faced were of such an extreme type, which according to the 
normal science ’s view of their colleagues lacks not only ‘completeness of being,’ 
but being itself. It is important to note that Knorr-Cetina characterizes this 
everyday viewpoint with looking “at objects from the outside as one would 
look at tools or goods that are ready to hand […].”24 This is exactly my 
claim about the difference in the basic human-nonhuman relationships, 
dominating the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘enduring’ sciences.
20 Cf. Tchalakov, “The Object and the Other in Holographic Research;” 
Tchalakov, “Language and Perception in the Coupling between Human and 
Non-Human Actors,” Yearkbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, 
Technologies and Society 52 (2004): 193–215. During the interviews, Methodius 
unequivocally related his hint on the possibility of designing unknown ‘deep-
relief lenses’ with his decades-long research experience in linear and diffrac-
tion optics, and especially with his experimental researches on holographic 
computer memory project. Describing this experience, his closest friend from 
optical high technical school and then from Faculty of Physics at Sofia Uni-
versity used the following expression: “Methodius infested a lot in optics!”
21 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, transl. Nidra Poller, 
introduction by Richard A. Cohen (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1992).
22 Cf. Karin Knorr-Cetina, “Objectual Practice,” in The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory, ed. T. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and E. von Savigny 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 175–188.
23 Ibid., 181. 
24 Ibid., 181 (italics mine—I.Tch.). 
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Building on Steven Shapin’s important reminder about the close link 
between vocation (calling) and amateurism in the development of modern 
science, I would, in the following, like to further explore the idea of an 
‘enduring’ science based on solidarity, mutuality, and on relationships 
of intercorporeality.
Some recent studies of science practices have revealed that amateurs 
are not an early modern phenomenon, and that they continue to play an 
important role in a number of scientific fields. Analyzing the history of ho-
lography, Sean Johnston reveals how a different context of research, with 
specific political, cultural and emotional values, contributed to the inven-
tion of a radically different technology in the early 1970s—the low-cost 
sandbox holography, which allowed artists and science amateurs to carry 
out research in holography and produce valuable works of art.25 Another 
interesting example were research activities initiated and carried out in 
the past twelve years by the Mars Society at its Desert Research Station in 
Utah, USA. Organized entirely on a basis of volunteers and sponsored 
research, this truly amateur project has been able to produce research 
results of interest to NASA and other public research institutions.
Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe also stress the “fruitful exchanges 
between professional astronomers and amateurs” in their study of con-
temporary trends in scientific research, both accounting for their inherent 
risks and uncertainties and the increasing role of what traditionally was 
called ‘public’ or ‘amateurs’ in confining these risks and uncertainties.26 
During the 2012 STS Summer School with my students of sociology from 
Plovdiv University carried out at the Bulgarian National Astronomical 
Observatory at Rojen, Rhodope Mountains, we witnessed the collaboration 
between professional astronomers and astronomers-amateurs, some of 
whom—being wealthy entrepreneurs, IT experts, etc.—possessed sophis-
ticated astronomic equipment that their professional colleagues envied. 
In his study of the collaboration between professional research-
ers from the Luxembourg Museum of Natural History27 and science 
25 Cf. Sean F. Johnston, Holographic Visions. A History of New Science (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 4.
26 Cf. Michel Callon, Pierre Lacombe and Yannick Barthe, Acting in an 
Uncertain World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), ch. 1.
27 Meyer describes the research situation at Luxembourg Museum of 
Natural History in the following way: “[T]here are, on the one hand, staff 
members involved in scientific research. For these staff members doing 
research is a profession. On the other hand, many, so-called ‘scientific 
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amateurs, Morgan Meyer insists on the relative difference between the 
two groups, claiming that it is “a matter of power and authority, rather 
than a matter of truth.” The distinction between professional scientists 
and amateurs is negotiable and the line of demarcation between them is 
continuously re-established through what Meyer calls ‘boundary work’:
In STS it is commonplace to argue that what demarcates science from 
non-science is not some set of essential or transcendent characteris-
tics or methods but rather an array of contingent circumstances […]. 
The boundaries between amateurs and professionals are not only 
negotiated in discourse. They are also revealed through temporal, 
spatial and material processes. There are, in fact, many places where 
boundary-work takes place; boundary-work is interconnected with 
objects, tools, bodies, and specific spaces and places… When they 
do science, where they do science, how they do science and with 
what tools they do science is what differentiates collaborators from 
Museum staff members and, more generally, amateurs from profes-
sionals. Time, space and materiality come into play when identities 
are constructed, when they are compared, opposed, and entangled. 
Identities are, then, located in space, articulated in discourse, related 
to materialities, expressed as temporalities, and situated as practices. 
Defining oneself as an amateur or a professional is not merely a matter of 
individual or human attributes; it is about situating oneself in relation to 
these interconnected elements.28 
collaborators,’ work with the Museum. These scientific collaborators work 
on a voluntary basis and most of them are amateurs; for them, practicing 
science is a (serious) leisure activity. Among these scientific collaborators 
there are all sorts of people: a bank employee interested in astrophysics, a 
school teacher fascinated with beetles, a teenager interested in—and even 
publishing about—fossils, and so forth. Rather than being produced only 
by professional researchers, science in the Museum originates from a close 
cooperation between specialized people and laypersons—a model termed 
‘co-production of knowledge’ by Callon […]. At the Luxembourg Museum of 
Natural History, as I discovered, amateurs seem to be doing similar things 
to those that we expect of professional scientists: they publish articles, do 
fieldwork, give talks, present posters at conferences. As a consequence, they 
too come to belong—at least partially—to the world of the professional.” 
(Morgan Meyer, “On the Boundaries and Partial Connections Between 
Amateurs and Professionals,” Museum and Society 6/1 (2008): 38–53: 38. 
28 Ibid., 48–49.
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In a recent article on the rising amateur science movement called “do-
it-yourself biology” (DIYbio) that is spreading in the US and other de-
veloped countries, Meyer describes it as “a diverse set of places in which 
laboratories, associations, and networks around do-it-yourself biology 
have emerged. DIYbio, created in the Boston area in 2008, describes 
itself as an ‘Institution for the Amateur Biologist’. It now counts around 
2000 members and has a website (www.diybio.org) which is arguably the 
worldwide focal point for people interested in DIY biology. Associations 
like DIYbio are today present in many countries across the globe.”29 
These are just few examples of contemporary amateur science, which 
are enough to witness the lasting relationships between professional 
scientist and amateurs, although now—unlike in the 18th and 19th cen-
tury—professional scientists are at the core, while amateurs are believed 
to be at the ‘periphery’ of research. What is important, however, is the 
persistence of these relationships, which somehow preserve and transfer over 
the centuries the initial sense of doing science as ‘calling’ and deep personal 
involvement—a phenomenon we identified in the core of the ‘enduring 
type’ of science. In search of better conceptual and methodological tools 
29 Morgan Meyer, “Build Your Own Lab: Do-it-yourself Biology and the 
Rise of Citizen Biotech-economies,” Journal of Peer Production 2 (2012), 
http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-2/invited-comments/build-your-
own-lab/. Accessed July 7, 2014. Meyer recalls the famous story of the 
private laboratory created by Kay Aull, a PhD student at the University of 
California, San Francisco, that has been widely covered in the media (Le 
Monde, Sky News, Wall Street Journal, etc.) and academic journals: “For the 
price of around 1000 dollars, Aull set up a laboratory in the closet of her 
apartment in Boston. Aull built many devices for her experiments herself 
[…]. She uses a rice cooker to distil water. Instead of buying an incubator, 
she put one together out of a polystyrene packaging box, a thermostat from 
an aquarium, a fan, a heating pad, and a digital thermometer. In order to 
be able to separate DNA, she constructed an electrified box out of a picture 
frame and a plastic box lined with aluminium foil. A blue Christmas light 
serves her to produce blue light to be able to see DNA. But she also bought 
some tools from eBay: a thermo cycler and an electrophoresis supply. Using 
these rather basic tools she was even able to build a hemochromatosis test. 
Her father was in fact diagnosed with the genetic disease called hemochro-
matosis and she wanted to find out if she also carried the mutation (which 
she does). Commenting Aull’s story about this test, Wohlsen […] writes: 
‘Aull’s test does not represent new science but a new way of doing science. 
A practical piece of biotechnology based on the most sophisticated science 
available was built in a closet using tossed-off gear.’ ” Ibid., 3.
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to account for this phenomenon, I will, in the last section of the paper, 
explore some recent findings on the activity of amateurs, carried out by 
Antoine Hennion under the rubric of what he calls ‘sociology of taste’ 
and ‘sociology of attachment.’ 
anTo ine  hennion ’s  noT ion  oF  amaTeur ’s  acT ion  
and  i Ts  ‘ reFlex i v i T y ’
Affiliated with the famous Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation (CSI), 
Mines ParisTech, Hennion was hardly known as a STS scholar even 
though he had published valuable analysis of innovations.30 For many 
years, the focus of his research was music, which he considered as a 
‘rather unstable object of study,’ approaching it from the point of view of 
a ‘sociology of musical passion.’31 For more than a decade, he described 
his works as “sociology of taste” (sociologie du goût). Based on what he 
calls ‘pragmatics of taste,’32 he considers the taste (taste in music, in art, 
in wine, etc.) as a king of ‘activity’ with its particular characteristics. 
At one of our meetings with him, I pointed out that most of his find-
ings about the activity of amateurs were directly applicable to the activ-
ity of scientists in the laboratory, citing the ‘fruitful exchanges between 
professional and amateur,’33 the above mentioned analysis by Steven 
Shapin and other recent studies. I was surprised by his response that 
‘[…] the topic of amateurs in science is an old one and enough explored. 
[…] [These studies] deal with the opposition between amateur and profes-
sional and the consequent problems of norms, institutions, carrier, money, 
etc., as opposed to the libido of knowing, to the freedom or ingenuity of 
amateurs. It is often quite bland.”34
30 Cf. Antoine Hennion, “L’innovation comme écriture de l’entreprise,” in 
Encyclopédie de l’innovation, ed. Philippe Mustar and Hervé Penan (London: 
Economica, 2003), 131–152.
31 Cf. Antoine Hennion, La Passion musicale. Une sociologie de la mediation 
(Paris: Métailié, 1993).
32 Cf. Antoine Hennion, “Pragmatics of Taste,” in The Blackwell Companion 
to the Sociology of Culture, ed. Mark D. Jacobs and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan 
(Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2005), 131–144.
33 Cf. Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, Acting in an Uncertain World, 61–67.
34 “[C]’est un vieux thème, les scientifiques amateurs, souvent étudié, c’est 
assez différent de ce qu’on cherche quand on se penche sur l’activité (y compris 
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What I meant, however, was precisely ‘la libido de savoir, […] la liberté ou 
[…] l’ingénuité’ in the field of science, as well the peculiar inter-corporeal 
relationships between the amateur (i.e. the scientist!) and object of his 
passion (i.e. his ‘knowledge-objects’!). I am still convinced that Hennion’s 
findings, seemingly ‘disentangled’ from STS, are of key importance for 
the research on scientific and engineering practice if we want to better 
understand the process of ‘coupling’ between humans and (untamed, 
wild) objects of research, where the relationships of inter-corporeality, 
mutuality and solidarity are an inextricable part of the process. 
Antoine Hennion’s ‘sociology of taste’ pushes forward the critique of 
the traditional sociological notion of human activity—a process the Actor-
Network Theory began more than twenty years ago, but discontinued 
midway through. It is highly significant that the ‘pragmatic phenomenol-
ogy of taste ’ as the methodological framework for his analyses (which 
could perfectly also be named ‘pragmatics in inter-corporeality’) is an 
interesting synthesis between American philosophical pragmatism and 
the non-orthodox phenomenology of the late Merleau-Ponty. I told him 
in our conversation that, had I known his text ten years earlier, I could 
have described the ‘heterogeneous couples’ in research labs I studied in 
a rather different manner—at least I would have paid more attention to 
the problem of reflexivity in (innovative) human action he elaborated with 
remarkable ingenuity. 
hennion ’s  meThodoloG ical  pr inc iples 
Hennion develops an original approach to a specific type of human ac-
tivities, those of amateurs of given art (music), sports (rock-climbing), or 
products (wine, artworks, etc.). He prefers the term ‘amateur’ because of 
its wider meaning compared to other related terms such as ‘fan’ or ‘en-
thusiast,’ while at the same time finding it less pretentious than the term 
‘connoisseur’ (as used, for example, by Karl Mannheim).35 He defines the 
la leur, pour le coup). Là, le thème central est plutôt l’opposition amateur/
professionnel, avec ces problèmes de normes, d’institutions, de carrière, 
d’argent, par opposition à la libido de savoir, à la liberté ou à l’ingénuité 
de l’amateur, c’est assez fade, souvent.” (Personal communication with 
Hennion, February 2010).
35 Cf. Karl Mannheim, Structures of Thinking (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1982), 215–216.
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activity of amateurs as a “systematic activity, which makes them develop, 
in various degrees, their sensitivities or abilities in a given domain.”36 
Approaching the amateurs’ activity through the ‘lense’ of his prag-
matic phenomenology of taste, he is able to unfold the ‘stacked layers’ of 
some minute gestures of human actors, thus surfacing their attachments 
to other people, to instruments and objects, and—maybe most important 
of all—to the materiality of language (speech, the language of music, the 
‘language’ of the human body). Here is a typical excerpt from one of his 
papers:
The pragmatics of taste I am trying to develop has meaning only if it 
succeeds to tell us something about objects […]. Considered experts in 
the art of allowing themselves to grasp the differences in the world, 
the amateurs show us that the objects are not “already there,” with 
their natural properties, waiting to be taken by a relevant practice, 
cultural or social. This is not a matter of values; it’s a matter of existence, 
of presence in the world. The curious practices of amateurs are not 
simply an acquisition [apprentissage] of the given properties of the 
objects of their passion, nor a kind of folklore needed to warm up by 
way of a collective of objects that are a priori cold, neutral, and con-
tingent. The objects of our passion have to be made to emerge, with their 
differences, and we have to develop a susceptibility for these differences.37
36 Antoine Hennion, “Those Things That Hold Us Together: Taste and 
Sociology,” Cultural Sociology 1 (2007): 97–114: 112.
37 Antoine Hennion, “Affaires de gout. Se render sensible aux choses,” in 
Sensibiliser. La sociologie dans le vif du monde, ed. Michel Peroni and Jacques 
Roux (La Tour d’Aigues: Éditions de L’Aube, 2007), 35–36. “La pragma-
tigue du goût que j’ai essayé de developer n’a de sens que si elle edit aussi 
quelque chose sur les objets […]. Ce que montrent les amateurs, si on sait 
les voir comme des experts dans l’art de faire venir à eux les differences 
du monde, c’est bien que les objets ne sont pas ‘déja là’, minus de leurs 
proprieties naturelles, en attente d’être saisis par une pratique relevant, elle, 
de la culture ou du social. Ce n’est pas une affaire de valeurs, c’est une affaire 
d’existence, de presence au monde. Les curieuses pratiques des amateurs ne 
sont ni un simple apprentissage des proprieties données de leur objet de 
passion, ni un folklore nécessaire pour réchauffer par le collectif des objets 
a priori froids, neutres, arbitraries. Il faut les faire surgir, ces objets de notre 
plaisir, avec leur differences, et nous render sensibles à ces differences.” Ibid., 
35–36; italics mine—I.Tch.
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I claim that there is a direct link between my analyses of scientific practice 
as presented in the publications cited above, and Hennion’s analyses of 
the ‘emerging (arising) objects’ of amateurs’ passion, of amateurs’ bodies 
and reflexivity, and of the collective nature of their taste. In the remainder 
of the paper I will try to outline these findings in more detail, relying 
most of all on his paper on ‘sociology of taste and the attachment,’ pub-
lished in English in 2007, and his paper on the reflexivity of the amateur, 
published in French in 2009. It is worth combining these two papers, as 
they reveal his efforts to cope with the ‘resistance’ of subject-matter and 
his experimenting with different, if related, conceptual apparatuses. My 
aim here is to selectively arrange these findings, stressing their relevance 
for the study of the practices in the ‘enduring science’ outlined above 
—especially to the problem of resistance and endurance of scientists to 
the pressures from the scientific community, and to the relationships of 
solidarity, mutuality, and intercorporeality with their ‘knowledge-objects.’ 
The  TasTe  oF  amaTeurs  and  The  pass ion  oF  sc ienT isTs 
Hennion defines taste as a ‘natural attraction’ amateurs experience to the 
object of their passion. The French use of the term stresses its pragmatic 
aspects, as revealed by phrases like ‘cultivation of taste’ or ‘development of 
an affinity’ to the objects of taste (works of art, wine, etc.). Such expres-
sions indicate the presence of a long tradition in which taste is not taken 
for granted but considered something to be produced and developed. 
This tradition makes it easier to apply the notion of taste to the field of 
science, where we could similarly analyze the ‘passion to knowledge’ by 
its practitioners, whether professionals or amateurs.38 
Developing his notion of taste, Hennion distances himself from the 
critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and his followers which also paid 
special attention to taste in their research and where the relationships 
of amateurs to the objects of their passion was considered as ‘socially 
constructed via the categories of description and frames of appreciation 
used, institutions, authority of the leaders, imitation of the others, or 
“through the social game of identity making and differentiation.” Instead 
38 Hennion himself points to the ‘wider sense’ of the notion of amateur he 
uses, which covers a number different practices and activities, and distances 
himself from the “negative English sense of amateur as ‘non-professional’ ” 
(Hennion, “Those Things That Hold Us Together,” 112).
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of transforming ‘preferences into signs,’ however, he elaborates a frame 
of analysis that respects the ‘amateurs’ own understanding of their tastes 
as well as that of ‘the practices they undertake to reveal these tastes to 
themselves’: the elaboration of procedures that detect the taste of things 
and that ‘put amateurs’ taste to the test’; their relying on the properties 
of objects that have yet to be deployed, the training of their own abili-
ties and sensibilities to perceive the objects’ properties, the support of 
a collective of amateurs and of the appropriate devices and techniques 
for feeling the things in a particular situation. Critical sociology, insists 
Hennion, neglects these practices or denounces them as ‘rituals’ whose 
principle function is less to make amateurs ‘feel,’ than to make them 
‘believe.’ Gestures are said to produce the collective belief that what is 
preferable lies within things, while the sociologist knows full well, since 
Durkheim and Bourdieu, that preferences are but a collective production 
of this very belief.”39
According to Hennion, the widespread popularity and persistence of 
critical sociology’s views on taste are partly due to the modalities of the 
very practices of amateurs, which frame the ways amateurs experience 
the objects of their passion—unlike the situations in which we face an 
unknown object (a default situation in ‘enduring science’ research!); in 
the ‘normal times’ of everyday life there is a remarkable correspondence 
between us and our own senses, where we are generally able to account 
for what we are experiencing and feel, that is to articulate and describe it. 
Although this ‘clear and defined taste’ is precisely what Pierre Bourdieu 
deals with in his analysis of musical taste,40 it is NOT the subject of 
Hennion’s analysis. Rather, he is fascinated by the “[…] act of tasting, the 
gestures that make it possible, the skills that are related to it, the support an 
amateur is looking for in others or in handbooks and other texts written for 
beginners, as well as those minor tuning to the responses of objects to those who 
are genuinely interested in them, and the efforts to explain to yourself what is 
happening [italics mine—I.Tch.].”41
After many years of studying amateurs, Hennion said he realized that, 
for them, ‘the things have no taste in itself.’ Instead, they ‘leave themselves 
to the taste of things’ constantly developing procedures to challenge it, 
39 Ibid., 97–98.
40 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: 
Minuit, 1979).
41 Antoine Hennion, “Réflexivités. L’activité de l’amateur,” Réseaux 153 
(2009): 55–78: 58–59.
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to ‘put the taste to the test.’ Testing their tastes, he claims, the amateurs 
rely both on the things themselves and their properties, and on the sensibility 
and capabilities a man had to develop in order to notice these properties. The 
things are not given to the amateurs, they are to be deployed and only then 
to be noticed. This is not at all a process of making someone believe 
in ‘collective representations,’ nor can it be reduced to physiological or 
psychological determinants on the side of the objects themselves (for 
example the aromatic hydrocarbons in wine).
The situation thus described is very similar to that of Methodius, 
Barbara McClintock and other ‘enduring science’ researchers: when facing 
their enigmatic, under-defined and slipping ‘knowledge objects’ they also 
have found that the theories, instruments and experiments they have employed 
until now are of no use anymore and have to be re-written, readjusted and even 
invented anew. And in doing this they have to endure the critique and 
sometimes even hostility of their colleagues. We still lack an elaborated 
conceptual apparatus to describe this process, and here Hennion’s find-
ings indeed open a promising direction to follow.
The main challenge in the elaboration of such a conceptual frame, 
sensitive to the practices of ‘ordinary’ amateurs and ‘enduring science’ 
researchers is to brings back to their own hand the determinism in the 
name of which the experts—biologists, chemists, physiologists, psycholo-
gists, sociologists, etc.—are pretending to speak. To succeed, Hennion 
claims, we need to focus our attention to some lesser known and still 
neglected issues such as the bodies of amateurs, the ‘circumstances ’ of their 
activity, and the specific ‘reflexive work on their own attachment.’ None 
of this can be explained by hidden social, psychological, etc. causes. It 
can, however, be considered “a collective technique, whose analysis helps us 
to understand the ways we make ourselves sensitized, to things, to ourselves, to 
situations and to moments, while simultaneously controlling how those feelings 
might be shared and discussed with others.”42 
co-producT ion  oF  The  body  (oF  The  amaTeur)  
and  The  objecTs  oF  h is  pass ion
Who is the ‘subject’ and who is the ‘object’ of the taste?—Here is an 
example of Hennion’s own experience as a cliff (rock) climber:
42 Hennion “Those Things That Hold Us Together,” 98.
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What could be simpler? Below, there are climbers who want to reach a 
certain height. In front of them there is a rock, hard, inert, and quietly 
installed in the expansive timeline of geology. Between the two, the 
necessary tools are present—a guide of the approximate itinerary, the 
nails and rope for security, the super-adherent rubber boots. Does 
not all this seem to fit the good old theory of action? Here, we find 
human beings endowed with clear intentions, codified competencies, 
and technical means, attempting to attain an objective by putting into 
motion plans, plans which they are able to correct as they encounter 
the incidents that the route will lay before them, by and by.
And yet, does this description give a relevant account of what is occur-
ring? What kind of action is it, what subjects bring it into being, and 
with what results? The goal most certainly is not to reach the top, for 
having barely attained it, the climber re-descends […]. Are they fol-
lowing a plan? Nothing happens as they would want it to. Progress is 
defined by the gestures that enact it. One might say that the object of 
the climb is really in the achievement of the route. But even in this, the 
attempts they make fail, and there lies all the pleasure. A route made 
is a route already forgotten, to the benefit of the next one, different, 
more difficult, the route which another climber just attempted in vain. 
A curious action, in which defeat is more interesting than success […].43
He insists that in order to understand what is going on here, we have to 
reverse the classical sociological theory of action and instead of a focus 
on the subject and its goals and plans, to focus on the instrumental aspects 
of action, to the“gestures, holds, movements, passages—all the words, 
between the two, that attach one to the other, the climber to the rock, that 
speak their uncertain contact, and that have no meaning if we attribute 
them to only one or to the other.”44 Climbing cannot be defined without 
all these words, pointing to the ‘contact between the hand that grasps 
and the fold in the rock face,’ and to the “indistinct composition of both 
the miniscule rugged edges of the rock, which design the movement’s 
possibility and the immediate capacity of the climber’s body.” Hence we 
cannot put the route and the climber, each with its own properties, at the 
beginning of the analysis—just the opposite, they are ‘mutually defined 
in the course of climbing itself.’
43 Ibid., 98–99.
44 Ibid.
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The traditional sociological vocabulary of human action makes impos-
sible the grasping those primary characteristics of climbing (‘the double 
erasure of the climber and the rock’ and the ‘transition that defines one 
by the other’), which holds its essence and its beauty:
How will I get by, what is going to happen, what will I feel, how is 
my body going to react? There is nothing passive about this erasure 
[…]. In no way does it signal a reduction to the here and now of the 
situation, to an interaction without ties and without a past. Quite the 
contrary: preparation, obstinacy, and training are needed to condition 
oneself and to allow one’s body to guess at a movement, to slide itself 
into its accomplishment, and to surmount in a supple fashion thus, 
what at first seemed to require a brutal effort.45
Cliff climbing in the analysis of Hennion emerges as a ‘reservoir of dif-
ferences, which only the climb reveals and makes emerge’. It can neither 
be reduced to its physical properties (a geological mass), nor to some 
‘socially constructed’ object of passion. The rock and the climbing are 
mutually co-defined in an evolving process, yet the differences are ‘in 
the rock, and not in the ‘gaze’ brought to it’: “The ‘object’ is not an im-
mobile mass against which our goals are thrown. It is in itself a deployment, 
a response, an infinite reservoir of differences that can be apprehended and 
brought into being.”46
Compare this to the following excerpt from the protocols of my ob-
servations of the practices in the holographic laboratory, when Margarita, 
one of the researchers in the lab, was describing her experiments with 
so-called ‘photo-refractive crystals’: 
A few years ago, I took a crystal from my colleagues at the Solid 
State Physics Institute and decided first to look at its parameters—I 
recorded a hologram and measured its diffraction efficiency, spatial 
frequencies, etc. These were standard, tiresome procedures, which 
we had performed thousands of times. Nevertheless we made the 
measurements because we had to and because we considered it necessary 
to know these parameters. Then I noticed that alloying the crystal 
with certain microelements allowed the phase grating [the simplest 
45 Ibid, 100.
46 Ibid., 101.
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possible hologram—I.Tch.] to be recorded with very high diffrac-
tion efficiency. It results from the interference between two laser 
beams—those we apply to the crystal and its reflection from the back 
surface of the crystal. This phase grating causes heavy losses in the 
light passing through the crystal […]. Eventually we found out that it 
also shifts the vector of polarization of the light, which caused quite 
interesting effects. It was a most peculiar case—we had expected one 
thing, while we arrived at something quite different!
A colleague of mine studied photo-chromatic effects measuring the 
ability of the crystal to propagate polarized light beams. However, 
when he illuminated the crystals with these beams, which normally 
should not pass through them, he registered light behind the crystal! 
He believed the cause was the photo-chromatic effects in the crystal—but 
this was NOT the case, because of the phase grating we discovered 
[…]. Eventually we modeled all this on the computer and solved the 
problem mathematically.
[…] One must know the material very well. One should measure 
almost everything possible in order to be able to determine the re-
lationships […]. In our field, a newcomer [a young scientist] needs an 
“introductory period” before he enters the real research work. [He needs] 
to touch the crystals, to see what will happen under various conditions, 
to record, to delete, to illuminate, to apply a magnetic field, to read what 
has been recorded—to analyze the crystallographic orientations, to 
calculate a little and hence to try seeing the vectors […]. So he/she 
needs to know all these things in advance, in order to interpret the 
phenomena correctly.47
Can we say that scientists also develop a ‘taste’ in the objects they 
study?—Considering the abundance of infinitive verb forms Margarita 
uses to describe a newcomer gaining experience in her research field, 
it is not difficult—following Hennion—to imagine her developing her 
‘taste’ by ‘dancing’ around optical tables, her careful gestures when put-
ting together the experimental setup, then focusing the laser beams, her 
eager gaze at the screens and displays of the devices; then the careful 
checking of the data at her office, on the desk and on the computer, the 
numerous calculations and the endless comparisons between various 
47 Interview held in 1994.
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samples; followed by her coming back to the laser and the experimental 
setup, the careful modifying of the setup, then new experiments… This is 
a living body which, similarly to the cliff climber, vibrates and pulsates, 
which at some points extends like an octopus covering with its breathless 
‘kinesthesia’ the nearby objects and then suddenly going still, thoughtful 
and silent.
What, then, is the taste, the ‘natural affinity’ between amateurs and 
the object of their passion?—Just like in the climbing, it is not an attri-
bute that is ascribed to the objects, to the personality of the amateurs or 
to both. The taste and its object are not given in advance; they emerge 
simultaneously in the repeating, progressively adjusted trials: “the meticu-
lous activity of amateurs is a machinery to bring forth through contact 
and feel differences infinitely multiplying [them] ‘within’ the objects 
tasted and ‘within’ the taster’s sensitivity.”48 So it is not the amateur who 
‘has’ a taste—rather, the taste ‘has’ both the amateur and the object of 
his passion. And yet the taste is not a mysterious accomplishment, but 
rests on what every amateur knows quite well: procedures, methods, and 
circumstances; it requires time, it needs the uncertain support in others’ 
opinions, sharing of impressions, etc. 
Tracing the co-production of the amateurs and the objects of their 
passion, Hennion offers a profound critique of reductionism (both re-
ductionism of physics and that of sociology) and its inability to grasp the 
process of becoming, thus ending with ‘the objects and their effects’ and ‘the 
social construction of taste.’ His pragmatic solution is quite different: the 
things do have effects, but only when we allow them a chance to reveal 
it! His examples: the gesture of a tennis player who is ‘free’ and ‘natural,’ 
depending on the efforts and time invested in training; the opera singer 
who reveals his originality to the extent that he masters a new technique, 
helping him overcome endless blockings and find out his own, ‘natural’ 
voice; or the the cliff climber’s route with his sequence of seemingly 
meaningless movements and grips, considered as imposed only by the 
rock itself or as a ‘trace’ left by the climber. In all these cases we have 
not a replacement, but rather an ‘addition’ of what is ‘natural’ and what 
is ‘socially constructed.’ This is not ‘the taste one has,’ but an emerging 
taste, taste as ‘de-gust-ation’: ‘an open-ended test of tasting, where one 
leaves himself to the things in order to find out ‘their taste.’ 
48 Hennion, “Those Things That Hold Us Together,” 101.
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The  TasTe  as  acT i v i T y  and  reFlex i v i T y  as  i Ts  Key  aT Tr ibuTe
As dinner advances, each person is more giddy, they talk, they inter-
rupt one another. A guest serves wine to his neighbor, who takes 
his glass, drinks and sets it back down, all the while continuing the 
conversation. He eats, looks over, and speaks to another neighbor.
Cut to a second scene. It is the same, the same guests, the same 
ambience, the same gestures. The man takes his glass, he begins to 
drink. At this point, he stops an instant, takes two small sniffs, drinks 
again, makes a “moment” with his lips while replacing his glass and 
before taking up and continuing where he was in the broken thread 
of conversation.49
This simple example introduces the issue of reflexivity as a key element 
of taste. The minor difference between the two scenes—the slight shift of 
attention and brief focus on the wine—reveals the reflexivity in the core 
of taste as an event, without any explicit gesture or announcement on the 
side of the amateur, for example to publicly declare how unique the wine 
is and to congratulate the host. This inherent reflexivity of the amateur’s 
action neither requires an assumption about his ‘clear awareness’ during 
the tasting, nor that he give himself an account of the interruption of 
the course of the dinner and his taking a different stand to the wine, nor 
him consciously inspecting his own senses during the degustation.50 ‘We 
do not cease to perform these little controls,’ adds Hennion, since this is 
‘the normal state of spontaneous management of multiple relationships 
to our body, to others, to things, to events.’
49 Ibid, 104.
50 Adopting the ‘reflexive stand’ that is predominant in social sciences 
here means to apply “a very heavy descriptive apparatus, weighing down 
the instance with too burdensome a charge, the drinker with too precise 
an intention, the course of the action with a rupture that nobody felt. It is 
an ordinary displacement, like those through which we ceaselessly oper-
ate in all situations without awareness. No need to isolate two courses of 
contrasting action as though in reality we were not permanently gripped 
in a whole tissue of states, of modes of being present to ourselves, to the 
situation, to others and to objects, that interlace, superimpose, that encase 
themselves like parentheses” (ibid., 104–105).
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Similarly to the analysis of knowledge, when analyzing taste, sociologists 
are inclined to take for granted the conscious control, the ‘clear awareness’ 
of a situation. Hennion claims such control exists in rare situations only, 
in which we are indeed able to identify such conscious efforts and focus 
on a determinate object which ‘presumes intention and will, a temporal 
and material framework, training, time, and favorable conditions.’ How-
ever, the barely noticeable gesture of the guest in the second scene above 
does not need such frame—he just ‘opens one of these multiply enfolded 
parentheses without disturbing the course of affairs any further.’ 
In his 2009 article, especially devoted to the problem of reflexivity, 
Hennion provides a penetrating analysis of the seemingly minor details 
of the guest’s behavior in the second scene in order to reintroduce the 
distinction between the amateur and the layman. Barely noticed, these 
gestures signal a different attitude—not just having a sip of wine, but 
degustation, an attention that makes the presence of the tasted object 
stronger, the attention and the presence of the object reinforcing each 
other without a primary cause. Yet the guest does not simply have a drink, 
he drinks wine—there is no taste, insists the author, 
without this minimal ordering of experience that makes the experi-
ence appear, this light shifting of self that opens a parenthesis in the 
course of what is happening, modifies it, orients it, makes it enter 
into a frame, even if all these small events are adumbrated, occur-
ring without effort or calculation. I drink and “I drink,” I feel effects 
and I stop and reflect for an instant on what “it” does to me. There 
is also no taste in the other direction without this intensification of 
the object, which itself responds or provokes.51
Instead of a rock-solid and inert object, when testing his taste, the ama-
teur faces an object that ‘rises its presence,’ that ‘shifts, advances a notch, 
to deploy itself and deliver its richness.’ The analysis of taste has to focus 
on these ‘minute displacements’ that indicate the establishment of a 
‘more marked contact.’ Citing Merleau-Ponty, Hennion points out that 
this ‘marked contact’ provokes both my shifting towards the object and 
the shifting of the object out of itself: “what the minimal word ‘attention’ 
expresses so lightly and so well—in a single movement, like the taster’s 
gesture—these two displacements which make contact, grant attention 
51 Ibid., 105.
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to, capture the attention of …”52 Yet these minute displacements and their 
‘minimal ordering’ are complex enough: on the part of the taster we have 
his reflexivity 53, while on the part of the objects, their capacity to interrupt, 
to surprise or to respond.54 Curiously enough, Hennion calls this right 
of objects to advance ‘their reflexivity, their power to make themselves 
more present.’ Thus, the notion of reflexivity ceases to describe a property of 
the subject and acquires a ‘symmetrical,’ or rather an ‘ontological’ dimension.
One of the key findings of Hennion’s analysis of reflexivity in taste—
and the peculiar form of ‘attention’ related to it—was the specific passivity 
of amateurs in which they leave themselves to be ‘affected’ by the object, 
“offer themselves to beautiful things.”55 
The  pr imary  Form oF  reFlex i v i T y  ThaT  lanGuaGe  preser ved
In the social sciences, reflexivity is considered as a key characteristic 
of the subject and has, especially over the last decades, been one of the 
most studied topics. Providing a brief summary of these studies, Hennion 
outlines three prevailing meanings of the term: the first, used mostly 
in political science and anthropology, refers to the subject’s capacity of 
constant self-evaluation, to assess the attitudes of the others or to project 
his own characteristics onto them; the second major meaning concerns 
the ability of the studied subjects to react to the observers and to modify 
their behavior over the course of the study, including integrating the re-
sults of research into their own activity; and the third meaning, developed 
especially in the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, is the awareness 
that researchers should be ‘reflexive,’ i.e. they should apply the results of 
52 Ibid.
53 “‘Hey, this wine’s not too bad …’—to whom other than oneself as the 
yet undefined subject of experience is this curious interjection addressed, 
this ‘hey’ which invites the required attention?” (ibid., 105).
54 “Objects […] deliver themselves, un-probe themselves, [shy away], 
impose themselves on us. Language is, thankfully, less exacting than the 
philosophies of the subject and of intentionality. Language unscrupu-
lously authorizes objects this use of the reflexive (we say that one must 
let the wine ‘express itself ’), that amateurs know so well: beautiful things 
offer themselves only to those who offer themselves to beautiful things” 
(ibid.). 
55 Ibid.
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their research to themselves as well.56 His conclusion is that these mean-
ings of reflexivity are in tune with the classical reasoning in sociology 
and consider it most of all in an epistemological frame, as a problem of 
our knowledge of the world, and not as a phenomenon (or an event) in 
the world itself.
Distancing himself from this tradition, Hennion discovers an ancient 
form of reflexivity in the taste that points to the “[…] originary state where 
things, persons, and events have just arrived, with no action, subject or 
objects yet decided.” He found this primary meaning in the reflexive verbal 
forms often used by amateurs themselves (for example when saying that 
‘one has to leave a wine to pronounce itself ’) but which have been lost in 
most of modern languages:
This is what was expressed by the “middle” Greek form… The middle 
form is not a secondary form which would be neither active nor 
passive, but it is primary and foundational, that from which beings 
and events arrive. The middle form precedes these all too voluntary 
regimes, for which it is the matrix: it arrives to itself as it arrives; it 
passes itself as it is passed […]. Becoming, knowing, arriving, exist-
ing, desiring […]. most of these verbs which the Greek employed in 
the middle form designate something that emerges forth, which we 
would be hard pressed to distinguish as active or passive […]. This 
middle form […] has been chased out by this very division in most 
modern languages, and they have to invent various grammatical ways 
of restoring it, when needed. In English, it is by the invading use of 
the gerundive (becoming, etc.). It is not by chance that the reflexive 
form took it over in French, with great inventiveness, giving birth to 
many untranslatable formulas, like “cela se passe,” “cela ne s’invente 
pas,” “l’affaire se présente mal,” etc.57
The sociology of taste as developed by Hennion welcomes this reflexive 
form of language since it reveals the key aspect of the attachment be-
tween amateurs and objects of their passion (“en effet, une musique, cela 
s’écoute; un vin, cela se boit”), pointing out to the primary state where 
no action, subjects and objects are yet decided. Its use reveals the taste as 
‘de-gustation,’ the initial heterogeneity of the event—the listening to the 
56 Cf. Hennion, “Réflexivités. L’acitivité de l’amateur,” 64–65.
57 Hennion, “Those Things that Hold Us Together,” 106.
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music, wine-tasting, rock-climbing, etc., where one cannot distinguish 
a priori the music and its fan, the wine and the wine-lover, the rock and 
the climber. Here we deal with bodies, devices, states, duration. “After all, 
outside of laboratories and schools, what else is music?,” Hennion asks. 
Most of the analyses of reflexivity in social sciences in fact simplify 
the problem, reducing it to the endless self-inspection of the subjects, 
coupled with the corresponding inspection of the objects. However, no 
activity could be defined beyond its own accomplishment and achieve-
ment, beyond its inner frames, points of support, etc., which make pos-
sible the single gesture out of which a subject of action and its object 
emerge. Hennion reminds us that ethnomethodology is still one of the 
few exceptions in the social sciences sensitive enough to this problem of 
action, as expressed in its formula that “‘activities provide their own ac-
countability,’ their own aptitude to present themselves, they give a grasp 
on their own reporting.”58
The  collecT i ve  naTure  oF  TasTe ;  acT i v i T y  and  pass iv i T y 
Hennion’s analysis of the reflexivity reveals in taste ‘an attention to, a 
suspension of, a stopping at what is happening—and symmetrically, a 
stronger presence of the object being tasted [that] also advances, takes its 
time, unfurls and exhibits itself.’ His example of two short scenes from a 
dinner marks the thin difference between the casual link of a layman in 
the first case and the amateur’s attachment in the second.
His next step is to relate the reflexivity thus understood “to a double 
historicity, both personal and collective, and more generally to a space of its 
own, in which the activity was able to give itself locations, moments, and 
the means of constituting itself as such.”59 The taste itself is also reflexive, 
it is a ‘framed activity’ that points to its past: “One does not appreciate 
wine or music as though one has tripped over a rock. One likes wine AND 
one ‘likes wine’ (or this or that wine), in quotes: one drifts lightly away 
from oneself to ‘enter’ into this activity, which has a past and a space.”60
The collectivity of the taste as activity ‘is demarcated by its objects, its 
other participants, its ways of doing, its locations, its movements, its instruc-
tions.’ They constrain the novice in his way to becoming an amateur, but 
58 Ibid., 108.
59 Ibid., 108.
60 Ibid.
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precisely with their help he produces his taste; they steer his attention, 
guide his training and gestures and ‘make people, little by little, become 
amateurs.’ Eventually they become sensitive to the wine, to the challenges 
of the cliff or the specific kind of music. Then the amateurs can talk about 
these things as objects of their passion, but—insists Hennion—it cannot 
be reduced to the talking itself. 
This ‘emerging nature,’ this ‘becoming’ of the taste makes so difficult 
the ‘external’ description of the specific knowledge and know-how of the 
amateurs. There exist inherent limitations in an observer-sociologist’s 
understanding of the taste of amateurs. It is rather difficult for him to 
make sense of the way the amateurs perceive a work of art or of the way 
astronomer-amateurs look at the stars—precisely because the objects of 
their passion are not ‘given,’ they are the outcome of the ‘performance’ 
of the listeners, wine-lovers, star-gazers, etc. These performances rely 
on previously acquired techniques, training of your own body, repeating 
(often unsuccessful) experiments. This takes time, it evolves over time 
and the success takes place in the course of these events. 
We can easily identify the collective nature of taste thus defined in 
the large excerpt from the interview with Margarita, the scientist from the 
holographic laboratory we cited above—here, too, one senses the hidden 
presence of the community of fellow researchers in the field, both in the 
establishment of the set of commonly selected, commonly tested and com-
monly evolving ways of ‘tasting’ their research objects, and as adherence 
to the common language and ways of communicating the results of the 
‘testing of [researchers’] taste.’ 
Like amateurs, scientists too are ‘the primary sociologists of taste’ 
and, as STS practitioners know quite well already, our only chance as 
researchers is to follow them:
With taste and pleasure, the effects are not exogenous variables, or 
automatic attributes of objects. They are the results of a corporeal 
practice, collective and instrumented, settled by methods that are 
discussed endlessly, oriented around the appropriate seizing upon 
of uncertain effects.61
‘Attachment’ is the right term to use, since it ‘splits the opposition be-
tween a series of causes that would come from without, and the elusive 
61 Ibid., 106.
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and inexpressible instantaneousness of a present that cannot be reduced 
to analysis.’ It stresses the ‘activities’ and ‘states’ on the side of amateurs, 
while on the side of the objects ‘it leaves open their right to respond, their 
capacity to co-produce ‘what is happening’ and that which will emerge 
from contact.62 Far from being agents manipulated by forces of which they 
are unaware, Hennion says, the amateurs are ‘masters of esthetic, social, 
technical, bodily and mental experimenting.’ 
The reflexive, yet collective and instrumental nature of taste also 
directs our attention to the ‘thousands of devices’ invented by amateurs. 
Hennion’s ‘pragmatics of taste’ discovers a fascinating world
[…] full of objects and tools, devices, frames, confrontations and ref-
erences, of all kinds of supports, collectives and material equipment. 
They permit taste to deploy itself beyond the here and now of the 
interaction. These are at once instruments and the traces, ceaselessly 
mobilized, of the presence of others. There are other options for de-
ciding one’s taste than either determinism or spontaneity […] far from 
fleeing determinisms, the taster is replete with them: his problem is 
not to escape determinisms, but to refine their quality. Determination 
is a synonym of attachment—it is what links us, constrains us, holds 
us, and what we love, what binds us, that of which we are a part.63
One could claim that ‘objects and tools, devices, frames, confrontations 
and references’ in laboratories are much more complex and elaborated 
compared to those in the communities of amateurs and indeed a lot of 
work needs to be done to correctly apply Hennion’s analysis of taste to 
research practices. Yet it should be valid in principle, especially if we 
take into account the practice of science amateurs described above by 
Morgan Meyer. 
By exploring the collective aspect of taste, Hennion is able to grasp 
the transition from a local, ‘minute’ point of its emergence and becoming 
62 Cf. ibid.; Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion, “A Sociology of Attach-
ment: Music Lovers, Drug Addicts,” in Actor Network Theory and After, ed. 
John Law and John Hassar (Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1999), Bruno Latour, “Factures/fractures. De la notion de réseau à celle 
d’attachement,” in Ce qui nous relie, ed. André Micoud and Michel Peroni 
(La Tour d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube, 2000), 189–208.
63 Hennion, “Those Things that Hold Us Together,” 109.
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as well as from the reflexivity in its primary sense to the wider (and in 
this sense ‘global’) level of reflexivity, operating in any given field of taste 
or among amateurs as a group: in musical passion, among wine-lovers, 
cliff climbers, and—for sure!—among the amateurs in science. When a 
certain type of amateurship grows, this leads to a differentiation inside the 
community of amateurs—wherein different kinds of authorities appear 
and gain prestige—critiques, guides, receipts, prescriptions and norms. 
This process includes debates about what can be done and what can-
not, with different types of ‘self-describing discourses’ emerging.64 Taste 
emerges when it is pronounced, and it is pronounced in the process of its 
becoming; and since this is a historical process, the primary local reflex-
ivity gradually adopts the classical form of description and of discourse:
In each field, the amateurs develop a specific vocabulary, more or less 
developed, which takes place between a psychological and technical 
description of objects on the one hand and poetic descriptions of 
the amateurs’ emotions. The taste is supported by these expressive 
descriptions (as, for example, in wine-tasting, one speaks about red 
fruits, roots, mushrooms and truffles, tongue, nuance, etc.) that are 
neither purely technical nor simply a product of imagination—they 
make the taste instrumental and shared with the others. The cri-
tiques elaborate this intermediary language that often upsets both 
amateurs and professional experts, but which also has its own merits 
that neither purely subjective comments, nor technical analysis of 
the experts can achieve—it allows to express “what happens,” and 
not just to point out the result of it or express the “free float” of our 
imagination.65
Once this process advances enough and stabilizes, we enter a state where 
the traditional sociological study of taste is at home and can easily re-
duce it to its double language of ‘objects with their properties’ and the 
‘socially produced preferences and meanings.’ But we already know that 
this would simply be an ‘external’ description that misses the essence of 
the amateurs’ engagement with the objects of their passion.
64 Cf. Marilyn Strathern, “What is Intellectual Property After?,” in Actor 
Network Theory and After, ed. John Law and John Hassard (Oxford/Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 156–180.
65 Hennion, “Réflexivités. L’acitivité de l’amateur,” 68.
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conclus ion
Hennion ends his analysis of taste with a discussion of the strange 
intertwining between activity and passivity in the amateur’s action. As 
noted, taste is a matter of sensing, of being taken, of feeling. Instead of 
being something passive, however, the taste “passes through an intense 
mobilization of one’s abilities, it is backed up by skills and traditions, objects 
and tools. It has a history, it defines a collectivity.” It is not just an act of 
sensing, he says, but of “making aware of ” and thus active. Yet at the 
same time, 
contrary to an action, [taste] is entirely turned toward availability 
to what comes […]. [It is] an active way of putting oneself in such 
a state that something may happen to oneself […]. [I]t is a passivity 
actively sought […] letting oneself be carried away, overflowing with 
the surprises that arise through contact with things.66
Transferring Antoine Hennion’s results from his ‘sociology of taste’ to 
a ‘sociology of scientific practices,’ that is from studying amateurs to 
studying scientists, will not be a simple endeavor and in fact is a research 
project of its own. My task in this paper was to present those of his find-
ings I consider especially valuable and to provide a research context—that 
of the ‘enduring science’—to which they seem relevant.
So instead of a concluding summary, I end my paper with a bit of 
empirical evidence, derived from the studies I started this paper with and 
which I believe illustrates in yet another way the relevance of Hennion’s 
pragmatics of taste for the study of scientific practice.
In the beginning of this paper, when I presented the case of 
Methodius as typical for the ‘enduring science,’ I cited him as saying that 
his earlier work on holographic optical memory and the difficulties he met 
stemming from the very nature of linear and diffraction optics ‘suddenly’ 
made him disbelieve these centuries old research traditions. So he began 
to wonder what there actually was between the wave and the corpuscular 
nature of light. This ‘wondering’ determined his destiny for the next ten 
years of his life, full of pitfalls and suffering. Here is the answer to my 
66 Hennion, “Those Things that Hold Us Together,” 109.
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question in 1997, after the successful end of the story, about his reasons 
to not have given up, even though left on his own: 
It is important to believe that the thing (the new lenses) is “there,” 
that it is feasible and “is.” It is the “physics of things” that makes you 
certain of this. Henceforth nothing else is given: you have to devise 
your own theory and mathematical tools and then prove through 
experiments that what you claim possible is actually possible.
As it turned out, he was not entirely correct in this claim, because little 
later in the interview he recalled one important detail: 
First I browsed through related studies but found nothing. Then I 
discussed the matter with academician K. Roussinov, a prominent 
Russian specialist in optics, and he told me that there neither was a 
theory, nor a mathematical mechanism, nor did we know how this 
could be practically effected […]. Later I came across an article on 
“magic mirrors,” whose making had been zealously guarded as a tradi-
tion in the emperor’s courts of India, China and Japan. The author of the 
article described them as magnificent optical devices (optical correlators) 
that operated by daylight. These were ordinary bronze mirrors, on the 
back surface of which the ancient masters had engraved a likeness 
of Buddha or of some other deity with a relief on the scale of 10–15 
micrometers. It was an ordinary mirror, but as soon as one centered 
a sunbeam on the wall, the image of Buddha could be seen on the 
lit spot. In case of sunspots, atmospheric changes, etc., the image of 
Buddha would change, and the ancient people used it to predict their 
future. When the last masters of magic mirrors died, these skills like-
wise disappeared with them. Then, all of a sudden, these long forgotten 
skills of working on sunlight proved to me that there could be something 
in the gap between diffraction and refraction optics.
This is telling evidence for one of Hennion’s findings, which he sum-
marizes with a phrase popular among the amateurs he studied: “beautiful 
things offer themselves only to those who offer themselves to beautiful 
things.”67 These magic mirrors had been there for centuries, but none 
of the modern scientists had ‘left themselves’ to them until a virtuous 
67 Ibid., 105.
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researcher came along with his specific ‘taste’ and let himself to these 
mirrors to save him in his loneliness and provided him a point of support 
to endure the distrust of his fellow scientists. 
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Dealing With the Changing Nature  
of the Asymmetry in Human-Technology 
Inter-Actions
absTracT 
The paper discusses how Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Activity 
Theory (AT) handle the symmetry/asymmetry between human and non-
human agents. The intention is to focus on using the comparison as a 
methodological tool in a conceptual exploration that could potentially 
benefit the ANT research field. The suggested topic builds on a long 
prehistory. First, ANT has been firmly associated with the principle of 
symmetry (ANT symmetry) between human and non-human objects or 
agents. According to Callon, “[t]he rule which we must respect is not to 
change registers when we move from the technical to the social aspects 
of the problem studied.”1 Latour, on the other hand, pointed out that 
this principle of generalized symmetry was the “most important philo-
sophical discovery” in ANT.2 At the same time he explains that for ANT 
scholars the symmetry principle “simply means not to impose a priori 
1 Michel Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translations: Domes-
tication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” In Power, 
Action, and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?, ed. John Law (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 196–233.
2 Bruno Latour, “One Turn After the Social Turn,” in The Social Dimen-
sions of Science, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 
1992), 272–294.
some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a mate-
rial world of causal relations.”3 Second, AT a priori “posits an asymmetry 
between humans and things” (AT asymmetry) and considers it essential 
for the conceptualization of intention, imagination, and reflection as a key 
part of human cognitive processes.4 This is why AT considers any tenden-
cies to symmetrizing the inter-activity between people and technology 
artifacts as a deflection from its core principles. It is not by accident that 
AT scholars have been clearly and systematically expressing their dis-
comfort with respect to ANT’s symmetry principle. Third, the symmetry 
vs asymmetry discussions have provoked ANT scholars to both clarify 
and refine the meaning of the symmetry principle. The understanding of 
asymmetry suggested by Tchalakov and Kapriev5 (TK asymmetry) should 
be considered as part of these refinement efforts. At the same time, the 
TK asymmetry is not at all similar to the AT asymmetry. This is why the 
comparison between the TK asymmetry within the context of ANT and 
the AT asymmetry will be very fruitful as a source of valuable insights. 
i . acT i v i T y  Theory  approach  ( aT  asymmeTry )
Activity Theory (AT) is a conceptual framework originating from the 
socio-cultural tradition in Russian psychology. It was originally devel-
oped by the Russian psychologist Aleksei Leontiev.6 A version of activity 
theory, based on Leontiev’s framework, was suggested in the 1980s by 
the Finnish educational researcher Yrjö Engeström.7 Currently, both 
3 Latour, Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 76.
4 Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie A. Nardi Acting with Technology. Activity 
Theory and Interaction Design (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 10. 
5 Georgi Kapriev and Ivan Tchalakov, “Actor-Network Theory and 
Byzantine Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Action: Three Points of 
Possible Dialogue,” in Yearbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Sci-
ence, Technology and Society 57 (2009): 207–38; Ivan Tchalakov and Georgi 
Kapriev, “The Limits of Causal Action: Actor-Network Theory Notion of 
Translation and Aristotle’s Notion of Action,” in Yearbook of the Institute 
for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society 47 (2005): 389–433.
6 Alexei Leontiev, Activity, Consciousness, and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979). The original work was published in Russia in 1975.
7 Yrjö Engeström, Learning by Expanding: an Activity-theoretical Approach 
to Developmental Research (Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy, 1987).
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variants of activity theory are being widely used, not only in psychology, 
but also in other fields. The summary of AT provided here is based on 
a framework that was developed within the context of conceptualizing 
human activity as it is expressed in the design and use of technology.8 
In fact, there seems to be a growing interest in the adoption of activity 
theory among those who are interested in studying human-technology 
interaction. There are several AT points that are quite relevant to the 
context of human-technology interaction, including: an emphasis on 
human intentionality; an emphasis on the asymmetry between people 
and things; the importance of human learning and skill development; 
the idea that culture and society both shape human activity. For AT, the 
act of design has a clear intentional component since it is impossible to 
decouple design from the intention of the designer. On the other hand, 
in acting with technology, people deliberately commit very specific 
acts with particular technologies. AT has therefore clearly posited an 
asymmetry between humans and things (AT asymmetry). For AT, hu-
man abilities to learn through the interactions with other people and 
artifacts are distinctive from any sort of agency that could be assigned 
to artifacts. In AT, it is essential to theorize intention, imagination, and 
reflection as core human cognitive processes. In this way, any theoretical 
accounts based on the assumption for a similarity of agency between 
people and artifacts are considered as inappropriate. Another principle 
of AT is the notion of development with a commitment to understand-
ing how human activity unfolds over time in a historical or temporal 
frame: “we cannot understand activity if we do not watch it cycle, grow, 
change.”9 The adoption of the development principle aims at establish-
ing a practice of design in which the ability of users to grow and change 
with technology is essential.
The concept of activity is the most fundamental concept in AT.10 Ac-
tivity here involves not only human activity, but the activity of any object 
involved in a purposeful interaction of a human subject with the world.11 
8 Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie A. Nardi, “Activity Theory in Nutshell,” 
in Acting with Technology. Activity Theory and Interaction Design (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2006).
9 Kaptelinin and Nardi, Acting with Technology, 11.
10 It emerged mainly in psychology aiming to understand individual hu-
man beings, as well as the social entities they compose through the analysis 
of their activities. 
11 Cf. Leontiev, Activity, Consciousness, and Personality. 
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The fundamental insight here is the primacy of activity over the subject 
and the object. Activity is considered as the most basic category and the 
analysis of activities is considered as the way of properly understanding 
both subjects and objects. This is a key difference with respect to tradi-
tional analytical thinking which most often operates under the assump-
tion that to understand an activity it is necessary to first understand the 
subject and the object separately, and then conceptualize their interaction. 
AT scholars challenge this assumption claiming that its apparently flaw-
less logic could be misleading.12 
AT distinguishes between the processes of internalization and exter-
nalization which are considered to operate continuously at every level of 
human activity. Internalization is related to the reproduction of culture13 
or the internal reasoning and reconstruction of external objects (a new 
user observes a mobile phone being used and learns to how to use it).14 
Externalization is the process of the creation of new artifacts.15 Human 
beings internalize existing standards and rules of activity by appropriat-
ing the intended use of newly created artifacts but also externalize them 
by inventing new ways of use. Internalization and externalization are 
highly integrated and continually iterating. AT also distinguishes be-
tween collective activity and action emphasizing that humans engage in 
goal-orientated actions that do not necessarily directly contribute to the 
attainment of an object of activity through the mediation of tools (tool 
mediation is a key concept in AT). But eventually the actions lead to the 
satisfaction of a need (the motive) through the attainment of the object. 
Therefore, activities satisfy a need, and actions constitute the activities. 
The hierarchical structure of activity should be considered dynamically 
since it explicitly recognizes that activities, actions, and operations change 
over time. An activity is part of a wider network of activity systems and 
sometimes the outcome of a particular activity is not intended for the 
same collective which produces it, but to be consumed by some other 
12 Cf. Kaptelinin and Nardi, Acting with Technology, 31.
13 Cf. Yrjö Engeström and Reijo Miettinen, “Introduction,” in Perspec-
tives on Activity Theory. Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computa-
tional Perspectives, ed. Yrjö Engeström, Reijo Miettinen and Raija-Leena 
Punamäki-Gitai (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–17. 
14 Cf. Yunjie Xu, “The Dynamics of Interactive Information Retrieval 
Behavior, Part I: an Activity Theory Perspective,” Journal of the American 
Society for Information Science and Technology 58/7 (2007): 958–70.
15 Cf. Yrjö Engeström and Reijo Miettinen, “Introduction.”
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collective in another activity system.16 An important element of every ac-
tivity system is that its activities are constantly developing as a result of 
contradictions, tensions, and instability, and the systemic needs of both 
subjects and communities. Examining the tensions and contradictions 
that exist in an activity system provides a lens to understanding (i) the 
development and change taking place within the activity, (ii) the need for 
creative efforts of both subjects and communities in trying to deal with 
tensions and contradictions, (iii) the dynamic nature of the circumstances 
enacting the emergence of the specific attributes of the human subjects 
and non-human objects. 
The last point is of particular interest since, for AT, the properties 
(qualities, attributes or characteristics) of the subject and the object do not 
exist before and beyond activities.17 Not only do these properties manifest 
themselves in various circumstances; they actually emerge and truly exist 
only in activities, when being enacted. The specific way an abstract at-
tribute is manifested can depend critically on the specific circumstances 
of the situation at hand.18 On the other hand, activities are considered 
as a source of development of both subjects and objects. For example, 
the activities of a subject may cause substantial changes in the subject’s 
properties (home owners’ skills of using air conditioning systems improve 
over time in a way that minimizes energy consumption and maximizes the 
home comfort). Therefore, defining activities in a static way and merely 
through their components may not be adequate. On the other hand how-
ever, according to AT scholars, the notion of activity cannot be extended 
to all types of interactions. For them, any activity is bound to a subject 
and not every entity is a subject. Subjects live in the world; they have 
needs that can be met only by being and acting in the world. Computers, 
for example, do not have “needs” in the same way we have and cannot be 
considered subjects. The interaction between the subject and the object 
therefore is not a symmetrical relationship between two components of 
a larger system and can be described as “acting-in-the-world.”19 Agency 
can be described as the ability to act in the sense of producing effects; it 
16 Cf. Mikko Korpela, H.A. Soriyan and K.C. Olufokunbi, “Activity Analysis 
as a Method for Information Systems Development: General Experiments 
From Nigeria and Finland,” Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems 12 
(2000): 191–210.
17 Cf. ibid., referring to Leontiev, Activity, Consciousness, and Personality.
18 Cf. ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 32.
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is a fundamental attribute of both the subject and the object. However, 
the agency manifested by the subject of activity is of a special character; 
it can be defined as the ability and the need to act. AT therefore makes 
a difference between activity and agency. 
Studies focusing on human-technology interaction may appear to 
focus on the same unit of analysis as AT—on the interaction between 
human beings (users) and technological objects (products or systems). 
However, while the ‘user-technology’ interaction can be considered as part 
of activity, the purposeful interaction with the world cannot be limited to 
the interaction with the user interface of a technological product. User-
technology interaction models usually deal with lower-level interaction 
limited to mere ‘tasks’ and tasks are typically described in terms of the 
functionality of a system rather than the purpose and meaning for the 
subject. In this sense, using a technological product or system does not 
necessarily have a purpose on its own; its meaning is determined by a 
larger context of human activities carried out to accomplish things that are 
important regardless of the technology itself, such as enjoying the relation-
ship with a close relative, communicating an urgent message to someone 
who is waiting for it etc. AT extends the scope of analysis from the specific 
tasks to the specific context of a subject’s purposeful interaction with the 
world, including the social and cultural context. The boundary of the 
‘objective world’ is not limited by the user-technology interface. People 
are interacting with the world through this interface, and vice versa.20 For 
AT, ‘user-technology’ interaction is a phenomenon that is too narrow and 
does not count as a genuine activity. Activities should include not only 
the interaction between people and technology, but also the objects (and 
other subjects) in the world with which subjects are interacting in their 
everyday lives via technology. One should also pay attention to develop-
mental changes by focusing on the activities of people using technology 
rather than on specific “user-technology” interaction at a given moment 
of time. The focus on developmental includes: (i) extending the scope of 
analysis to include higher-level, meaningful tasks that can be supported 
by the interaction between diverse technologies; (ii) studying technology 
in use instead of focusing on users and systems separately; and (iii) taking 
into account long-term developmental changes in users, technology, their 
interaction, and the overall context of interaction.21
20 Cf. Susanne Bødker, Through the Interface: A Human Activity Approach 
to User Interface Design (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991).
21 Cf. Kaptelinin and Nardi, Acting with Technology, 35.
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Studies using AT to investigate the adoption of technology in a dynamic 
user environment have developed and validated the concept of user 
readiness—how prepared and willing an individual is to interact with a 
technological product or system that was made available for a certain pur-
pose.22 The concept could be related to the user characteristics that were 
already discussed—consumer innovativeness or the adopter categories 
in the innovation diffusion model, as well as to other relevant concepts 
such as technology use experiences and task situations. Compared to 
the traditional socio-psychological perspective, the AT perspective of 
technology adoption yields a different understanding regarding the na-
ture of these factors. For example, when a technology product or system 
is defined as the object of adoption, technology use experiences such as 
perceived ease-of-use and perceived usefulness are usually conceptual-
ized to reflect its overall properties. From an AT perspective, however, 
the user’s perceptions related to a technological product or system are not 
an overall systemic effect but rather reflect his or her actual experiences 
with it in the very specific context.23 User perceptions of the task setting 
have rarely been included in technology adoption research. From the AT 
perspective, however, such situational perceptions need to be considered 
because it is the task context that defines the nature of the specific activi-
ties (AT’s unit of analysis). User experiences with a specific technological 
product are embedded within a context and the corresponding task situ-
ations and use experiences are interrelated. The important question is 
how task situations and use experiences together influence users’ attitude 
towards adoption. In addition, users’ perceptions of task contexts (e.g., 
stressfulness, frustration from a high degree of complexity, excitement 
from novel and useful features) are likely to influence their use experi-
ences and should be included in AT’s approach to technology adoption.24 
Compared with use experiences and task situations, user characteristics 
are relatively stable and mainly make individual differences in user at-
titudes toward the same technological products or systems. “For example, 
22 Cf. Jun Sun and Marshall Scott Poole, “Capturing User Readiness to 
Interact With Information Systems: an Activity Perspective,” Data Base for 
Advances in Information Systems 41/2 (2010): 89–109.
23 Cf. Jun Sun, “Why Different People Prefer Different Systems for Differ-
ent Tasks: an Activity Perspective on Technology Adoption in a Dynamic 
User Environment,” Journal of the American Society for Information Science 
and Technology 63/1 (2012): 48–63.
24 Cf. ibid., p. 50. 
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a person who is anxious about using computers would be less ready to 
interact with the systems available for a task than would another who is 
more comfortable.”25 Thus, user-, technology-, and task-related factors 
interact with each other in influencing users’ adoption efforts. 
i i . acTor -neTWorK  Theory  approach  ( anT  symmeTry )
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) emerged in the early 1980s at the Centre 
de Sociologie de l’Innovation of the École Nationale Supérieure des Mines 
de Paris.26 It is usually associated with the names of Bruno Latour, John 
Law and Michael Callon. John Law has recently referred to ANT as a 
set of “tools, sensibilities and methods of analysis that treat everything 
in the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated effect of the 
webs of relations within which they are located. It assumes that nothing 
has reality or form outside the enactment of those relations.”27 ANT 
analyzes how all things—natural, conceptual, textual, social or technical, 
could be more accurately considered as equally or symmetrically present 
and equally relevant in the web of relations defining the reality around 
us. It “advances a relational materiality, the material extension of semiot-
ics, which presupposes that all entities achieve significance in relation 
to others”28 and has been seen by some scholars as a way of intervening, 
i.e. as a methodology, and not as a theory of what to think.29 It has not 
so far been considered as a design approach but it definitely represents 
an opportunity for design research. 
25 Ibid.
26 Cf. Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, “The Key 
to Success in Innovation, Part I & II,” International Journal of Innovation 
Management 6/2 (2002): 187–206, 207–225; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the 
Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford, UK and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
27 John Law, “Making a Mess With Method,” in The Sage Handbook of 
Social Science Methodology, ed. William Outhwaite and Stephen Turner 
(London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 2007), 595–606. 
28 Cassandra S. Crawford, “Actor Network Theory,” in Encyclopedia of 
Social Theory, ed. George Ritzer (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc., 
2004).
29 Tara Fenwick and Richard Edwards, Actor-Network Theory in Education 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 2.
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The symmetry principle between humans and non-human artifacts pro-
moted by ANT scholars has become the subject of multiple discussions, 
critics and confusion (ANT symmetry). It has been usually considered as 
a reaction against any a priori assumptions about the sources, the nature 
and the ownership of agency within a specific research context. For ANT 
scholars, it is particularly important to annihilate any a priori difference 
between social and non-social factors, actors or agents.30 In every specific 
situation the identification of all relevant acting subjects (or actants31) 
is continuously and dynamically performed and the specific agencies 
are ceaselessly debated. Non-human artifacts are also considered to be 
active which is another expression of the fundamental principle of sym-
metry between human and non-human agents. Any asymmetry of acting 
resources does not mean that they are generated by social asymmetries 
alone. “It just leads to the opposite conclusion: if inequalities have to be 
generated, this is proof that other types of actors than the social ones are 
coming into play.”32 Asymmetries therefore are seen as a manifestation of 
the effects of multiple agency and hidden or composite actors. The ulti-
mate conclusion is that “the type of actors at work should be increased”33 
and that objects should be made “participants in the course of action.”34 
This is one of the key aspects of the ANT symmetry principle—objects 
should be included as equally present and relevant in the course of ac-
tion; they have equal rights with respect to other subjects involved the 
course of action. Including non-human objects in the course of action 
shifts the focus away from the identity and the nature of the actors to 
the interactions and the associations (interdependencies) between them. 
In this way the ‘fabric’ of the social acquires a rather dynamic nature 
30 Cf. Crawford, “Actor Network Theory,” 1: “Actors are combinations 
of symbolically invested ‘things,’ ‘identities,’ relations, and inscriptions, 
networks capable of nesting within other diverse networks.” 
31 Cf. ibid.: “The ‘volitional actor’ for ANT, termed actant, is any agent, 
collective or individual, that can associate or disassociate with other agents. 
Actants enter into networked associations, which in turn define them, name 
them, and provide them with substance, action, intention, and subjectivity. 
In other words, actants are considered foundationally indeterminate, with 
no a priori substance or essence, and it is via the networks in which they 
associate that actants derive their nature. Furthermore, actants themselves 
develop as networks.” 
32 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 64. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 70
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emerging within the context of all influential interactions and associa-
tions including any emerging non-human sources of agency. Suddenly, it 
is the interactions and the associations that become sources of ontology 
or active ontological resources. 
“Most of the far-reaching and long-lasting associations are made 
by something else that could not be detected as long as the notion of 
social force was not submitted to scrutiny.”35 It seems therefore that the 
main insights of ANT are related to answering the question about the 
meaning(s), the nature or the fabric of ‘the social.’ For ANT, the social 
doesn’t designate a domain of reality or some particular item, but 
rather is the name of a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a 
translation, an enrollment. It is an association between entities which 
are in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, 
except during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together. 
[…] Thus, social, for ANT, is the name of a type of momentary as-
sociation which is characterized by the way it gathers together into 
new shapes.36 
The advantage of dissolving the notion of social and replacing it either 
by short-lived interactions or by new associations is that it makes it 
possible to distinguish between what pertains to its durability and what 
pertains to its substance. Strum and Latour37 discuss the meaning(s) of 
the social by promoting a performative, instead of an ostensive model. 
In the ostensive definition of the social 38 society exists and actors enter it 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 65. 
37 Cf. Shirley S. Strum and Bruno Latour, “Redefining the Social Link: 
From Baboons to Humans,” Social Science Information 26 (1987): 783–802. 
38 Strum and Latour summarize the Ostensive definition as follows: 1) It 
is, in principle, possible to discover the typical properties of what holds 
a society together, properties which could explain the social link and its 
evolution, although in practice, it may be difficult to detect them. 2) These 
properties or elements are social. If other properties are included then the 
explanation of society is economic, biological, psychological, etc. 3) Social 
actors (whatever their size—micro or macro) are in the society as defined 
in 1). To the extent that they are active, their activity is restricted because 
they are only part of a larger society. 4) Because actors are in the society, 
they can be useful informants for scientists interested in discovering the 
principles of society. But because they are only part of society, even if they 
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adhering to rules and structures that are already pre-determined. The 
overall nature of the society is unknown and unknowable to the actors. 
It is however accessible to external observers such as scientists who, as 
if standing outside of society, have the capacity to understand and see 
it in its entirety. In the performative definition of the social 39 society is 
constructed through the many efforts that are being used to define it; it 
is something achieved in practice by all actors. This shifts the emphasis 
from looking for the social link in the relations between actors to focusing 
on how actors emerge and achieve this link making it durable. The shift 
was made possible by the introduction of the concept of ‘actant.’ Actants 
emerge in a given network by virtue of the emergence of their relations 
with other actors and other actants. The introduction of actants helps 
emphasizing the fact that nothing lies outside the network of relations and 
that there is no difference in the ability of technology, humans, animals, 
or other non-humans to act leading to change. 
For example, in a heavy traffic mountain road a stone on the road has 
the potential to entirely change human lives and not just to disturb traffic 
flow. A customer in a user newsgroup for a specific product may emerge in 
a new role as a product marketer—it is still the same actor but emerging 
in a completely new role as a new actant having the ability to influence the 
purchase decisions of other potential customers. These examples bring 
are “aware,” they can never see or know the whole picture. 5) With the 
proper methodology, social scientists can discover the principles of what 
holds society together, distinguishing between actors’ beliefs and behav-
iors. The picture of society as a whole, thus devised, is unavailable to the 
individual social actors who are within it (cf. ibid.).
39 Strum and Latour summarize the Performative definition as follows: 1) It 
is impossible, in principle, to establish properties which would be peculiar 
to life in society, although, in practice, it is possible to do so. 2) A variety of 
elements or properties contribute to the social link as defined by social ac-
tors. These are not restricted to the purely social and can include economic, 
biological, psychological, etc. 3) In practice, actors (no matter what their 
size—macro or micro) define, for themselves and for others, what society 
is, both its whole and its parts. 4) Actors “performing” society know what 
is necessary for their success. This may include knowledge of the parts 
and of the whole and of the difference between beliefs and behaviors. 5) 
Social scientists raise the same questions as any other social actor and are 
themselves “performing” society, no more and no less than non-scientists. 
They may, however, have different practical ways of enforcing their defini-
tion of what society is (cf. ibid.).
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in another important distinction in ANT—between intermediaries and 
mediators.40 Intermediaries are entities which do not make any difference 
to a given state of affairs to the extent that they can be ignored. In a way, 
they simply transport the force of some other entity more or less without 
transformation and by so doing become invisible. Mediators are entities 
which enhance or reduce differences. They are the ones that potentially 
lead to change, thus becoming the main object of study since their outputs 
cannot be predicted by looking at their inputs.41 From an ANT point of 
view, the social must constantly be performed or re-constructed through 
complex engagements with various composite mediators.
i i i . The  approach  suGGesTed  by  TchalaKov  and  
Kapr iev  ( TK  asymmeTry )
Tchalakov and Kapriev have articulated another approach to the sym-
metry/asymmetry issues in ANT by using insights from Byzantine 
philosophy.42 The main message in their joint works emphasizes the fact 
that some of the key achievements of Byzantine philosophy and, more 
specifically of the Byzantine theory of activity and action, “are in striking 
correspondence” with some of the contemporary critiques of the under-
standing of activity in the social sciences, especially with the critiques 
emerging from within the adherents of actor-network theory and the 
sociology of regimes of engagement. The key achievements of the Byz-
antine philosophical tradition are articulated through the contributions 
of three key Christian saints and great thinkers Maximus the Confessor 
(c. 580–662), John of Damascus (c. 645 or 676–749) and Gregory Palamas 
(1296–1359). Their theory of action is based on the notion of ‘nature’ 
which is identified with ‘essence.’ However, these two notions are used 
in a quite different manner in comparison to the philosophical lexicon 
of the Latin tradition which is in the roots of modern philosophy and 
sociology. In the Byzantine philosophical tradition reality is perceived as 
active but the essence or nature of every single thing is unknowable in 
itself. The essence or nature of a thing is never considered in itself, but 
40 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 37. 
41 Cf. ibid. 
42 Cf. Kapriev and Tchalakov, “Actor-Network Theory and Byzantine In-
terpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Action;” Tchalakov and Kapriev, “The 
Limits of Causal Action.”
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rather as a source of energetic manifestations and dynamism. An essence 
can be known only through its natural energies. The variety of the natural 
attributes of a thing can be known only through its energies or actions. 
That is why Tchalakov and Kapriev believe that the Byzantine philosophi-
cal tradition could easily agree with most of ANT’s basic principles such 
as “existence precedes essence” and the rejection of actions “with a point 
of origin.” It would also refuse attributing competences to an actor prior 
to the actualization of action itself by insisting on the “surprise” and 
the “under-determination of action” as well as its characterization as an 
“event.”43 By emphasizing the notion of hypostasis, this tradition has also 
no difficulties to admit the ‘actantial’ character of the objects considering 
them as autonomous agencies in their different interactions.
According to Tchalakov and Kapriev, there are three key achievements 
of Byzantine philosophy that can be summarized as follows.44 
First, this is the two-fold nature of action or the fact that the course of 
action of any agency, be it human or non-human, could in principle be 
described by means of two major types of actions: ‘causal actions’ and 
‘existential actions.’ In the original Aristotelian terms these two types cor-
respond to ‘movements’ and actions in a proper sense or energies (energeia). 
This distinction emerges from the different way (as compared to the 
way of the Latin tradition) the Byzantine philosophers have interpreted 
the Aristotelian concepts of dynamis and energeia (translated in Latin as 
potentia and actus or, respectively, as possibilitas and actualitas). Applied 
to the contemporary critiques of the traditional sociological notions of 
human action, the above distinction provides an additional good reason 
for ANT to introduce semiotic notions that symmetrically account for 
the activity of both human and human agencies. 
Second, this is the unique and original language, which allows describ-
ing the way for different acting agencies to mutually influence each other 
in the course of action. The most important concepts here are hypostasis, 
persona/prosopon and perichoresis (interpenetration or co-inherence). In 
the Latin tradition the first two concepts have been commonly used as 
synonyms. However, recent studies have clearly pointed out that that, 
while persona denotes only rational beings (God, angels, human beings), 
the Byzantine concept of hypostasis has a universal meaning—every being 
43 “Action should remain a surprise, a mediation, an event.” Latour, Reas-
sembling the social, 45.
44 Cf. Kapriev and Tchalakov, “Actor-Network Theory and Byzantine 
Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Action.” 
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has its hypostasis, including inanimate objects such as stones, machines, 
threes and houses. By emphasizing this point Tchalakov and Kapriev 
suggest relating the concept of hypostasis to the ANT notions of actant 
and agency. In turn, the fact that the concept of perichoresis denotes the 
mutual penetration and co-inherence of two (or more) different natures 
(together with their own properties and energies) while preserving their 
proper otherness, opens the possibility for the description of specific 
circumstances associated with the emergence of composite hypostases 
including or combining multiple sources of agency as well as circum-
stances associated with the inclusion of multiple inhomogeneous natures 
(for example, human and non-human, but also the radically different 
non-human natures of technological and non-technological artifacts) 
under the guidance of a seemingly single actants.
Third, this is the ability to explicate the empirically observable differ-
ences between different hypostases (or acting agencies) having the same 
nature, i.e. the ability to explain how hypostatic or actant uniqueness 
emerges from within the same resource of natural energies. Byzantine 
philosophy addressed this issue by elaborating on another category of 
Aristotle—hexis, which defines the personal, or rather, the uniquely hypo-
static factor in the actualization of the natural energies or actions. From 
the point of view of Byzantine scholars, the dominant understanding of 
habitus (even within the context of ANT itself45) operates at the level of 
‘movements’ and appears to be unable to incorporate the complexity of 
the Greek notion of hexis. 
According to Tchalakov and Kapriev, these three achievements could 
clearly expand the resources and increase the sensitivity of ANT towards 
a more comprehensive understanding of human actions, especially in 
the case of some little studied or highly neglected phenomena such as 
resistance, suffering and endurance in the course of particular scientific 
endeavours. It is within this context that they discuss the need of rein-
troducing the concept of asymmetry (TK asymmetry) between human 
and non-human actors, yet on a different (non-Cartesian) ground. They 
have two basic claims. First, the traditional sociological theories of hu-
man action have greatly reduced it to the type of causal actions. Second, 
in addition to its major advantages (symmetrical treatment of human 
and non-human agents and a more comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics of their relationships) ANT needs some further conceptual 
45 See for example Latour, Reassembling the Social, 210–211.
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developments in order to be able to cover some important and unique 
aspects of human behaviour. 
The need for further conceptual development becomes particularly 
necessary when studying the emergence of stable and long-standing 
heterogeneous micro-communities based on the human association with 
the particular properties of specific non-human agents, an association 
that could be described as a unique relationship of inter-corporeality. 
The specific context of this asymmetric insight goes back to the work of 
Tchalakov focusing on the scientific outcomes of long years of appren-
ticeship in research labs including the human assimilation of materiality 
and the materiality of scientific language in a given area of research.46 
Scientists describe this process using specific verbal forms referring to 
the bodily, practical engagement in research, which enables the human 
body to gradually become sensitive to the invisible realities of the subject 
of scientific practice and to the apophatic challenge of using scientific 
language to articulate the experience associated with these invisible 
realities.47 
According to Tchalakov and Kapriev, it is impossible to describe these 
empirically observable relationships of sharing, mutuality and fusion 
between human and non-human actors only by using ANT’s language 
of translation. ANT needs a concept of asymmetry between non-human 
and human actors so that it could describe such unique human behaviour 
as the one described above by using categories such as moral obligation, 
endurance, struggle, dedication, responsibility, duty, passion and, why 
not, love. Such characteristics are difficult to ascribe to non-humans 
but it is equally difficult to ascribe them to all humans. They should be 
considered as an expression of uniquely personal existential predisposi-
tions that could be described through the concepts of existential actions, 
hypostatic particularity, and perichoretic synergy. This is why they cannot 
be easily hidden under the guise of intentionality. This is a key difference 
between AT and TK asymmetries. 
46 Cf. Ivan Tchalakov, “Language and Perception in the Coupling between 
Human and Non-human Actors,” Yearbook 2004 of the Institute for Advanced 
Studies on Science, Technologies & Society: 192–215; Ivan Tchalakov, “The 
Object and the Other in Holographic Research—Approaching Passivity 
and Responsibility of Human Actors,” Science, Technology and Human Values 
29/1 (2004): 64–87.
47 Cf. Tchalakov, “Language and Perception in the Coupling Between 
Human and Non-human Actors,” 199–203.
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i v . conclus ion 
One of the motivations for this paper was to emphasize the fact that 
we are currently witnessing a change of human condition due to the 
unprecedented increase of complexity of everyday technological arti-
facts. The technologies around us are becoming more complex, more 
intelligent and more autonomous as compared to what has been known 
before. This trend goes in parallel to an increasing scale of society 
which amplifies different societal pressures from a number of different 
perspectives.48 First, having more people in society increases the weight 
of the reputational pressures driven by the necessity for the majority of 
people to follow dominant group norms due to fear from bad reputation. 
Second, having more people in society means more interactions among 
people. The more interactions among people cause the emergence of 
new societal dilemmas and interdependencies among them. Handling 
the interdependencies require new and more complex social management 
systems that need to rely even more heavily on technology. Uncertainty 
is a key component of new technology development and more technology 
means that the new systems will have more flaws and more possibilities 
to fail in surprising and unexpected ways which additionally complicates 
the entire socio-technological environment.49 Third, there is a growing 
variety of new technological systems. As more and different technolo-
gies permeate human lives and society in general, there are new areas 
of concern that need to be addressed, new societal dilemmas, and new 
possibilities for social system struggles.50 There is increasing number 
of social aspects which are controlled not by people but by automatic 
systems. Unfortunately, the automation of social systems is paralleled by 
a process of depersonalization of the interaction between people which 
creates additional problems due to communication ambiguities. Fourth, 
globalization has brought the opportunity for people moving at much 
greater distances across national borders, across nations and continents. 
48 See the insightful discussion provided by Bruce Schneider, “Techno-
logical Advances,” in Liars & Outliers. Enabling the Trust that Society Needs 
to Thrive (Indianapolis: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 225. Schneider however 
focuses on the issues of trust and security. 
49 Cf. ibid. 
50 Just as an example, Internet fraud requires the Internet. 
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The greater mobility of people with weaker social ties weakens the ef-
ficiency of moral and reputational norms and diminishes the strength 
of institutional pressures. This creates a necessity for more control and 
more monitoring, not only of people, but also of the flow of unprec-
edented amounts of goods and services which additionally enhances 
the need for more complex technological solutions based on wireless, 
sensing, information and communication technologies.
The point here is that many technological “solutions” are emerging 
as independent autonomous actors in our lives. Yes, computer viruses 
and antivirus programs do not have intentions; yes, there were designed 
by a programmer, but it does not really matter who this programmer 
was if, for example, the antivirus program will consistently remove the 
attachments from my e-mail because of the suspicion or ‘fear’ of poten-
tial virus activities. Such type of consistent activity could consistently 
affect and completely disturb my activities for an entire weekend before 
I can speak to someone who could help me fixing the problem. In the 
meantime, the only face, persona or prosopon before me is my computer 
screen. Behind this “persona” emerges the hypostasis of the computer 
with all of its functions, interactive features, messages, pop-ups, failures 
or ‘user friendliness.’ The personalization of technological artifacts or 
assigning personality to active objects is part of human nature. It was 
Rodolphe Töpffer (1799–1846), the inventor of the comic books who came 
to realize that assigning personalities to specific images is not difficult. 
Actually, “He found that it was impossible not to do so.”51 Focusing on 
Töpffer’s insight Gombrich framed a law which he called Töpffer’s Law: 
Any image that we can interpret as a face will have a distinct individual 
personality. “The most astonishing fact about these clues of expression 
is surely that they may transform almost any shape into the semblance 
of a living being.”52 In this sense non-human actors around us acquire a 
definite character and expression; they are endowed with a life on their 
own and with a presence. One does not need to be an ANT scholar in 
order to recognize that. At the same time, accounting for such emerging 
presences is not a mere act of assigning intentionality to objects. I would 
also agree (as Tchalakov and Kpriev did) with Michel Callon and other 
51 Punyashloke Mishra, Michael D. Nicholson & Steven K. Wojcikiewicz, 
“Seeing Ourselves in the Computer: How We Relate to Technoloyies,” 
Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy 44/7 (April 2001): 634–41.
52 Ernst Hans Gombrich, Art and Illusion: a Study in the Psychology of 
Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon Press, 1972), 289. 
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ANT representatives that “demanding that the non-humans should have 
intentions in the same way as humans is in itself an anthropocentric or 
sociocentric demand” that does not fit the spirit of ANT.53 It is important 
however to realize that there is great potential for ANT in accounting 
for the potential impact of the increasing complexity and autonomy of 
everyday technological artifacts. 
In concluding, I would like to make two final comments about the 
difference between AT and TK asymmetries. First, I should emphasize 
the fact that the idea of asymmetry is not absent from ANT in the first 
place. I would emphasize the point made by Strum and Latour that, by 
embracing the performative framework, ANT admits the existence of 
two sets of inverse relationships: the first one revealing a strange symmetry 
among all actors since “the more active the actors, the less they differ from 
one another;”54 the second one revealing a new asymmetry since “the more 
actors are seen to be equal, in principle, the more the practical differences 
between them become apparent in the means available to them to achieve 
society.” I see this new asymmetry as an anticipation of the articulation 
of the TK asymmetry which focuses on the uniqueness of the personal/
hypostatic factor as an additional aspect in distinguishing between dif-
ferent human actors. The introduction of this additional aspect provides 
additional exploratory resources for ANT and should be acknowledged 
as a distinctive scholarly contribution. 
Second, I can see how easily this contribution could be claimed by 
AT scholars as part of their focus on intentionality. This is why I believe 
that in order to establish it as part of common scientific usage it has to be 
radicalized even further by emphasizing the universality of the concept of 
hypostasis.55 In other words, I would suggest exploring the articulation of 
the TK asymmetry within the context of non-human objects. This sug-
gestion appears to be highly justified within the context of the increasing 
complexity and autonomy of everyday technological artifacts. 
53 Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, “Don’t Throw the Baby Out With 
the Bath School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley,” in Science as Practice and 
Culture, ed. Andrew Pickering (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1992): 343–68. I am grateful to Dr. Domen Bajde, Department of Marketing 
Management, University of Southern Denmark, who in an informal private 
discussion reemphasized this specific point. 
54 Strum and Latour, Redefining the Social Link, 785.
55 See the text by Prof. Georgi Kapriev included in this volume. 
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charloTTe  j aeKel
jacK-out-of-the-BoX
Literature’s Knowledge About Malfunction, 
Interference, and Waste
Curiously enough, Bruno Latour’s work is shaped by an optimism 
towards technology, serving to isolate himself from Heideggers compel-
ling thoughts on this particular matter. For Latour, composition, con-
nection and operativity is the basic matter of practice, especially when 
interferences or “malfunctioning artefacts”1 emerge. Take the prominent 
anecdote from the sixth chapter of Pandora’s Hope, entitled A Collective of 
Humans and Nonhumans. Here, Latour tells us a fictional story about an 
interrupted lecture when an overhead projector suddenly breaks down. 
While the projector was perceptually absent before it stopped working, 
the instantaneous crisis of that “intermediary” brings up the projector’s 
“individual existence.”2 The crisis immediately calls for the repairmen 
to open the black box called overhead projector which itself consequently 
raises the numbers of actants: “Whereas the moment before the projector 
scarcely existed, now even its parts have individual existence, each its 
own ‘black box’.”3 The actants multiply, shifting our attention from the 
solitary object to “a group of people around an object.”4 For Latour, this 
mediating process moves from the initial disinterest towards the black box 
(i.e. overhead projector) to the newly emerged dissipation and alignment of 
the actors in the so called “obligatory passage point”5 (OPP), where the 
1 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge, MA et al.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 184.
2 Ibid., 183.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 184. Obligatory passage points can be understood as institutions 
of actor-networks, commonly associated with the primary process of 
assembly of artifacts reintegrate and restart a new blackboxing. But what 
happens to broken black boxes and loose elements which had lost all of 
their proliferate functions and therefore are no longer available for any 
further coordination of interest? How can these entities be reconnected to 
the chains of operations and the assembly of humans and nonhumans? 
Things along these lines simply lost their way. No one keeps track.
The aim of this essay is to retrace the things that left the ‘assembly-line,’ 
way beyond any obligatory passage point. However, these things are far from 
being neutral. Quite the opposite: Like an unleashed Jack-in-the-box their 
clamour herald against the schism between man and things, denying suc-
cessfully the assembly and the collective. Whereas Latour does not explicitly 
talk about things of that kind in his ‘science’-fictions, literature does.
Latour picks up literary patterns, creates fictional narratives as the 
detective story in ARAMIS or the Love of Technology, which, due to its 
hybrid character between socio-technology and literature,6 introduces the 
new literary genre named “scientifiction.”7 
translation. At this particular point goals, questions, or any matters what-
soever are forced to merge. Consequently, the OPP serves as a necessary 
element when it comes to the formation of networks and their programs of 
action. It mediates between all the actors of a network. According to Michel 
Callon and John Law it works like “a single locus to shape and mobilize the 
local network.” Michel Callon and John Law, “The Life and Death of an 
Aircraft: a Network Analysis of Technical Change,” in Shaping Technology/
Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker and 
John Law (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 31.
6 This is about the failed project ARAMIS, an innovative idea of civil 
transportation for taxi cabs which never came to actualization. A young 
student of math and physics attains the teachings of a “laboratory Sherlock” 
—a professor of sociology called Norbert—in order to resolve the issue “Who 
Killed Aramis?” Bruno Latour, ARAMIS or the Love of Technology, trans. 
Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA et al.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
2. At first glance, we find an exception from the claim that defect objects can 
not be tracked since the scientific research focuses on a technical object that 
failed. Failed objects, as we know, left the assembly. However, the reasons 
for the project to have failed are of large concern, without any interest in 
the material remains of the project. Therefore the post-mortem-research on 
ARAMIS suddenly turns into an observation in statu nascendi. Cf. Christoph 
Neubert, “Innovation, Mobilisierung, Transport. Zur verkehrstheoretischen 
Grund legung der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie in Bruno Latours Aramis, or the 
Love of Technology,” in Verkehrsgeschichte und Kulturwissenschaft, ed. Christoph 
Neubert and Gabriele Schabacher (Bielefeld: transcript 2013), 93–142: 105. 
7 Latour, ARAMIS, IX.
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What is striking though are the bright moments in which Latour reveals 
his strong interest in literature, namely the homogenization of the dys-
functional elements: For Latour, defects, transforming things into waste, 
do not account for a suitable option for observation. This becomes evi-
dent especially in Latour’s reading of a comic strip whose hero is called 
Gaston Lagaffe—a proficient virtuoso when it comes to the mastery of 
transliterating the effects of things, the strange assemblages and the 
consequential chaos. The relevant essay can be found in La clef de Berlin 
et autres leçons d’un amateur de sciences and is called Portrait de Gaston 
Lagaffe en philosophe des techniques.
Before turning to Latour’s reading, please allow me a little detour. The 
fact that knowledge is extracted from a literary genre like a comic strip 
is in no way of small concern here. At first, socio-technological premises 
seem to allow to bring literature and theory together. Therefore, we can say 
that the questions about the possibilities of any literature’s knowledge or 
poetology of knowledge8 are not at stake anymore. This brings us to Michel 
Serres, himself also well-known to Latour, who, rather than eliminating 
them, stresses the differences that lay in the engagement of interference 
and collectivization. In the chapter Rires: les bijoux distraits ou la cantatrice 
sauve from his book Hermes II. L’Interférence Serres starts with a suspicion.
Analyzing Les aventures de Tintin, he remarks: 
Et si la philosophie ne résidait plus là où on l’attend d’ordinaire? 
Quand elle se tort d’agonie dans la nuit de l’ésotérisme, la bande 
dessiné montre au grand jour et sans détour les plaies de nos discours 
[…]. […] sachez enfin où vous instruire et sur quoi méditer. […] Oui, 
la monadologie contemporaine, c’est Les Bijoux de la Castafiore.9 
In his work The Parasite, the subject-matter in charge for uncovering the 
truth of the parasite and its interference shifted from tales to fables—
and now to comic strips. Thus it seems we find no need to differentiate 
between heavy and light literature as well as to exclude literary fictions 
from the realm of knowledge. 
8 For an overview on the studies concerning literature and knowledge, 
see the chapter “Ansätze,” in Literatur und Wissen. Ein interdisziplinäres 
Handbuch, ed. Roland Borgards et al. (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 2013), 
3–54.
9 Michel Serres, Hermès II. L’Interférence (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 
1992), 223.
89Charlotte  J aekel :  J aCk -out-of -the -box
The comic strip does not share any of the established paradigms of official 
philosophical the ory. Much more, his dazzling and colorful animations 
shine a bright light of what is hidden in the dark of the discourse: interfer-
ences—the phone connection fails to contact the caller10—, chatter—a third 
party, Castafiore’s parrot, intrudes and causes confusion11—, technology and 
its distortions12—Professor Tournesol invents the color TV, which hap-
pens to be an immature project causing visual impairment—and parasites, 
causing all their clamor and noise until the stocks are fully exhausted—
the members of the local orchestra who heard about the presence of the 
famous singer Castafiore are getting royally drunk, serenading, stumbling 
noisily their way out of the room13—and of course broken mediators, for 
example the stairs which ceased to serve its initial means to transport 
up- and downwards without ever being repaired.14 This particular knowl-
edge, ever displayed and negotiated, is essentially attached to the literary 
genre of the comic strip. The strip and literature create the topology of 
diabolic interference and secession: either the collective disassembles or 
it has hardly ever been an assembly before.
By also turning his attention closely to the literary genre of the comic 
strip, Latour performs a crucial shift within the production of knowledge 
from academic philosophy to the minor form of the narration, as does 
Serres. By the way, this issue was more than once object of his conversa-
tions with Michel Serres.15
However, the outcomes are diametrically opposed: Latour points out 
in his reading of the story called Lagaffe mérite des baffes16 [Lagaffe Deserves 
Some Slapping] the conditions of felicity in any mediation; dysfunctional 
elements regain their functions in favor of a new collective. Gaston’s 
problem was the lack of a present delegation: his superior coincidentally 
10 Cf. Hergé, Les aventures de Tintin. Les bijoux de la Castafiore (Luçon: 
Castermann, 2007), 5.
11 Cf. ibid., 19.
12 Cf. ibid., 48–50. 
13 Cf. ibid., 29–30.
14 Cf. ibid., 7; 62.
15 Cf. Michel Serres, Éclaircissements. Cinq entretiens avec Bruno Latour 
(Paris: Éditions François Bourin, 1992), 41–43. In his interviews with 
Bruno Latour Michel Serres states that “[l]a philosophie est assez pro-
fonde pour faire comprendre que la littérature est plus profonde qu’elle.” 
Ibid., 42.
16 André Franquin, Gaston. Lagaffe mérite des baffes (Luçon: Dupuis 1979).
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turned into his pets’ concierge, a situation that forced him to sudden 
building conversions. He puts up a kitty door, arousing jealousy for the 
seagull, his other pet, that wants to reclaim her right to freely leave and 
enter the room as she pleases. Consequently, he cuts a hole into the upper 
half of the door. Yet, the hole in the door is too permeable when it comes 
to little puffs of air, a quality conversely owned by the kitty door’s flap, 
which then gives reason for Gaston’s boss to be immediately upset. The 
outcome of that peculiar chain of actions is a permeable door. In fact, the 
door has by now lost its original purpose of being either left open and 
permeable or closed and therefore non-permeable. Latour’s observation 
does not concern the door’s functional disorder but rather a finally suc-
cessful collectivization: All’s well that ends well, since as Latour claims 
“il n’existe qu’une porte et qu’une seule qui soit telle quelle permette 
de tenir ensemble les lubies de Gaston, de Prunelle et de leurs animaux 
familiers.”17 This might surprise us if we think about his boss Prunelle’s 
angry red head who, after the building conversions, is asked by Gaston 
“Sois pas de mauvaise foi: Cette porte est fermée, oui ou non?” Prunelle, 
snorting with rage, is displayed as a disgraded superior, asserting merely 
undefined noises (“RÂÂÂH!”).18
It surprises us even more if we focus on Latour’s further thoughts on 
the nature of doors taken from Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: 
The Sociology of a Door-Closer.19 Here, a door-closer declares a strike. 
Latour describes the resulting issue as follows: “There is a problem with 
doors. Visitors push them to get in or pull on them to get out (or vice 
versa), but then the door remains open.” An open door however is—like 
Gaston’s ‘door’ after having cut the gap for his seagull—nothing but “a 
gaping hole in the wall through which, for instance, cold rushes in and 
heat rushes out.”20 Gaston’s remodeled door is no longer a mediator 
between the exterior and the interior. Its tragic fate, like anything he has 
been in contact with, will be replacement or displacement. 
It is precisely these things, that are primal actors of literary fictions: 
condemned, impractical material, obsolete entities that escape from their 
17 Bruno Latour, La clef de Berlin et autres leçons d’un amateur des sciences 
(Paris: La Découverte, 1993), 23.
18 Franquin, Gaston. 15.
19 Cf. Jim Johnson [a.k.a. Bruno Latour], “Mixing Humans and Nonhu-
mans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer,” Social Problems 35/3 
(1988), Special Issue: The Sociology of Science and Technology: 298–310.
20 Johnson, “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together,” 300.
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initial functions, removed from office like waste and junk. The reasons 
for that, I claim, lie in the fact that goal and potential of interference is 
consubstantial.
Studying the practices of disposability became a fashionable field of 
interest in the social studies, and more recently in the cultural studies. 
Strangely enough that literary theory has only hardly tackled the rela-
tion between literature and waste—a literary history of waste still holds. 
At that point, this essay is working on and negotiating the intersection 
between literature and waste and has its primary focus on three literary 
examples. They all share a common ground by distinctively taking waste 
as an actor into account rather than ignoring it: Franz Kafka’s Cares of 
a Family Man, Don DeLillo’s Underworld and thirdly E.L. Doctorow’s 
Homer and Langley. 
Concerning Kafka’s Die Sorge des Hausvaters [The Cares of a Family Man], 
published in the Chanukkah-edition of the journal Selbstwehr in 1919, 
we will have to face an odd thing called Odradek, an object far from any 
possible categorizations. Whatever left the box now haunts the Haus-
vater, with Hausvater maintaining its economical connotation: The head 
of the house, a strong guarantee for the financial efficiency, the wealthy 
legacy and the systemic and environmental boundaries of the oikos. This 
particular character is now challenged by a thing that pays him regular 
visits and furthermore shares a familiar circle.
The narration starts with a linguistic question, shifting into a her-
meneutical and phenomenal description of that peculiar thing.21 The 
sign ODRADEK is here transparent and non-transparent at the same 
time, same as its essential structure whose mode of movement is closely 
attached to its inherent technology: 
Die einen sagen, das Wort Odradek stamme aus dem Slawischen und 
sie suchen auf Grund dessen die Bildung des Wortes nachzuweisen. 
Andere wieder meinen, es stamme aus dem Deutschen, vom Slawi-
schen sei es nur beeinflußt. Die Unsicherheit beider Deutungen aber 
21 For a short summary of the range of hermeneutical and etymological 
interpretations of the word “Odradek” cf. Renate Werner, “Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters. Ein sprachkritischer Scherz Franz Kafkas,” in Literatur und 
Leben: anthropologische Aspekte in der Kultur der Moderne. Festschrift für 
Helmut Scheuer zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Günter Helmes et al. (Tübingen: 
Narr, 2002), 185–87.
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läßt wohl mit Recht darauf schließen, daß keine zutrifft, zumal man 
auch mit keiner von ihnen einen Sinn des Wortes finden kann.22
The search for meaning comes to nothing, same does the attempt to de-
compose the word itself. It is compact, it follows Slavonic or Germanic mor-
phological rules. However, it seems impossible to isolate the elements that 
lead to the word’s emergence. In the case of Odradek, these elements reveal 
themselves to the analytical gaze without being detached from the whole:
Natürlich würde sich niemand mit solchen Studien beschäftigen, 
wenn es nicht wirklich ein Wesen gäbe, das Odradek heißt. Es sieht 
zunächst aus wie eine flache sternartige Zwirnspule, und tatsächlich 
scheint es auch mit Zwirn bezogen; allerdings dürften es nur ab-
gerissene, alte, aneinandergeknotete, aber auch ineinanderverfilzte 
Zwirnstücke von verschiedenster Art und Farbe sein. Es ist aber 
nicht nur eine Spule, sondern aus der Mitte des Sternes kommt ein 
kleines Querstäbchen hervor und an dieses Stäbchen fügt sich dann 
im rechten Winkel noch eines. Mit Hilfe dieses letzteren Stäbchens 
auf der einen Seite, und einer der Ausstrahlungen des Sternes auf der 
anderen Seite, kann das Ganze wie auf zwei Beinen aufrecht stehen.23
22 Franz Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” in Drucke zu Lebzeiten, ed. 
Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch and Gerhard Neumann, in Schriften. Tage-
bücher. KA, ed. Jürgen Born et al. (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2002), 282. 
[“Some say the word Odradek is of Slavonic origin, and try to account for 
it on that basis. Others again believe it to be of German origin, only influ-
enced by Slavonic. The uncertainty of both interpretations allows one to 
assume with justice that neither is accurate, especially as neither of them 
provides an intelligent meaning of the word.” Franz Kafka, “The Cares of 
a Family Man,” The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1983), 282.]
23 Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 282–83. [“No one, of course, would 
occupy himself with such studies if there were not a creature called Odradek. 
At first glance it looks like a flat star-shaped spool for thread, and indeed 
it does seem to have thread wound upon it; to be sure, they are only old, 
broken-off bits of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most varied 
sorts and colors. But it is not only a spool, for a small wooden crossbar 
sticks out of the middle of the star, and another small rod is joined to that 
at a right angle. By means of this latter rod on one side and one of the 
points of the star on the other, the whole thing can stand upright as if on 
two legs.” Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man,” 428.]
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If one takes a closer look at the components mentioned here, one can 
evidently observe a common direct relation to waste: the thread seems 
endlessly knotted and torn, hence a typical case for the trash when things 
are no longer of any use. Or, even worse; twisted, tangled like an outcast 
member of the collective. A new problem is at stake: On the one hand, the 
entity constantly reveals its possible functionality or at least raises sus-
picion for any past function whatsoever. But at the same time, the whole 
remains closed and everything is engaged with each other in a seamless 
flow. Any further persecution would end in a wild goose chase since the 
tiny useless actor became a transparent black box, eluding from himself:
Man wäre versucht zu glauben, dieses Gebilde hätte früher irgend-
eine zweckmäßige Form gehabt und jetzt sei es nur zerbrochen. 
Dies scheint aber nicht der Fall zu sein; wenigstens findet sich kein 
Anzeichen dafür; nirgends sind Ansätze oder Bruchstellen zu sehen, 
die auf etwas Derartiges hinweisen würden; das Ganze erscheint zwar 
sinnlos, aber in seiner Art abgeschlossen. Näheres läßt sich übrigens 
nicht darüber sagen, da Odradek außerordentlich beweglich und nicht 
zu fangen ist.24 
The characterization suits two particular approaches. Firstly the concep-
tualization of a “groupement[ ] non productif[ ],”25 as it is displayed by 
Gilbert Simondon, whose work Du mode d’existence des objets techniques 
was more than a profound inspiration for Latour, especially the inherent 
political implications. The function of these groupements non productifs 
can be understood as a “couplage,” as “un enchaînement réglé de média-
tions organisées”26 between man and nature, between the interior and 
the exterior: notably, Odradek turns up in transitory spaces as “auf dem 
24 Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 283. [“One is tempted to believe 
that the creature once had some sort of intelligible shape and is now only 
a broken-down remnant. Yet this does not seem to be the case; at least 
there is no sign of it; nowhere is there an unfinished or unbroken surface 
to suggest anything of the kind; the whole thing looks senseless enough, 
but in its own way perfectly finished. In any case, closer scrutiny is impos-
sible, since Odradek is extraordinarily nimble and can never be laid hold 
of.” Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man,” 428.]
25 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Edi-
tions Aubier, 1989), 246.
26 Ibid.
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Dachboden, im Treppenhaus, auf den Gängen, im Flur”27 or migrates into 
other houses. These technical objects seem to be useless as far as their 
observation is under the spell of the “paradigm de travail:” “qui pousse à 
considérer l’objet technique comme utilitaire; l’objet technique ne porte 
pas en lui à titre de définition essentielle son caractère utilitaire.”28 It is 
exactly this subordination of technical objects under the paradigm of util-
ity, practicability and labor that can be easily ascribed to the Hausvater. 
He does not succeed to value the self-contained object. It needs to obey. 
But that is precisely why from an informational point of view, as indicated 
by the linguistic and hermeneutic speculations from the exposition of the 
narration, we are faced with a problem, because: 
l’objet technique peut être lu comme porteur d’une information défi-
nie; s’il est seulement utilisé, employé, et par conséquent asservi, il 
ne peut apporter aucune information […]. L’object technique apprécié 
et connu selon son essence […], pénétré d’intelligibilité fonctionnelle, 
valorisé selon ses normes internes, apporte avec lui une information 
pure. On peut nommer information pure celle qui n’est pas événe-
mentielle, celle qui ne peut être comprise que si le sujet qui la reçoit 
suscite en lui une forme analogue aux formes apportées par le support 
d’information.29 
This very information is our problem. The linguistic and hermeneutic 
issue from the story, shifting from naming to meaning, tries to extract 
significance. We face the problem of transmitting information twice, at 
the end of Kafka’s narration, when Odradek justifies itself: 
Manchmal, wenn man aus der Tür tritt und er lehnt gerade unten 
am Treppengeländer, hat man Lust, ihn anzusprechen. Natürlich 
stellt man an ihn keine schwierigen Fragen, sondern behandelt ihn 
– schon seine Winzigkeit verführt dazu – wie ein Kind. „Wie heißt 
du denn?“ fragt man ihn. „Odradek“, sagt er. „Und wo wohnst du?“ 
„Unbestimmter Wohnsitz“, sagt er und lacht; es ist aber nur ein La-
chen, wie man es ohne Lungen hervorbringen kann. Es klingt etwa so, 
wie das Rascheln in gefallenen Blättern. Damit ist die Unterhaltung 
27 Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 283. [“in the garret, the stairway, 
the lobbies, the entrance hall.” Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man,” 428.]
28 Simondon, Du mode d’existence, 246.
29 Ibid., 247.
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meist zu Ende. Übrigens sind selbst diese Antworten nicht immer zu 
erhalten; oft ist er lange stumm, wie das Holz, das er zu sein scheint.30 
Instead of information, Rascheln prevails, which phonologically and se-
mantically very much resembles Rauschen [engl. noise]—the domination 
of noise.
Or, we do not detect any flow of signals, the object’s hush, noise is 
absent, the channels are shut. The flow of information is blocked since 
no further formations exist anymore. However, Simondon’s quotation 
spares a crucial aspect: Simondon’s appreciation of the essence of the 
inherent-coherent technical object issues from the appreciation of the 
human invention hiding behind the discourse of essence.31 The herme-
neutical problem behind this formulation, namely that any invention has 
to be understood as such before it turns into information, can be easily 
ignored for a moment. Assuming Odradek as a creature of creation might 
in fact exemplify the problem mentioned above, he still recollects and 
recombines the dysfunctional and useless cloth to a whole new totality. 
The negation of the impractical valuelessness of their elements turns them 
into a creative artifact. Now, everything has purpose while neglecting 
its purposiveness, just as the actants who break free from the operative 
chains in order to reassemble.
The coined phrase of a “purposiveness without purpose” does not 
only transform the text into a commentary on nonhuman things and 
their missing human formations, but also—as a second approach—to 
a self-commentary on art. Since Kant, we know of this phrase to have 
been one of the most prominent definitions of a work of art. Independent 
of any pragmatic or functional relations we conceive the work of art as 
30 Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 283. [“Many a time when you go 
out of the door and he happens just to be leaning directly beneath you 
against the banisters you feel inclined to speak to him. Of course, you put 
no difficult questions to him, you treat him—he is so diminutive that you 
cannot help it—rather like a child. ‘Well, what’s your name?’ you ask him. 
‘Odradek,’ he says. ‘And where do you live?’ ‘No fixed abode,’ he says and 
laughs; but it is only the kind of laughter that has no lungs behind it. It 
sounds rather like the rustling of fallen leaves. And that is usually the end 
of the conversation. Even these answers are not always forthcoming; often 
he stays mute for a long time, as wooden as his appearance.” Kafka, “The 
Cares of a Family Man,” 428.]
31 Cf. Simondon, Du mode d’existence, 247.
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being genuinely complete and inherently purposive. In fact, the Kantian 
work of art, the creation of an artistic genius, is similarly embedded 
like Simondon’s technical object, that is to say as a mediation between 
man and the totality of nature. This, by the way, reminds us largely of a 
trademark conception coined by the German Classicism as can be found 
in the work of Karl Philipp Moritz: 
Der Begriff vom Unnützen nämlich, insofern es gar keinen Zweck 
keine Absicht außer sich hat, warum es da ist, schließt sich am wil-
ligsten und nächsten an den Begriff des Schönen an, insofern das-
selbe auch keines Endzwecks, keiner Absicht warum es da ist, außer 
sich bedarf, sondern seinen ganzen Wert und den Endzweck seines 
Daseins in sich selber hat.32 
This immediate proximity of artificial artifacts and technical objects lead 
to a clear rejection of art being subordinate to technology.
But there is another element in Kafka’s narration that leads us from 
noise to waste, to what cannot be further utilizable, and therefore exceeds 
itself from the realm of application and utility, from socio-technological 
collectives to its renewed access to nature. For though Odradek’s neat 
innocence might have persuaded us, he employs a dark threat.33 The 
Hausvater puts it like this: 
Vergeblich frage ich mich, was mit ihm geschehen wird. Kann er denn 
sterben? Alles, was stirbt, hat vorher eine Art Ziel, eine Art Tätigkeit 
gehabt und daran hat es sich zerrieben; das trifft bei Odradek nicht 
zu. Sollte er also einstmals etwa noch vor den Füßen meiner Kinder 
und Kindeskinder mit nachschleifendem Zwirnsfaden die Treppe 
hinunterkollern? Er schadet ja offenbar niemandem; aber die Vor-
stellung, daß er mich auch noch überleben sollte, ist mir eine fast 
schmerzliche.34
32 Karl Philipp Moritz, “Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen,” in 
Karl Philipp Moritz, Werke in zwei Bänden. Vol. 1, ed. Jürgen Jahn (Berlin 
and Weimar: Aufbau 1973), 261.
33 Cf. Hartmut Böhme, Fetischismus und Kultur. Eine andere Theorie der 
Moderne (Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), 50–53.
34 Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” 284. [“I ask myself, to no purpose, 
what is likely to happen to him? Can he possibly die? Anything that dies 
has had some kind of aim in life, some kind of activity, which has worn 
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Its stable being was a result of the constant extraction of purposes, aims 
and goals. It is simply worn out. Its relief from temporality though is the 
factual matter of concern.35 At the same time, its strange constitution, a 
hybrid state of neither being regarded as a functional thing nor as a com-
posting and steadily resolving waste makes it so hard to grasp conceptu-
ally. The task seems to be a hard one to tackle, especially for a theory like 
the ANT which is at work with chains of operation and mediation. This 
problem could be easily put aside to the realm of literary theory if it were 
not for the task of all the theoretical and para-theoretical approaches to 
conceptualize these particular non-things while giving us the same evidence 
as does our ordinary experience beyond any assemblage. In his book 
Rubbish Theory. The Creation and Destruction of Value Michael Thompson 
points out that the “covert rubbish category is not subject to the control 
mechanism (which is concerned primarily with the overt part of the sys-
tem, the valuable and socially significant objects).”36 Qualified as an invis-
ible and worthless object, it successfully escapes from observations and 
in an ideal world, free of nature’s negative attitude, [it] would reach 
zero value and zero expected life-span at the same instant and then 
[…] disappear into dust. But, in reality, it usually does not do this; it 
continues to exist in a timeless and valueless limbo.37
Whereas most of the theoretical approaches start out from an ideal world, 
the worthless and displaced object persists somewhere in the realm of 
culture. Vilém Flusser’s portrayal of São Paolo, the city of dirt, smell and 
waste and its carelessly discarded bottles is a compelling work in that 
context.38 The shattered bottles transform into broken fragments and 
out; but that does not apply to Odradek. Am I to suppose, then, that he 
will always be rolling down the stairs, with ends of thread trailing after him, 
right before the feet of my children, and my children’s children? He does no 
harm to anyone that one can see; but the idea that he is likely to survive me 
I find almost painful.” Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man,” 428.]
35 Cf. for the linking between temporality and care Martin Heidegger, 
Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), 180–234.
36 Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory. The Creation and Deonstruction of 
Value (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 1979), 9.
37 Ibid., 10.
38 Cf. Vilém Flusser, “Aus der Stadt der Erstinkenden. Eine Flaschenpost,” 
in Vilém Flusser, Nachgeschichten. Essays, Vorträge, Glossen (Düsseldorf: 
Bollmann, 1990), 181–84.
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linger on in between nature and culture; turned into waste, not valueless 
and formless, but in itself anti-value and anti-form: “Wir können überall 
beobachten,” claims Flusser, 
wie sich Unrat, Schmutz und Fäulnis zu Bergen häufen, wie sie aus 
allen Kanälen quillen, unsere Schritte hemmen, in unsere Körper 
und Geister dringen, immer weniger vermieden werden können, wie 
die in ihnen sich mehrenden Pestträger uns immer mehr infizieren 
und wie die darin verborgenen Scherben, zum Beispiel weggeworfene 
Flaschen, uns immer tiefere Wunden schneiden.39 
In this case one can definitely speak of a certain kind of agency, al-
though with a negative quality, which itself restricts human agency. By 
doing so it diminishes the human faculty of freedom in the same way 
as do the regular technical objects who were assigned legitimate agency. 
A theory that ignores these particular objects would mean to shutter 
important parts of the network. Yet, this cannot be the answer to our 
problem. 
The general ignorance of waste has eliminated its subject matter from 
the cultural matrix in order to maintain its clear cut realm of what can be 
defined as culture. But not only has it stabilized its scope—as a result we 
might gain another fictional theory: We can track down our discussion 
to Jesse Detwiler, a prototypical “waste-theorist” and “visionist”40 from 
Don DeLillo’s 1997 Underworld. 
39 Vilém Flusser, Dinge und Undinge. Phänomenologische Skizzen. Mit einem 
Nachwort von Florian Rötzer (Munich and Vienna: Hanser, 1993), 21. [“We 
can easily observe the filthy, rotten debris, piled up, becoming mountains 
of waste, pouring out of the channels, hindering us to move along, invad-
ing our minds and bodies, impossible to avoid, increasingly infecting us, 
plague-ridden; and how the shattered glass of thrown away bottles that lies 
beneath cuts deeply into our flesh.” Author’s translation.] There is also a 
prominent literary example for shards which cause injuries: The Pfahl-
dorfgeschichte in Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s paradigmatical thing-novel 
demonstrates how the garbage in a village of neolithic stilt houses turns 
into a new actor, who—in the shape of shards—cuts wounds into the villag-
ers’ feet. Cf. Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Auch Einer. Eine Reisebekanntschaft 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1987), 157.
40 Don DeLillo, Underworld (London, Basingstoke and Oxford: Picador, 
2011), 285.
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Is literature able to draw connections that theory fails to see? Detwiler’s 
teaching, which he usually spreads at the UCLA, sounds familiar and em-
phasizes the superiority of agency of garbage towards the agency of humans: 
Detwiler said that cities rose on garbage, inch by inch, gaining eleva-
tion through the decades as buried debris increased. Garbage always 
got layerd over or pushed to the edges, in a room or in a landscape. 
But it had its own momentum. It pushed back. It pushed into every 
space available, dictating construction patterns and altering systems. 
And it produced rats and paranoia.41
DeLillo’s novel introduces an epistemological problem: it is this hybrid, 
which is excluded from the act of cognition. This is mainly because cogni-
tive systems are designed to exactly reduce complexity by ignoring waste 
for the sake of mere self-defense—causing philosophy and civilization to 
split. Both are solid corporations of waste. While philosophy successfully 
keeps the matter of waste a best kept secret—Plato’s Parmenides 42 is an 
early non-literary evidence—civilization is genuinely waste-modeled. If 
one keeps in mind philosophy’s ignorance of waste, the reading of the 
following passage might become plausible. The discourse of the “waste-
theorist” continues: 
Civilization did not rise and flourish as men hammered out hunting 
scenes on bronze gates and whispered philosophy under the stars with 
garbage as a noisome offshot, swept away and forgotten. No, garbage 
rose first, inciting people to build a civilization in response, in self-
defense. We had to find ways to discard our waste, to use what we 
couldn’t discard, to reprocess what we couldn’t use. Garbage pushed 
back. It mounted an spread.43 
41 Ibid., 287. Cf. Torsten Hahn, “Im Absturz. Kafkas Beobachtung der 
Gegenseite oder Von Resten und Medien,” in The Parallax View, ed. Markus 
Krause, Arno Meteling and Markus Stauff (München: Fink, 2011), 105–121.
42 Plato, “Parmenides,” in The Dialogues of Plato in Four Volumes, Vol. III, 
trans. Benjamin Jowett, (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1878), 
244–300. Whoever is philosophically concerned with waste is in danger 
of “fall[ing] into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish,” as Socrates 
replies to the question if there are ideas about “things as hair, mud, dirt, 
or anything else which is foule and base.” Ibid., 247. 
43 DeLillo, Underworld, 287.
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This garbage needs management. However, the waste-theorist does not 
call for traditional waste-management facilities. His politics are quite the 
contrary: “[B]asic household waste ought to be placed in the cities that 
produce it. Bring garbage into the open. Let people see and respect it.”44 
The garbage is meant to be turned into a tourist attraction in a district 
with “georgeous buidlings to recycle waste,”45 where parties of tourists 
can dispose their garbage, “[b]us tours and postcards” 46 guaranteed. 
This counter-program calls the roll to translit(t)erate the “covert rubbish 
category”47 to an ‘overt’ category as Michael Thompson puts it. “Don’t 
hyde your waste facilities. Make an architecture of waste.”48 As opposed 
to philosophy, literature encourages to reinstall waste into society. Here, 
one can perfectly see how “[l]e summum de la philosophy peut tenir dans 
un petit récit,”49 as Michel Serres puts it. 
The topology of the discourse of the properly moving garbage, the 
kind which does not elude itself from observation, seems to be that of 
literature. Our last example is supporting this thesis in a similar fashion. 
Here, we find another, yet quite idiosyncratic case of an architecture of 
waste: Edgar Lawrence Doctorow’s Homer & Langley, fictionalizes the 
story of two brothers from New York, written in 2009. During the course 
of their lives, the historical characters Homer and Langley Collyer col-
lected tons of refuse: dishes, books, instruments, curtains, rugs, weapons, 
or furniture. Over the years, Langley compiled these objects by collect-
ing jaunts in New York. Certainly, after the brothers’ death their flat 
was in danger to collapse so the vast collection of things needed to be 
removed under extraordinary circumstances. Doctorow’s novel begins 
with the blind Homer who is forced to leave his passion for playing the 
piano because of an advancing deafness. To compensate his loss, he 
starts to write his memoirs on an old Braille machine. In his memoirs, 
his brother’s passion becomes evident: Langley is a manic collector of 
cultural debris, objects which became useless, worthless and superfluous 
to society. He passionately amasses old military equipment which he 
bought cheaply since it has lost its value after World War I: gasmasks, 
guns, and so forth. He is similarly proliferate when it comes to piling 
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 286.
47 Thompson, Rubbish Theory, 9. 
48 DeLillo, Underworld, 286.
49 Serres, Éclaircissements, 42.
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up daily newspapers, though we know that nothing is as old as yester-
day’s news. With this in mind, he aims to reassemble the fragments to 
establish the only timeless “eternal always up-to-date-newspaper”50 in 
order to replace every future news reports.
Categories of the useful and the useless do not matter. This becomes 
evident when he plans to buy a Model T, a car nobody but him seems 
to be interested in anymore, because, as we learn from Homer: “At this 
time, the end of the thirties, early forties, cars were streamlined. That was 
the word for the latest up-to-date thing in auto-design. Streamlining cars 
meant warping them, not showing a right angle anywhere.”51 But precisely 
the purchase of an outdated car model no person is interested in is the 
core of his very motivation. His motivation is even curiously extended 
when he places this car in the center of the family property’s dining room. 
This would not have been a problem, had not Miss Robilaux, the family’s 
cook, been wondering “why something made for the outside is inside.”52 
Miss Robilaux had already been employed while the brother’s parents 
were still living and their house had not been witness to the ubiquity of 
garbage in society. As Homer recalls: “a glorious elegance prevaled [in 
the house], calming and festive at the same time.”53 Miss Robilaux has 
been transformed into “the last connection to [their] past.”54 Of course 
the ongoing havoc in the patrician house set her thinking. However, 
Langley cannot quite follow Miss Robilaux’s concerns: “How can you 
make an ontological distinction between outside and inside? On the basis 
of staying dry when it rains? […] The inside is the outside and the outside 
is the inside.”55 By eliminating the ontological difference of the interior 
and the exterior which accompanies the distinction between waste and 
the practical and also its cultural demarcation, the house more and more 
favors the ‘worthless,’ as Michael Thompson puts it, hence these objects 
whose biography remains unwritten since they are rendered categori-
cally invisible. Garbage as it is folds its way back from the outside into 
culture itself, and in addition to that is being amplified by Langley with 
the greatest effort possible. It reclaims its own politics.
50 E.L. Doctorow, Homer & Langley. A Novel (New York: Random House 
Paperback Edition, 2010), 136.
51 Ibid., 80.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 207.
54 Ibid., 100.
55 Ibid., 80–81.
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In the course of the novel, this third nonhuman actor increasingly cap-
tures the house: The waste, the langleyan “accumulation of decades”56 
is now in complete domination. This leads to Homer, blind and by now 
completely deaf, only communicating with his brother via his Braille ma-
chine, becoming included by the culturally excluded: “Langley’s defensive 
strategy has made it unwise if not impossible for me to try to get around 
the house. For all practical purposes I am imprisoned.”57 Langley’s defen-
sive strategy is nothing else than political separation from intruders and 
enemies. A necessity which derives from the fact that the messy twins’ 
house at Central Park gained popularity due to several news reports; it 
even became “a greater attraction than the Empire State Building.”58 The 
house is attacked by stone-throwing children, prowlers are eager to get 
in possession of some stored money, the latter based on the newspapers’ 
rumors. Threatened by that, Langley becomes paranoid and sets traps: 
“Each room has its punishing design of our things. Washboards greased 
with soap are laid on the floor for the unweary to step on.”59 Langley 
begins to reassign meaning to the useless objects as if the waste only 
ever had just one designated meaning: to defend from intruders. Doing 
so, he tries to reinstall waste into the collective in order to be in control 
of it: “[H]e began to devise from the horded materials of our life in this 
house—as if everything here had been amassed in response to a prophetic 
intelligence—the means of our last stand.”60 Langley, the “solemn inves-
tigator of useless things,”61 turns into the creator of his own work: as an 
hermeneutician of waste, he assigns meaning to all the useless things in 
the house, yet ignoring or misinterpreting a crucial point—via their own 
powerful agencies and their sovereign qualities as an actor, things are 
able to resist Langley’s urge to attach meaning. 
Awaiting a fight for one’s last stand, the aging Langley not only con-
straints his brother Homer but also himself. He finds himself confronted 
with the increasing threat of immobility: “Langley is also constrained. 
He has established himself in the kitchen with access in and out of the 
house through the back door to the garden. The front hall is completely 
56 Ibid., 205.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 203.
59 Ibid., 206.
60 Ibid., 201.
61 Ibid.
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blocked with boxes of books stacked to the ceiling.”62 Even these stacks 
are only narrowed down to one sole meaning: “he has piled things up in 
pyramidal fashion that the least nudge of any one thing […] and the whole 
assemblage will fall on the interloper, the object of Langley’s stratagems.”63 
The “labyrinth of hazardous pathways, full of obstructions and many dead 
ends”64 contained in that architecture of waste is, as opposed to the remarks 
of the waste-theorist, not at all designed to attract tourists, but to keep 
away intruders. Yet, the architecture hides a fatal problem, Langley’s fal-
lacy: he overlooks the fact that the enemy is not out there in the streets, 
but right in the middle of his own house. To a considerable extent and 
with enormous effort65 he invited the very actor to his home who is largely 
emancipated and far away from letting himself be integrated into the as-
sembly. This actor will finally have put a nail in the brothers’ coffin: the 
impractical debris, the garbage gone wild, too powerful to be ever put 
back into the box again. All that, is rendered visible by Doctorow’s novel.
The blind and deaf Homer eventually realizes that he could not pos-
sibly survive without Langley’s support. Nobody is left to feed him and 
to help him get along navigating through the labyrinthine piles of waste. 
It is him who declares what both already knew: “My brother and I were 
going down.”66 Finally, in the tragic ending of the novel we read his last 
words emphasizing the clairvoyance of his vision: “[F]or how many days 
have I been without food. There was a crash, the whole house shook. 
Where is Langley? Where is my brother?”67
He was not able to foresee the astonishing consequences of his notori-
ous collection of waste: things acted upon their agencies. The “comfort of 
things”68 can turn into a horror of things unless we bring the agencies of 
things to our minds and start to successfully collectivize objects and their 
62 Ibid., 205.
63 Ibid., 206.
64 Ibid., 158. 
65 Homer describes the vast extent of his brother’s waste-collection: 
“the guts of pianos, motors wrapped in their power cords, boxes of tools, 
paintings, car body parts, tires, stacked chairs, tables on tables, headbords, 
barrels, collapsed stacks of books, antique lamps, dislodged pieces of our 
parent’s furniture, rolled-up capet, piles of clothing, bycicles.” Ibid., 158.
66 Ibid., 200.
67 Ibid., 208.
68 Cf. Daniel Miller, The Comfort of Things (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2008).
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remains. In this respect, Flusser’s demand for a “philosophy of waste”69 
perfectly highlights the epistemological gap which needs to be filled if we 
do not want to become overrun by garbage and waste. 
Literature is conscious about that problem. Therefore, it should 
matter to take literature’s knowledge into account as Michel Serres and 
Bruno Latour do. In his recently published work Enquête sur les modes 
d’existence, Latour describes fiction from a whole new perspective. Here, 
the “êtres de fiction”70 may claim “ubiquité,”71 without them, neither one 
of the disciplines like technology, politics, religion or law72 can be able to 
construct sufficient models of communication: “Pas de science possible, 
et surtout pas de science abstraite, sans peupler le monde de ces petits 
êtres capables d’aller partout, de se rendre partout.”73
Out of this very love for fiction in general and for literary fiction 
in particular we can open up the possibilities for literature to create 
and negotiate a type of knowledge operating far beyond any scientific 
discourse—a knowledge, capable to unveil the epistemological gap. The 
texts introduced in this paper did precisely that: to show that literature 
could lay bare the blind spot by focusing on things with a genuine qual-
ity. Things existing beyond obligatory passage points, operative chains 
and mediation.
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michael  n iehaus
Wandering thingS
Stories
i . inTroducT ion
Under the plain titel Wandering things. Stories I want you to pay attention 
to a specific manner how things can become actors or can be considered 
as actors. Quite simply, if you say that things are wandering, you must 
consider them—somehow—as actors. In this regard, the wandering of 
things can be represented only in stories. But—as I want to point out—
this simplicity holds an enigma, because our relation to the things in 
general is at stake. What about our relation to the things? If we try to get 
an answer to this question we maybe deposit a specific thing in front of us 
to observe it, or we may bring a thing to mind, as a matter of theoretical 
reflexion. In both cases, the subject-object-relation is already presup-
posed, as Martin Heidegger has declared. Under this circumstances, 
the thing being present-at-hand (vorhanden) is something, of which the 
readyness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) is granted. The thing is something at 
our disposal, it is an object of pleasure or consumption, or it is a willing 
object of contemplation. 
Philosophical theories of things are insofar unbalanced as they focus 
on a thing under the precondition it can be considered by itself. It is sup-
posed that the thing is either ready-to-hand or, in the contrary, deprived, 
not ready-to-hand (unzuhanden). The axis in question is that of presence 
and absence, but this presence and this absence take place only between 
me and the thing. The others have nothing to do with this affair, with 
this thing. The presence of the thing is not thought of as a belonging, 
as a possession or property; and the absence of the thing is not thought 
of as the belonging of an other. In this perspective, the thing as a social 
fact remains hidden.
i i . TransacT ion
The forms in which things can be possessed or not possessed become 
conspicuous in the transactions, that can be executed with them. A thing 
is an object of possible transactions. This is true especially for the things 
called mobilia in accordance with the Roman law and Fahrnis under the 
Germanic law: In the case of movable properties, the transactions be-
come observable. Movable things can actually pass from hand to hand. 
To speak of wandering things does not refer to the physical space, but 
to the social space. A culture in which different ways of having a thing 
don’t exist is hardly to imagine. The transaction is more than a Fort-Da 
as Freud describes it in Jenseits de Lustprinzips.1 It connects me with 
another in the mode of swapping, buying, donating, delivering, lending, 
stealing, bonding etc. But this is only the first step. In order to talk about 
wandering things (and not only about movable properties), an important 
additional condition has to be introduced in the following.
As long as there is only one transaction, I am connected with one other 
person. The function of the thing—apparently—is reduced to define this 
one connection. By the thing, I am referred to this other. So, if am cheated 
in purchasing something I have to adress myself to the salesman; if I am 
stolen I have to catch the thief; a gift should be responded by a gift in 
return; a souvenir should be preserved. 
Under this circumstances, it is not yet clear what a movable thing in 
fact can be. Therefore, a second transaction is necessary bringing a third 
party into play. This second transaction is implied in the first already. It is 
always possible: What I have got from somebody I can pass on to another. 
This happens continuously, and only at the first glance gift and exchange 
are more fundamental. Members of a culture connect themselves under 
the sign of objects being passed on. In this respect, the social bond ex-
ists because everybody is in the position of someone who may pass on 
movable things. In the same way, human communication is not based 
on mere signals to be exchanged (like in the case of the famous bees of 
Karl von Frisch), but on the possibility of passing on the words that are 
1 Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Jenseits des Lustprinzips,” in Psychologie des Unbe-
wußten, by Sigmund Freud, vol. 3 of Studienausgabe, edited by Alexander 
Mitscherlich, Angela Richards and James Strachey (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Fischer, 2000), 213–273, especially 224–226. 
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spoken to me.2 The third party is the precondition of speech. Human 
speech is something to circulate.
In this regard, wandering things are not described as a part of a struc-
ture or an element in a network as in the Actor-Network-Theory. The 
movable thing may function as an actor because it circulates inside a net-
work, but it may also overstep and transcend the network. It is something 
that can be displaced. So, in comparison with the Actor-Network-Theory, 
this is a different point of view. This point of view is only available by 
telling stories in which things get another kind of actor-status.
i i i . possess ion  and  oWnersh ip
In order to differentiate the various types of having a thing, there is the 
distinction between possession and ownership or proprietorship (Besitz 
und Eigentum in terms of the german law). Is it possible to imagine a 
culture not making a difference between rightful and wrongful possession? 
What kinds of options do I have, if someone denies my rightful posses-
sion of a movable property declaring he himself to be the legal owner? I 
can explain, where I got it from—for instance who gave or sold it to me. 
So, I can refer to a warrantor (Gewährsmann). The former owner becomes 
a third party, who guarantees the rightfulness of my possession. 
In the ancient germanic law this was a judical procedure called 
Dritthandverfahren. According to this procedue, the tried property right 
virtually releases the so-called “Zug auf den Gewähren”3, because my 
warrantor also needs a warrantor to testify his property right and so on. 
This is the best way to demonstrate that the others are implied in the 
thing that I hold in my hands.
But law also shows that the possession of a thing is not as simple as 
one might think. Possession means the de facto power over a thing (in 
German law: “tatsächliche Sachherrschaft”), but a will to possess the thing 
(“auf den Besitz gerichteter Wille”) is also required. Insofar, not only the 
category of ownership, but also the category of possession implies an 
immaterial and a little mystic dimension. Of course you don’t need to 
know all the things stored in your cellar in perticular, but a possession 
2 Cf. Jacques Lacan, “Fonction et Champ da la Parole et du Langage,” in 
Écrits, by Lacques Lacan (Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 1966), 237–323: 297.
3 Cf. Adalbert Erler and Ekkehard Kaufmann, eds., Handwörterbuch zur 
deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 1 (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1971), p. 160.
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of a thing you don’t have the slightest idea about, is not a possession any 
more. For example, from a legal point of view I don’t possess the drugs 
deposited in my cellar without my knowledge.
Every child can possess something. In the textbooks of this matter 
you can read that a child having forgotten his bicycle on the playground, 
still is the possessor of this bicycle, as long as the relation between the 
person and the object still has a certain intensity.4 If I am still aware of the 
place where I have left something, there remains a kind of bond between 
me and the thing. But this bond—paradoxically—can be cut by someone 
without my knowledge, if somebody else takes the property and stuffs it 
in his own pocket without respect for the other’s possession.5
Such considerations are important, because they show that possession 
is a strange thing. On the one hand possession is characterized as the actual 
control over an object—and therefore implies a power relationship (Gewalt-
verhältnis)—, but on the other hand it consitutes a protected legal position.6 
In principle, the thief even is allowed to use force to protect his piece of 
booty against the offense of the legal owner, because with the seizure he 
acquires a claim that his possession is protected (Besitzschutzanspruch). 
The reason for this is the legal certainty (Rechtsfrieden), which is a great 
value. Only the presumption, that the possession is legal, allows legal 
certainty. If someone can be seen possessing something he effectively 
exhibits himself as the proprietor. This is the publicity function (Publi-
zitätsfunktion) of possession. Of course, you may not only hold an object 
lawfully in your hands without being it’s legal owner, you can also hold 
it in your hand without possessing it. For instance, if you are a baggage 
porter you are not a possessor, but an agent in possession (Besitzdiener). 
Of course, the category of property is rather complicated, too. Accord-
ing to the German property law proprietorship is a comprehensive right 
of disposition (umfassendes Herrschaftsrecht). But that doesn’t mean that 
it is unlimited—just like the possessor, the proprietor of an object is not 
alone with it. So, at first the limit of the right of disposition results from 
the rights of a third party. At second, as it is articulated in the German 
Grundgesetz in Article 14, the social obligation of property (Sozialbindung 
4 The relation “zwischen Person und Sache” has to be “von einer gewis-
sen Intensität” [Walter Gerhardt, Mobiliarsachenrecht. Besitz – Eigentum 
– Pfandrecht (München: Beck, 1976), 15].
5 “ohne Achtung vor fremdem Besitz” (ibid.).
6 “rechtlich geschützte Rechtsposition” (ibid., 17).
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des Eigentums) has to be taken into account. At third, and particularly 
relevant in this context, the boundedness of ownership becomes obvious, 
if the property turns into waste. Having turned into waste, the ‘thingness’ 
of the object becomes insisting. Of course, there exists the abandonment 
of movable property as a special act in the law, but it cannot be performed 
ex parte, because in our society, there is no such thing as a no man’s land, 
but a waste deposal law instead.
The wandering of things, insofar it can be described in terms of le-
gal transactions, normally takes place without attracting attention. The 
things don’t manifest themselves as actors. Therefore, one could say: 
they remain properties. This changes if the things produce unforeseen 
feedbacks during their wandering or if the things are observed what they 
cause during their wanderings. Under this circumstance, it seems as if 
the things had their own way, as if they owned a self-will subjecting the 
participants to a structure or a relation. If a thing causes or uncovers 
relations behind the back of the participants, it appears as an actor that 
remains totally passive at the same time.
Such a wandering consists in succeeding incidents or transactions. 
So, it is object of a narration. It appears only in stories. To turn towards 
wandering things therefore means to talk about stories containing wander-
ing things which occur as actors—prominently or unimposingly. A “story” 
has to be understood as something having a plot causing relationships 
between different subjects. People are linked and brought into a constella-
tion by the wandering thing. It becomes a signifier beyond the importance 
that the thing may have for one single person in an exclusive relationship.
i v . Th inG -sTor ies 
Strictly speaking, a narrative with a thing as an actor will not be the story 
of this thing. Such pure thing-stories are rather borderline cases because 
they are hardly something else than the episodic stories of their following 
possessors and owners who are only externally related to each other. Of 
course, there are many narratives with this underlying structure. In Brit-
ish literature, so-called it-narratives were a temporary fashion especially 
between 1750 and 1830.7 
7 Cf. Mark Blackwell, ed., British It-Narratives (1750–1830), 4 volumes (Lon-
don: Pickwering & Chatto, 2012). This anthology contains a large number of 
thing-stories of different kinds of things, many of them are wandering things. 
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With regard to twentieth century literature, for instance Heinrich Bölls 
Abenteuer eines Brotbeutels (Adventures of a Haversack) tells the story of 
a haversack owned by different soldiers living and dying in a world 
of various wars until it turns back to the place where it started half a 
century before. Or, concerning novels of epic dimensions, in Accordion 
Crimes by Annie Proulx (1996), a particular accordion wanders through 
a twentienth-century Northern America in eight episodes. It crosses 
different minorities of immigrants and their various musical traditions 
dedicated to dwindle away. The thing, losing material and symbolical 
value during this journey, is thrown away as waste out of a truck in the 
end. The accordion’s journey is an odyssee: The thing is in the position 
of a completely passive epic hero only with the function to connect and 
disclose various rooms, social environments.
Stories are always dealing with subjects. Therefore, the thing of a 
thing-story virtually receives subject-status. But this subject-position is 
only one of suffering, whereupon this suffering is paradoxically a suffering 
without organs, so its story will be a passion without pain. Perhaps, this 
becomes most obvious in Hans Christian Andersen’s unfathomable and 
horrible fairy tale The Steadfast Tin Soldier. The story follows the voice-
less and unflexible tin soldier on his little odyssee until he melts with 
his beloved puppet dancer in the fireside, being a subject without acting.
This ambivalent position of the thing in a thing-story becomes mani-
fest, if the thing actually is ascribed subject-status—if it really does what 
we like to impute it to do hypothetically: to tell his own story. Many of 
the it-narratives in British literature have things as narrators, beginning 
with the satirical Adventures of a Shilling by Joseph Addison in 1710. In 
the eighteenth century, many pieces of money tell their adventures that 
take place when they pass from hand to hand.8 Often they function as 
spies who disclose the intimate secrets of their owners, because things 
allow ‘unperceived perception’.9 
If the thing becomes a narrator—may it be a coin as in Hans Chris-
tian Andersens fairy tale The Silver Shilling, a handkerchief as in James 
Fenimore Coopers Book Autobiography of a Pocket-Handkerchief or a car 
8 The first volume of the British It-Narratives ist dedicated to money, 
most of the texts name themselves as “adventures” (The Adventures of a 
Halfpenny, The Adventures of a Silver Penny, The Adventures of a Bad Shilling 
in the Kingdom or Ireland, Adventures of One Pound Bank Note and so on).
9 Cf. Mark Blackwell, “General Preface,” in British It-Narratives (1750–
1830), ed. Mark Blackwell, vol. 1 (London: Pickwering & Chatto, 2012), xx. 
114
as in the film In jenen Tagen by Helmut Käutner—the thing always tells 
his story detached from his materiality as a thing. It has no organ to tell 
its story, no mouth. It tells its story exclusively for us, the readers.10 So, 
the shilling in Addisons story can be coined newly, the handkerchief 
in Cooper’s Novel can be embroidered elaborately, the silver shilling in 
Andersen’s fariy tale can be speared in the middle and the limousine in 
Käutner’s film can be cannibalized without affecting its position as a 
thing delivering a speech without acting.
v. The  Th inG  and  The  inTersubecT i ve  Tr i anGle
In the it-narratives, precisely because the story is told by the thing itself, 
the thing appears as a non-actor. It is impossible for it to observe itself as 
an actor. On the other side a thing in a story may not only function as 
a subject, but also as a signifier. Since Jacques Lacan’s famous lecture on 
Edgar Allan Poe’s The Purloined Letter, this letter has become a paradigm 
of a thing functioning as a signifier and therefore it belongs to nobody. 
A letter is not a coin; it is not exchangeable.11 According to Lacan, the 
letter in Poe’s story is the “sujet véritable ,” because it has a route or a path 
of its own “un trajet qui lui est propre.”12 As long as it is not on its right 
place (that means: as long as it is inside the story) the letter circum-
scribes a way where those who grasp the letter consider themselves to 
be empowered on the one side, but on the other side they cannot display 
themselves as the empowered possessors. On the contrary, they are in 
a powerless position, because they can’t prevent the letter being taken 
away from them. 
Lacan analyzes Poe’s text as a story that exposes the pure materiality 
of the (subjecting) signifier without the signified: undoubtedly the content 
of the letter is something that can be cancelled down. Nevertheless, the 
letter only can appear in the story invented by Poe because it is more than 
a signifier. It’s just a letter with peculiar characteristics that are important 
10 In some of the stories the things, especially in the eighteenth century, 
may also be able to talk to each other and share their experiences, but 
certainly they cannot talk to human beings.
11 As Lacan declares, with respect so signifiation, money is the most 
annihilating signifier (the “signifiant le plus annihilant que soit de toute 
signification.” Jacques Lacan, Écrits (Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1966), 37. 
12 Ibid., 29.
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in the story. Only if the letter is a removable thing in a story it can have 
a way of its own and become a “a dramatic allegory of psychoanalysis.”13
Only insofar the signifier is a thing, it can be regarded as an actor 
that may signify someone. It can be an indication in a chain, in which I 
am a link. In Germany there’s a children’s game called Ringlein, Ringlein, 
du musst wandern (in Britain, there’s a similar game called button, button, 
who’s got the Button). In this game, a ring is strung, and the string runs 
through the fists of the children forming a circle. The ring is handed over 
by waving the fists until they get into contact to the fist of the neighbour. 
In the middle, there is the guesser—in some way the ‘eye of the law’—who 
after a while has to say who is the possessor of the ring at this moment. 
To deceive the guesser, the other children who don’t have the ring, move 
their fists too, as if they would transport the ring. The ring itself belongs 
to nobody. It owns to the bond represented in the string that connects 
the players making common cause against the ‘eye of the law’. 
In this children’s game, the thing circulates in a regulated way without 
generating a story. All participants (except the guesser) are in the same 
position. But things wandering inside of stories may also function as 
signifiers of a chain-linking. Such stories tell about people that are moved 
into a subject-position by the thing that has nothing do with their actual 
physical authority. In these cases, things indicate constellations between 
subjects they didn’t know about. The crux is an intersubjective chain-
linking of at least three persons. No doubt, from the legal point of view 
the path of the thing doesn’t need to be a wrong way at all. The thing 
doesn’t need to be purloined, defrauded, stolen or robbed. But one can 
also say that, from the point of view of the wandering thing, every way is 
a wrong way, a meander. This becomes obvious, if the thing returns to 
the first one opening his eyes about his own position in a triangle.
In Gottfried Keller’s story Die Berlocken the young French soldier 
Thibaut de Vallormes donates his famous trinkets he had robbed from 
various women and girls to an indian child of nature in hope for a wed-
ding coming soon, but during the grand feast with the French soldiers 
and the indians, he is shocked when he recognizes his beloved gift sus-
pending on the nose of the dancing “Donner-Bär” (“thunder-bear”) who 
is the true fiancé. 
13 Shoshana Felman, Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight. Psycho-
analysis in Contemporary Culture, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press 1987), 11. Cf. also Michael Niehaus, Das Buch der wandern-
den Dinge (München: Hanser, 2009), 364–384.
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Certainly, the triangle may be imaginary or perhaps latent. In The Arabian 
Nights. Tales of 1001 Nights Shahrazad tells the story of the three apples.14 
A young wife gets dangerously ill and begs her husband, a merchant in 
Bagdad, to bring her an apple. Unfortunately, apples are not available in 
Bagdad, so the merchant travels to Basra and brings back three apples. 
But when he returns, the weakness of his wife has grown worse and she 
puts the apples aside. So the young merchant leaves his home and goes 
to the basar in his shop. After a while, he sees a black slave passing by 
holding one of these three apples in his hand and playing with it. He asks 
him about the apple and the black slave tells him that he has got it from 
his sick mistress, and that the husband of his mistress has bought three 
apples for her in Basra. The young merchant, out of his mind with anger, 
returns home and finds only two apples. His wife cannot say something 
about the third apple, and so the merchant kills his wife immediately. 
But later, it is proved, that the little son of the married couple fetched the 
apple to play with it in the street where the black slave took it away in 
spite of his urgent requests that this apple would be one of three apples 
belonging to his sick mother. 
The deception by an evidence of jealousy is a literary topos. It’s not 
a surprise that the most famous tragedy of jealousness, Shakespeare’s 
Othello, unfolds this topic quite systematically. At first, Desdemnona gives 
the embroidered handkerchief to Othello to alleviate his headache, but 
he lets it fall down inadvertently. Then Emilia, Jago’s wife, picks it up. 
Jago demands it from her and places it in the chamber of Cassio. Cassio 
finds it and gives it to Bianca, his mistress begging her to make a copy. 
This handkerchief connects all six characters and characterizes the three 
couples of this tragedy until it catches Othello’s eyes again, becoming the 
decisive “ocular proof.”15 Certainly, after this acquittal the handkerchief 
makes its exit. Its only function is to configurate the involved subjects of 
the drama.
Loaded with significance, enwraped with discourses, not for the 
enlaced characters of the tragedy, but for us this handkerchief may be-
come an enigmatic thing. To appreciate it, its material qualities have to 
be considered: that it is handmade and worth to be copied, that it can 
14 Malcolm C. Lyons with Ursula Lyons, trans., The Arabian Nights: Tales 
of 1001 Nights, introduced and annotated by Robert Irwin, vol. 1 (London: 
Penguin, 2008), 122–129.
15 William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. Norman Sanders, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 129 (3.3.361).
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drop to the floor without a sound, that it can be contaminated by use and 
abuse and so on. All these qualities transcending its character as a sign 
must be considered to analyze the specific way in which a thing can be 
predestined to become an actor in a story.
v i . maG ic  insTrumenTs
The specific qualities of a wandering thing are especially important, if 
the thing is of a kind we usually call instrument. One could think, that 
the purely intrumental relation to a thing effaces its history. If a thing 
can be used as we want it to use, its former owners are indifferent and 
not worth mentioning. But, concerning stories, it is in question, if such a 
totally instrumental relation is even possible. Let’s look at the marvelous 
wish-fulfilment things in fairy tales which are surely instumental in an 
outstanding way. Some of them can be used for unspecific wish-fulfilment 
like Aladdin’s magic lamp in The Arabian Nights, some of them are tailored 
to specific needs like the objects in The Wishing-Table, the Gold-Ass, and 
the Cudgel in the Sack.
In both cases, there is a problem with the instrumentality from a logi-
cal point of view. The character that possesses the magic thing becomes 
the protagonist of the story only because he possesses it. One could say 
that the magic thing is attached to its legitimate owner. If the wrong one 
lays his hands on the magic thing—like the sorcerer’s apprentice on the 
broom in Goethe’s famous ballad—the instrumentality quickly comes to 
an end. The faculty to operate the instrument may become the crucial 
attribute—only Ulysses is able to draw the bow, the suitors are unable 
to do that.
In fairy tales—and this may be the really magical—there is always 
only one person considered to deserve the marvelous thing (in legends 
however the marvelous things can be heirloom). This is the reason why 
magic things don’t really change their owner in fairy tales. If they got lost 
in one way or another, they always return to the legitimate owner. In the 
fairy tale Die treuen Tiere (the loyal animals) by the Brothers Grimm for 
example the male protagonist deserves the white magic stone, because he 
has ransomed a mouse, an ape and a bear with his last money. The stone 
just floats along as he is abandoned in a box on the water. The helpful 
animals, who already have opened the lock, let him know that this is about 
a magical stone fulfilling wishes. Some time later, the man now owns a 
magnificent castle and so on, he—paradoxically enough—exchanges his 
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stone with some jewels offered by a few merchants coming to his castle. 
Immediately, he finds himself in the floating box again. Although the 
merchants have acquired the magic stone legally by all means, the three 
animals are allowed to help the man once more stealing the stone from 
the merchants and bringing it back to him. In fairy tales transactions are 
not ruled by the logic of proprietorship of the civil law. The merchants 
only have acquired the stone, but the protagonist deserves it. Is is attributed 
to him. 
The attribution of protagonists to marvelous things can also be of 
an opposite kind. This can be demonstrated by a literary fairy tale in 
which the obstinacy of the marvelous thing—and therefore its status as 
an actor—insists in a very specific way. In Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué’s 
story Das Galgenmännlein from 181216, the magic thing is a kind of crea-
ture with very specific qualities—a bottle imp.17 It is not necessary to 
describe how the protagonist of the story, a young man named Reichard, 
who wanted to make his fortune as a merchant in Italy, has gained this 
diabolic thing. For now, he is the legal owner and has a problem. If you 
own the bottle imp, it’s for instrumental use only: It fulfills all wishes for 
money, but if you own it when you die, you will burn for eternity in Hell. 
The ‘comprehensive right of disposition’ which is connected with the 
concept of property, here turns into the very reverse in the moment of 
death. The thing is not only indisposable, it is also indevisable. Insofar, 
one could declare the effects of this precept as a peculiar specification 
of the ‘social obligation of property,’ because the fear of an unforeseen 
death may provide that a maximum number of people become owners 
of this magic thing, that promises infinite properties. To some extent, 
such a bottle imp is expotentiated money, that is to say expotentiated 
potentiality.
In this manner, a wholly secularistic systemic logic is constructed and 
a pure homo oeconomicus, whose genealogical bonds are severed according 
to the undevisability of the thing. The dead is the one who is not further 
able to forward the circulation. The thing makes the money rolling. It 
fires the trade cycle. But this is not enough. In respect of the circulation 
of the bottle imp, there is a second basic condition. It is truly diabolic. 
16 Friedrich Freiherr de la Motte-Fouqué, “Das Galgenmännlein,” in Werke, 
ed. Walther Ziesemer, vol. 1 (Berlin: Bong, 1908), 223–248.
17 The famous story The Bottle Imp by Robert Louis Stevenson (1891) has 
a very different plot (it’s a love story), but the creature has the same specific 
qualities.
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In a reversal of all economic principles the bottle bottle must be sold for 
less than its owner originally paid, or else it will simply return to him. 
Of course, the bottle may not be thrown or given away. And these com-
mands must be transmitted from each seller to each purchaser. No tricks! 
All must take place according to the rules of legal economic transactions. 
Legal owner and possessor are always the same person. 
This is the crucial condition of the transfer. Being unfertile, the 
domain of circulation expends itself. Each transaction makes the next 
one more improbable. Because of the growing risc not to get rid of the 
purchased bottle imp, the fate of the last owner is already casting its 
shadow.18 Not only foresight is characteristic of human subjects, but also 
the consideration of the foresight of others.
The bottle imp is an in-between. Therein lies its obastinacy and its 
diabolic character in a literal sense. As a being in a undestroyable bottle 
it is composite, but indivisive. It does not bring together like the symbolon 
(originally the two fitting halves of a broken clay tablet in ancient Greece 
demonstrating the bond between coequals), but it tears apart. Concerning 
this paradigmatic thing, there’s no community (and no communication), 
there’s only the total legal position, the exclusive, unrelinquishable pro-
prietorship, subjecting the proprietor.
What about the end of the story under this circumstances? Reichard 
is lucky to be a protagonist of a fairy tale. After having used the bottle 
to get rich with more or less fortune, he makes various unsuccessful 
attempts to get rid of the bottle by cheating the purchaser in one or 
another way. Every time he gets back the bottle, the price has become 
lower. At the end, our contrite hero strays through the not yet unified 
Italy, searching for a princedom with a coin less worth than a halfpenny 
to have a theoretical chance to sell his property. At last he encounters 
the rescuing deus ex machina who is a veritable diabolus ex machina: a 
blackguard from the premodern times of diabolic economy. Once upon a 
time this sinister guy has sold his soul to the devil for a fixed amount 
of money spent now. He buys the bottle imp, so Reichard can return 
to Germany where he will found a family and operate economically the 
rest of his life.
18 In some philosophical papers, with respect to Stevenson’s text, this is 
named the “bottle imp paradox.” Cf. Roy A. Sorensen, “The Bottle Imp 
and the Prediction paradox,” Philosophia 15/4 (1986): 421–24.
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v i i . Th inGs  oF  poWer
In some way, Fouqué’s story demonstrates by overcompliance: Things 
that prove themselves as actors exceed the logic of personal property. 
The wandering thing, which is neither completely absorbed in its sign 
character nor in its instrumental function to a certain extent can become 
a mythical thing. This becomes obvious when a curse is said to be lying 
on it. It is not by chance, that perhaps the ‘greatest stories’ of the last two 
hundred years (from the point of view of their effectiveness) have such 
a cursed thing in their title: Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen 
and J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.19
In fact, both of these synthetical myths are kept together by a wan-
dering thing of power. From the beginning, it is evident that the category 
of personal property does not fit for the ring-thing in Der Ring des 
Nibelungen. Even before the ring enters the stage (if one can say so), there 
are four positions or parties raising a claim. At first, the claiming Rhine-
Daughters, from whom the material, the gold the ring is made off was 
robbed; secondly, Alberich himself, who was able to build the ring, because 
he abdicated love, and who now uses it to suppress the underworld; at 
third, Wotan, who asserts a right on the ring, because he is the supreme 
god, and who needs the ring to stabilize the order of the world; and at 
fourth the giants Fafner and Fasolt, who are qualified to require the ring 
as an compensation for the denied goddess Freia.
None of these clains is totally wrong, none of them is totally right. So, 
this ring is dedicated wo be removed because there is no right place for it. 
At the same time, the ring is representative for a world situation in which 
all right places are arguable. With his powerful eloquent curse Alberich 
only makes explicit the curse that is lying on the ring anyway. The ring’s 
master (“des Ringes Herr”) will be the ring’s slave (“des Ringes Knecht”), 
he exclaims.20 Yet, one has to ask, whether this curse really is realized in 
the great story of the Nibelung’s ring. According to the imagination of 
19 Cf. Michael Niehaus, “Dinge der Macht. Der Ring des Nibelungen und 
der Herr der Ringe,” Zeitschrift für Germanistik 22 (2012): 72–88.
20 English translation of the passage: “and serve the ring / that he seems 
to rule.” Alfred Forman, The Nibelung’s Ring. English Words to Richard 
Wagner’s “Ring des Nibelungen” in the Alliterative Verse of the Original (Lon-
don: Schrott, 1877), 65.
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Alberich, the self proclaimed legal owner of the ring, the return to the ring 
to himself would solve the curse. But, in the contrary, this imagination is 
in effect the centre of the curse. Alberich is the one who makes evident, 
that the proclaimed master of the ring is actually its slave.
The crucial point of the ring is, that it is standing idle nearly all the 
time, watched by the sleeping Fafner in his cave. With Siegfried’s robbery 
the ring enters a completely new constellation, being totally independent 
from his instrumental function as a thing of power. As a love token, a 
symbol of a marriage and an aid to memory it becomes a sign. After having 
been robbed by Wotan and Mime, the ring is never more applied. This is 
also the reason, why it is completely nebolous, how this ring really works.
The Nibelung’s ring has its place particularly in verbal and musical 
discourse. Repeatedly, the characters who are in the know point to him 
and broach the issue of its absence. Only the bearers of the ring don’t 
know anything about that (or don’t want to know). In this respect, the 
ring is similar to what Alfred Hitchcock has called a “MacGuffin.” With 
this coinage Hitchcock named a plot motive that initiates the plot of the 
story and keeps it running, but which is finally revealed to be irrelevant. 
Only its absence, its inaccessibility is relevant—due to this inaccessibil-
ity, the MacGuffin becomes an actor. A typical example for a MacGuffin 
would be a suitcase everyone wants to have although the content of the 
suitcase never becomes clear. Actually, the philosopher and psychoanalyst 
Slavoj Žižek has called the Nibelung’s ring “the greatest MacGuffin of 
all times.”21
Concerning the ring-thing, which is so small that it is nearly invis-
ible on stage, it is essential that it represents something that cannot be 
owned like an object. It is not possible to have power as a property. This 
is confirmed by the synthetical myth, when the ring is thrown back into 
the floods of the Rhine at last.
In a related, but also very different manner this theme is also devel-
oped in J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, the synthetical myth par 
excellence. The fictional universe created by Tolkien is undoubtedly a 
unique form of a “Gesamtkunstwerk.” In his trilogy, Tolkien unfolds a 
metaphysics of power. Unlike in Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen, the 
starting point in The Lord of the Rings is the little—the species of the 
21 “[D]e[r] größte[ ] MacGuffin aller Zeiten” (Slavoj Žižek, “Diese obskuren 
Objekte des Begehrens. Alfred Hitchcock als Wagnerianer – eine Hommage 
zum 100. Geburtstag des britischen Regisseurs,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 
August 13, 1999, 10).
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Hobbits inhabiting the idyllic “Shire,” in maximum distance to the centre 
of power. By chance the hobbits have got the “One Ring:” “One Ring to 
rule them all, One Ring to find them, / One Ring to bring them all and in 
the darkness bind them.” It was forged by the Dark Lord Sauron in former 
times in order to gain dominion over alle free people of Middle-earth and 
those who wore the other rings of power, especially the three rings of the 
elves. Creating this ring in Mount Doom in his empire Mordor, Sauron 
transferred much of his dark power into the ring. According to this plot, 
power therefore becomes an object that can get lost like a thing. So, on 
the one hand, this was necessary for him to rule the other rings, but on 
the other hand, he became dependant on the ring. With this objectification, 
power is executed by an instrument. Like in Der Ring des Nibelungen, the 
One Ring objectifies the faculty to enslave all alive, and like in Wagner’s 
music drama this functions in an inscrutable, paranormal way.
In the antecedent age, Sauron was defeated in a decisive battle, and 
the hero Isildur was successful to cut Sauron’s finger with the ring off. 
But instead of destroying the ring in Mount Doom, he keeps it. So, it 
goes astray. But unlike the Nibelung’s ring, Tolkien’ One Ring has su-
pernatural qualities not only in respect to others, but also in respect to 
his bearer. The curse realizes itself in a supernatural way. The possession 
of the ring extends the life while the body of the bearer becomes more 
and more etiolated. This is to epitomize, that all thinking and aspiring 
of the bearer of the ring increasingly is focussed on his ‘precious’. This 
obsession is not presented as enjoyment but as a curse. In the end, when 
Frodo, the little bearer of the ring, has to throw it in the fire of Mount 
Doom to neutralize this thing of power that shouldn’t have come into 
existence, he refuses to do so: “I do not choose now to do what I came to 
do. I will not do this deed. The Ring is mine!”22 This proves that he has 
become the slave of the ring. The destruction of the ring can take place 
only by accident, by a false step.
The fantasy-genre, for which Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings can be 
said having laid the foundation, is in a whole dominated by the question 
of power (as the detective story is dominated by the question of truth). 
There is always the problem how to gain power and how to gain the in-
struments to gain power, how to preserve power and how to overthrow 
a hostile power. And at all times it is the aim—generally within feudal 
22 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings. Part 3: The Return of the King, 
(London: Harper Collins, 2007), 1237.
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structures—to maintain the good power against the bad power that al-
ways appears as the force of overpowering. The One Ring is apparently a 
funcional equivalent for this kind of force.
Concerning the relation between this ring-thing and the story told by 
The Lord of the Rings, one has to assert that the ring is not an appropriate 
instrument. From a viewpoint outside of the fiction, Sauron creates the 
ring, so that the story of its loss, its appropriations and so on can be told. 
Indeed, this is something the ring has in common with many other magi-
cal instruments being so widespread in the world of the fantasy genre. 
Magical weapons for example are different from the correspondent skills 
(or parts of the body) not least because they can get lost, misappropri-
ated and abused by others. The world of fantasy is not reigned by the 
conception of proprietorship of the Roman law we are underlying in our 
real life. Here—mutatis mutandis—the Germanic law prevails without the 
Roman idea of proprietorship as a comprehensive right of disposition. 
The important things are not received by purchase, but by by destination 
to be their finder, by capture in a struggle or by being recognized as the 
dignified heir (they are more than mere objects and affairs). 
According to the relation between power and proprietorship, in 
Tolkien’s One Ring there’s a specific moment of reflection in comparison 
with the ‘ordinary’ important things in the fantasy-genre. Because the 
ring is created to be misused, nobody can be its legitimate owner, nobody 
can reveal himself to be its possessor. This would only prove its abuse. 
That is to say that nobody can own the power that is objectified in this 
ring. Accordingly, it is not the own power you gain when you grasp the 
One Ring—the power changes its possessor without being transferred. 
Power is presented as a thing (not an affair). This is the metaphysics of 
power (as complement to the microphysics of power according to Michel 
Foucault). And respectively the thing can be defined as something that 
is only supposed to be ones own. In the form of a synthetic myth we are 
reminded that the belief in proprietorship is also an effect of the habitua-
tion of the possessor and that the thing always remains a potential actor.23
23 Gandalf, the good magician in The Lord of the Rings also tells the story of 
the One Ring this way: “The Ring was trying to get back to his master. It had 
slipped from Isildur’s hand and betrayed him; then when a chance came it 
caught poor Déagol, and he was murdered; and after that Gollum, and it had 
devoured him. It could not make further use of him […].” And: “[…] the Ring 
itself decided things. The Ring left him.” Ibid., 73. In the case of wandering 
things having their own way, things always can be described this way. 
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To remind us of the circumstance that a thing is something else than an 
affair, it is not necessary that the things in question are magical things or 
supernatural things of power surmounting the logic of personal property. 
Obviously, this is the case with corpses that belong to nobody and may 
not be handed over as an affair.24 Wandering corpses are also subject of 
a lot of stories.25 Intead of turning over this dark leaf, I want to focus an-
other kind of things which are in a way the opposite of putrescent corpses: 
the bright jewels. In our culture, especially the diamonds are considered 
to be the most exclusive and imperishable things. In all likelihood, they 
will outlive all the people who will have held them in their hands. Even 
more: All these hands leave no marks. The surface of a jewel is smooth 
and hard. The stories and history pass it without leaving a trace. It is 
mute. It is only its manifestation that captivates us.
But this also means: In itself, the proprietor cannot prove his com-
prehensive right of disposition by, for example, engraving his name or his 
initials as it is common with rings. Between the jewel and its proprietor, 
there’s no visible relation. Of course, the are certificates and documents, 
but these are always auxiliary means only. In spite of the legal relation-
ship jewels refer to an archaic order of stories where everything depends 
on the de facto power over the thing and the category of legal ownership 
remains problematically. 
In most of the stories, the de facto power is not beneficial for the 
possessor. The curse laying on a jewel is a common topos. Therefore, at 
the end of the story they usually have to be deposited in a place, where 
they have ceased to be a personal property. In the complicated novel The 
Moonstone by Wilkie Collins (1868) the holy diamond has been brought 
from India to Great Britain a long time ago by a shady colonial officer. 
In Great Britain, the diamond causes confusion and trouble. The story 
can come to an end only when the Moonstone is returned to adorn the 
statue of the indian goddess. In the black humor-comedy Der Diamant 
24 Cf. Michael Niehaus, “Dinge in Bewegung,” in Handbuch materielle 
Kultur, ed. Stefanie Samida, Manfred K.H. Eggert and Hans Peter Hahn 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 2014), 132–140, especially 135–136. 
25 Maybe the best one is the novel The Wrong Box by Robert Louis 
Stevenson and Lloyd Osborne (1889).
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by Friedrich Hebbel (1841), the diamond is the questionable pledge of the 
legitimacy of a dynasty. But unfortunately it is erred, especially it has got 
into the belly of a jew who has swallowed it up to usurp it as his personal 
property. In consequence, a number of people is in hot pursuit of him 
to catch and disembowel him. Subsequently the diamond is defecated at 
the border of the stage. But nothing can harm its immaculateness, and 
so it can at last be returned to the sovereign. 
Colonial misdeeds also are responsible that the diamond in Robert 
Louis Stevenson’s The Rajah’s Diamond (a part of his New Arabian Night 
from 1882) causes confusion for his various possessors. When the Rajah’s 
Diamond—the sixthlargest diamond of the world—gets to hold of a young 
clergyman who has opened a found little case, the narrator comments, 
that this low-browed young man would not be acquinted with “precious 
stones”—“but the Rajah’s Diamond was a wonder that explained itself; a 
village child, if he found it, would run screaming to the nearest cottage; and 
a savage would prostrate himself in adoration before so imposing a fetish.”26 
The finder is mistaken when he thinks that everyone owning this 
stone would be released from the “primal curse,” because he “might follow 
his own inclination without concern or hurry.”27 Evaluating this diamond 
according to its exchange value, one would have to say, that “a man might 
as easily negotiate St. Paul’s Cathedral.”28 This leads to the consideration 
of an opportunity always being implicit when singulary stones go from 
hand to hand: It would be possible “to cut it into three or four.”29 But 
in stories, this sacrilege never is executed. The everlasting diamonds will 
remain untouched. The jewel is acclaimed as mythical thing. And that’s 
the reason why the stories are able to uncover its invisible reverse.
Finally, the hero of The Rajah’s Diamond, Prince Florizel of Bohemia 
holds the diamond in his hands. He has stated before, that this “diamond 
would be better in the sea:” “Jewels so valuable should be reserved for the 
collection of a Prince or treasury of a great nation. To hand them about 
among the common sort of men is to set a price on Virtue’s head.”30 
As he declares, even Prince Florizel himself “could scarcely handle the 
26 Robert Louis Stevenson, “The Rajah’ Diamond,” in New Arabian Nights. 
The Pavilion in the Link and other Tales, by Robert Louis Stevenson, reprint 
of the Vailima ed (New York: AMS-Press, 1974), 170. 
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 172.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 179.
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intoxicating crystal and be safe.”31 So, it seems to him as “if the Rajah,” 
who gave this diamond as a gift, “desired vengeance upon the men of 
Europe.”32 Before he is capable of throwing the Rajah’s Diamond from a 
bridge into the Seine in Paris, he incites himself to realize this heroic deed 
by a pathetic speech, declaring that the true character of this jewel would 
be the opposite of its appearance: “To me this nugget of bright crystal 
is as loathsome as though it were crawling with the worms of death.”33
i x . our  Th inG
What does all this mean in relation to the question of the thing wandering 
in stories? The wandering thing exceeds the actions the human subjects 
may perform with them. It is an actor itself insofar it has its own way. 
It may change its possessor and its owner, but from the point of view of 
the story, it will not have belonged to anyone. And—as everything that is 
wandering—it has not yet come in its place. That means, that if the at-
tention is drawn to the wandering thing, in an enigmatical way it appears 
to be more than it is for the human subjects inside the story. Inside the 
story the thing may function as an indication, as a symbolical exchange-
object, as an imaginary phallus, as an unattainable object of desire (objet 
petit a according to Lacan)—the thing iself as it appears inside the story 
is ever more than this. 
As it cuts a figure of its own, it detaches itself from the characters, 
the human figures. Of course, this detachment already results from the 
fact, that the thing is not shown in relation to a single character only. 
But in the particular relation already there are many different ways to 
have a thing. If you show your possession or if you desemble it, if you 
carry it on your body or deposit it, if you consign it to someone or if you 
hide it—all this (and much more) will less depend on the possessor than 
on the others and on the thing itself. In these different ways to have a 
thing not least the distance is measured between the possessor and the 
thing, and the thing presents itself as something being on the mend to 
become independent.
If we take it well, the thing is nor an object, nor a subject. Even as 
a sujet of a story it is a quasi-subject only. As close as possible to be the 
31 Ibid., p. 180.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 246.
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subject of a story the wandering thing comes, when it is nobody’s object. In 
the lapse time, when it is lost or forgotten and must be found again, it is 
exclusively our thing. It is not part of a network, it is not part of anything. 
We cannot avoid to think of a thing as something that, in case of being 
lost, is waiting to be found again.34 Tolkien’s One Ring has been waiting 
to be found in the depth of a river to become the curse for its possessor. 
Heinrich Böll’s haversack is always waiting for the next combatant to pick 
it up. Poe’s purloined letter has been waiting for Dupin to discover it. 
And still the Rajah’s Diamond thrown into the Seine by Prince Florizel 
is waiting to be found again.
This finding which in some cases for the characters in the story, but 
in any case for us is a rediscovering, is not a transaction, but something 
that falls to by chance. In the abyssal moment of rediscovering, the thing 
flashes up as a our co-subject. Of course this chance is necessary since 
in stories it is the destination of things to be rediscovered. This means, 
that in stories things can be considered as something that is meant for 
arriving at a befitting place. Certainly, with its arrival the story comes to 
an end and the thing ceases to be our thing.
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hiStoricaL aSpectS of a/SyMMetry

GeorG i  Kapr iev
the Byzantine trace
I should start by admitting that I am sincerely inspired by actor-network 
theory (ANT) tendency to compromise the ratio-centric and anthropo-
centric scheme of the subject-object divide as well as by the reification 
of both relations and activities including the possibility to study new 
phenomena such as resistance, suffering or endurance. However, I should 
also admit that I am not ready to follow ANT in all of its variations and 
details, neither considering it as a kind of an emerging dogmatic basis 
for a new scientific religion. 
I was introduced to the theoretical paradigm of ANT 10 years ago by 
Ivan Tchalakov who was suggesting that some of its constructs could be 
adequately considered and interpreted within the context of Aristotelian 
philosophy. Today, 10 years later, we know that Ivan Tchalakov was correct 
about that within the context of the concepts developed by Aristotle in 
book IX of his Metaphysics but, especially, within the context of efficiency 
of their Byzantine reception and upgrades. In the meantime we published 
our basic conclusions in two complementary papers.1 I am not planning 
entirely to reproduce them here but rather to discuss the application of 
the Byzantine philosophemes to ANT conceptual framework.
In book IX of Metaphysics Aristotle distinguishes between the ways of 
speaking about essence (ousia) of every being through the categories and 
through the concepts of force (dynamis) and action (energeia).2 Both Latin 
1 Georgi Kapriev and Ivan Tchalakov, “Actor-Network Theory and Byzan-
tine Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Action: Three Points of Possible 
Dialogue,” Yearbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology 
and Society 57 (2009): 207–38; Ivan Tchalakov and Georgi Kapriev, “The 
Limits of Causal Action: Actor-Network Theory Notion of Translation and 
Aristotle’s Notion of Action,” Yearbook of the Institute for Advanced Studies 
on Science, Technology and Society 47 (2005): 389–433.
2 Met. IX, 1, 1045b32–1046a2.
and contemporary translations tend to express the dyad dynamis-energeia 
as potentia-actus and, very often, as possibilitas-actualitas. Such kind of 
translations tend to associate the meaning of the signified within modal 
terms which obscures the original Aristotelian intentions, as Heidegger 
said too.3 Aristotle defines the force as exercising influence on something 
else and of undergoing influence from something else. The capacity of 
every force to influence is called energy/action, which is defined firstly 
as movement/kinesis. Suddenly after that Aristotle distinguishes between 
two kinds of actions: movememets4 and energies par excellence. The 
movements have a beginning and an end; they have a limit (peras), but 
they don’t have an ultimate purpose/telos. They are actions initiated by 
a certain external cause and cease when the cause is no longer present. I 
nominate the movement’s causal or instrumental actions.
The energies par excellence have telos and are identical with the exis-
tence of the essence / to hyparchein to pragma. This is the manifestation 
of the essence and its force, which is bound to the ultimate purpose of 
the essence. That is why Aristotle identifies moreover the energy with 
the entelechy/entelecheia.5 The energy hold in its self the form or it is 
identical with the form.6 It begins to give the definiteness of the life.7 
The energy is the existential action of the essence, but the energy does 
not have substantial character. This type of energy can be defined as 
existential. The network of energetic activities forms the reality of being 
and in this sense it is really actual or active.
The Neoplatonic reception of Aristotle distinguishes between the 
energy that is inherent in the essence and the energy which is directed 
outwards from the essence, accepting that the essence can be known 
only through its energies. It recognizes that beings could participate in 
each other through their energies and the participation is interpreted as 
synergy. It distinguishes between eternal and temporal energies (depend-
ing on the nature and status of the essences) and accepts the existence 
of beings possessing both eternal and temporal energies (human souls 
in particular). 
3 Martin Heidegger, Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1–3: von Wesen und Wirklich-
keit der Kraft, vol. 33 of Gesamtausgabe, ed. Heinrich Hüni (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Klostermann, 1981), 3–11, 49–116, quot. 10. 
4 Met. IX, 3. 1046b29–1047b2; IX, 8. 1049b8–10.
5 Met. IX, 6. 1048b22; IX, 8. 1050a7–10.
6 Nic. Eth. X, 4. 1174a17–28; 1174b8–9.
7 Met. IX, 8. 1050b1–2.
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The Byzantine tradition considers essence/ousia and nature/physis as 
identical and interprets them as the common form of a specific being 
that is represented in multiple individuals. However the truly authentic 
manifestation of each essence, either finite or infinite, is in its constitu-
tive force (systatike dynamis) and natural energy (physike energeia). It is 
impossible, points out Maximus the Confessor, to acknowledge an es-
sence and, at the same time, reject its constitutive energy. Every essence 
has its moving force in itself (it is autokinetos) because it is expressed 
by its energy and it exists through its energy. The natural energy is the 
ultimate and most straightforward characteristic of the essence; a nature 
cannot exist without its constitutive movement.8
I am fully aware of the resistance of many, including many actor-
network-theoreticians, against the concept of essence. I believe that such 
resistance is the result of a kind of terminological inertia which is typical 
of Modern Western philosophy and which tends to reduce the essence 
to an logico-epistemological abstractum—an essence understood as 
commonly and impersonally, but also ‘really,’ present in each individual. 
Driven by an (understandable) nausea from the absurdity of such 
kind of being J.-P. Sartre, for example, uses the terms ‘essence’ and ‘na-
ture’ as referring to the actual ‘image’ or ‘figure’ of the Self. He is however 
also fully aware that by means of his or her potential capacities every hu-
man being is a human and not “moss, mold or cauliflower.” This is why 
Sartre is forced to accept the existence of conditional human universality 
(une universalité humaine de condition). He prefers to speak of ‘human 
condition’ (condition de l’homme) instead of ‘human nature’ (de sa nature). 
This is “the ensemble of the a priori boundaries drawing the fundamental 
human situation in the universe” (l’ensemble des limites a priori qui esquis-
sent sa situation fondamentale dans l’univers). These boundaries are neither 
objective either subjective but have both objective and subjective aspects. 
The existential human project aims their redrawing and rearrangement, 
overcoming or adapting to them.9 Very well! 
One should also add the drawing of these boundaries does not delimit 
an empty space but the actual human potentialities, the potentialities of 
the human, which are realized and actualized through their activities. In-
terestingly, the Byzantine understanding of ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ could be 
8 Maximus Confessor, “Ambigua ad Thomam,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 
91 (1865), 1052B. 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, “L’existentialisme est un humanisme,” in http://www.
danielmartin.eu/Textes/Existentialisme.htm, accessed June 3, 2013.
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even described in a very similar way. The Byzantine thinkers distinguish 
between ‘nature contemplated in a species’ (katholou) which is used to 
form the general concept of any given nature, and nature contemplated 
as existing in a specific individual (en atomo). In the second case the 
nature is considered under the conditions of its actual existence. There 
is a difference between the two ways, for example, the living rational and 
mortal nature of a unique human being does not entirely overlap with 
the human nature of any other human being; it is characterized by its 
proper particularities and not the particularities of anybody else.10 From 
the second point of view nature does not precede the different beings who 
are the carriers of its characteristics. 
The concept of an individual being considered as hypostasis is the first 
significant upgrade in the art of Byzantine philosophy. The revolutionary 
aspect here, as well as in Christian thought in general, is giving priority 
to personality and existence, instead of giving priority to essence, nature 
and species. While the concepts of ‘individual/atomon’ is typically as-
sociated to the natural order and refers to the individual being which is 
seen from its commonly accepted valence within the context of a given 
species, ‘hypostasis’ is the kernel of a new conceptual order which stands 
on its own and without any relation of subordination to the natural one. 
The hypostasis is the carrier of the essence but in a unique manner. It 
is ‘what exists in itself and individually;’ at the same time, it is an essence 
in association with unique properties, which distinguish a hypostasis 
from any other hypostases of the same nature, but not only in the numeri-
cal order.11 The definition emphasizes its unique self-being, with which 
it is above the nature that is in the hypostase itself. If we could think the 
essence as actuality, then we must think the hypostasis as actualisation. 
Maximus describes the hypostasis as an acting subject (energon).12 It not 
only contains the essence, but also irradiates the natural energies and 
because of that it leads to their variation. Existential action of a specific 
10 Johannes Damascenus, “De haeresibus,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 94 
(1860), 745B–748C. Cf. Johannes Damascenus, “Expositio de fide ortho-
doxa,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 94 (1860), 1021D–1024A.
11 Cf. Basilius Magnus, “Epistula XXXVIII,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 
32 (1857), 328BC; Maximus Confessor, “Opuscula theologica et polemica,” 
in Migne Patrologia Graeca 91 (1865), 152A; Maximus Confessor, “Epistula 
XV,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca, 91, 557D. 
12 Maximus Confessor, “Opuscula theologica et polemica,” in Migne Pa-
trologia Graeca 91 (1865), 205BC.
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hypostasis can be stronger or weaker, more dispersed or more concen-
trated; it can change its intensity and concentration in time and space. 
And there is no principal difference when speaking of the hypostasis or 
the energies of rational or un-rational beings. 
All Christian thinkers since the second half of the 4th to the end of 
the 7th centuries seem to have considered hypostasis and prosopon/person 
as identical. John Damascene differentiates slightly between the concepts. 
‘Hypostasis’ refers, above all, to the independent and self-determined 
being, while ‘person/prosopon’ communicates the unique actions ensu-
ing from the personal properties in their relation to other persons. From 
this point of view, a person may possibly represent another person (like 
the perfect rules because he is representative of the emperor), whereas 
this is not possible with the hypostases. A person can be identified as a 
hypostasis only on the basis of its independent activity.13 In this sense 
person signifies the faculty of the hypostasis to be in relation with other 
hypostaseis. I will consider later one effect of this differentiation.
Before going further I would like to address one very reasonable 
question that was posed by Bruno Latour several years ago. The question 
goes like this: If the hypostasis manifests specifically natural energies 
how exactly it makes them personally or hypostatically unique? Or how 
and in what sense can we claim that the specific way (pos kai hopoios) of 
manifestation of the natural energies depends on a specific hypostasis? 
On what basis can we claim that “the existential energies might vary in 
their intensity—not only across different hypostases, but also in a specific 
hypostasis according to its existential states and temporal periods”?
The answer to these questions was paradigmatically given by 
Maximus the Confessor: the hypostatic specificity can be explained by the 
concept of hexis. It defines the personal, or rather, the hypostatic factor in 
the manifestation of the natural energies/actions. Maximus understood 
the Aristotelian concept of hexis mainly as an ‘inner personal state’ in 
opposition to thesis which is translated as ‘emplacement ’ or ‘position’ and 
describe the natural order of beings. Hexis is also different to diathesis 
which is usually translated as disposition and refers to the less stable 
attributes that are easy to remove and change. Mutatis mutandis the 
concept of hexis corresponds to Gestimmtsein, Stimmung and Befindlichkeit 
in Heidegger: he interprets the Befindlichkeit as a constitutive element 
13 Cf. Johannes Damascenus, “Dialectica,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 94 
(1860), 596A, 613AB; Johannes Damascenus, “De haeresibus,” in Migne 
Patrologia Graeca, 94, 749BC.
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of the In-Sein.14 The hexeis are described as potential and as mediators 
(mesotes) between forces and energies. Maximus defines hexis as “consti-
tutive characteristic” (systatike idiotes)15 for the activity of the hypostasis. 
The hexeis are the hypostatic factor in the direction and definiteness of 
the actions. They are the inner filters of the natural actualization. The 
teaching about hexis positions the problem of the being within a clearly 
hypostatic perspective. The hexeis are best understood as subject-carrying 
or psycho-morph mediators. In addition, they are in complete accordance 
with the requirement that “mediators are not causes and that without 
transformations or translations no vehicles can transport any effect.”16
In his book from 2005 Reassembling the social Bruno Latour refers 
very positively to Marcel Mauss and his concept of habitus. Mauss con-
siders the term habitus as a direct translation from hexis and refers to it 
as acquired ability or faculty pretending to follow Aristotle who is iden-
tified as “psychologist.” However Mauss really wants to see the term in 
association with “the techniques and work of collective and individual 
practical reason.”17 I would firmly argue that the understanding of hexis 
in Maximus and in the Byzantine tradition is much deeper and much 
broader than the one suggested by Mauss. In addition, this tradition 
does not consider Aristotle as a ‘psychologist.’ As a matter of fact, the 
Byzantine tradition does not develop its own psychological teaching. It 
concentrates itself to an anthropology focusing on the psychosomatic 
unity of the human being.
Aristotle reduces all dynameis to one primary force which is defined 
as both the capacity for action and the capacity to undergo an external 
influence (tou poein kai paschein) without however confusing the two.18 
It is quite important that the hypostases do not only manifest their 
natural energies but also incorporate external energies that become part 
of their own hypostatic existence. In this way by means of their proper 
14 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979), 11.
15 Maximus Confessor, “Disputatio cum Pyrrho,” in Migne Patrologia 
Graeca 91 (1865), 352A.
16 Cf. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to the Actor-
Network-Theory (Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
214.
17 Cf. Marcel Mauss, ‘Body Techniques’ in Sociology and Psychology: Essays 
(London: British Centre for Durkheimian Studies, 1979), 100–101; Latour, 
Reassembling the Social, 211.
18 Met. IX, 1. 1046a9–20.
138
energies different hypostases can interpenetrate each other or co-inhere 
in each other. It is the so-called ‘perichoresis’, the mutual energetic inter-
penetration, the inter-communication of properties and energies (antidosis 
idiomaton). In this interpenetration or co-inherence both the natures 
and hypostases preserve their otherness. It is not a secret that all these 
concepts were first introduced in Christian philosophy order to explain 
the relation between the two natures of within the composite hypostasis 
of Christ. The term perichoresis describes the mutual inter-penetration 
or co-inherence of Christ’s Divine and human natures together with all 
their properties and energies, preserving their otherness in relation to 
each other including their natural properties. Here it is strongly empha-
sized that in the hypostatic union does not absorb the human nature, but 
includes it in a synergy/synergia, co-action and co-activity.19 The Byzantine 
tradition extends this understanding to all hypostases and natures, both 
finite and infinite, that are en-hypostasized within them. 
In the byzantine tradition we should point out the emphasis on the 
relevance of the body for all contingent beings. In it the body has a very 
important place. This topic is quite different compared to Platonism and 
the theory of such platonizing philosophers as Augustine and Descartes, 
for example. Here the existential opposition is not between material 
and spiritual but between created and uncreated. The body and the 
soul are part of one human being, which is penetrated by all energies 
that are inherently manifested through the hypostasis. In addition, the 
body is the possessor and the coordinator of the hypostatic energies; 
it is the mediator of all energies that are both manifested and incorpo-
rated through the hypostasis. In fact, it is the body that manifests the 
energies outwards.20 
It is quite interesting that the concept of perichoresis, with its inher-
ent connection to hypostasis and hexis, could be associated with several 
positions that could be considered as central to ANT. If one elaborates 
on the meaning of perichoresis within the context of ANT, one would 
19 Cf. Maximus Confessor, “Ambigua ad Thomam,” in Migne Patrologia 
Graeca, 91, 1053B; Maximus Confessor, “Opuscula theologica et polemica,” 
in Migne Patrologia Graeca 91 (1865), 208AB; Maximus Confessor, “Dispu-
tatio cum Pyrrho,” in Migne Patrologia Graeca 91 (1865), 337CD.
20 Cf. Georgi Kapriev, “The Body as Coordinator of Natural and Super-
natural Energies in Human Beings in Maximus the Confessor and Gregory 
Palamas,” in The Wedding Feast, ed. Paul Ladouceur (Montreal: Alexandra 
Press, 2010), 103–112.
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easily see that there is no interaction that could be called isotopic, nor 
synchronic, synoptic, homogeneous or isobaric.21 The concept relativizes 
the opposition between interior and exterior and enables the transition 
from speaking about ‘actors’ to thinking about ‘attachments.’ At the 
same time, it forces us to avoid speaking of actors as puppets that are 
manipulated against their own will. In such a way it becomes practically 
impossible to think of acting without actors and of subjectivity without 
subjects, which ensures certain interiority without the need for its rei-
fication.22 Such perspective relativizes the sharp divide between ‘being’ 
and ‘having’ which is dominating the Western way of thought. The being 
self supposes to possess and to be possessed, to hold and to be held23. 
Within this specific horizon of meaning of the concept perichoresis it is 
impossible to think of actors as mere points or atoms. Indeed, an actor 
can be seen as a source, not in the sense of a monadic causality, but 
rather as a source possessing by necessity a specific star-like shape. In 
this way the meanings of actor and actor-network do not contradict each 
other but emerge in a mutual complementarity, since an actor-network is 
what is made to act by a large star-shaped web of mediators flowing in 
and out, where all the attention should focus on the mediators making 
other mediators do things.24
Here is the place where I should discuss once again and justify 
the introduction of the concept of ‘asymmetry’ that was introduced by 
Tchalakov and myself a few years ago. I believe that it was understood 
quite incorrectly. It does not at all assume the preexistence of a privi-
leged and ontologized subject of action. The idea was borrowed from 
the ‘Christological asymmetry’ articulated by Georges Florovsky whose 
starting point was the initial non-hypostatic status of the human nature 
in Christ.25 In Florovsky’s case the notion of asymmetry emphasizes the 
fact that the process of perichoresis is initiated by the Divinity in a way that 
the Divine action enables the opportunity for human nature to acquire 
the real possibility to inter-penetrate or co-inhere with the Divine nature. 
It does not mean and does not lead to a radical dominance of the Divine 
nature. It means the existence of a specific kind of dialogical reciprocity 
21 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 200–202. 
22 Cf. Ibid., 213–214.
23 Cf. Ibid., 217. Latour refers here to Gabriel Tarde.
24 Cf. Ibid., 216–217.
25 Георгий В. Флоровский, Восточные отцы V–VIII веков, Париж: YMKA 
Press, 1933 (repr. Москва, 1992), 26.
140
within the context of the co-inherence of the Divine and human natures.26 
What we (Tchalakov and myself) were talking about was an asymmetry 
emerging from the possibility for different actor-networks to take specific 
initiatives in different situations or contexts and in different moments of 
time. If you consider the ‘social’ connections in the specific case of ‘a wall, 
a nail, a hammer and someone using the hammer to put the nail in the 
wall (for example I myself)’ you will easily get a feeling about the reality 
and the painfulness of the transitions I am talking about. 
I would like to summarize my understanding of the asymmetry by 
emphasizing two different aspects: First, this is the fact that in every 
practical situation there is someone or something that is the first in 
initiating a change and, by being first, this someone or something is in 
a stronger position to predefine the specific situational dynamics of the 
particular change. This is valid for every moment in the situation. Second, 
this someone or something possesses unique (as compared to all other 
actants) hypostatic and natural properties. This second asymmetric aspect 
is based on the hypostatic and natural specificity of the manifestation 
of the energies which also predefines the specific way a specific change 
will be actualized. The important point here is that the two aspects are 
equally applicable to both human and non-human agents.
Bruno Latour and most of the ANT authorities do not like the term 
‘initiative.’ They associate it with the actor as “a source of initiative or 
a starting point, the extremity of a vector oriented toward some other 
end.”27 At the same time Latour insists that “ANT is not […] establish-
ment of some absurd ‘symmetry between humans and non-humans.’” He 
explains: “To be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a priori 
some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a mate-
rial world of causal relations.”28 I should point out that we (Tchalakov 
and myself) do not believe on such type of apriority either. Another one 
of Latour’s question is: “How long can a social connection be followed 
without objects taking the relay?”29 O.K., the asymmetry we are talking 
about consists exactly of the “taking the relay” in every possible moment 
of a specific “social connection,” independently of who is the actor or 
the actor-network taking the relay. “There are divisions,” with an almost 
26 Cf. Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology 
of Maximus the Confessor (Lund: Gleerup, 1965), 26–27.
27 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 216.
28 Ibid., 76.
29 Ibid., 78.
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mystical tone continues Latour, “that one should never try to bypass, to 
go beyond, to try to overcome dialectically. They should rather be ignored 
and left to their own devices, like a once formidable castle now in ruins.”30 
Well, my job is to be interested in “formidable castles,” especially if they 
are “now in ruins.” I would like to return now to the difference between 
hypostasis and prosopon or person in the way it was articulated by John of 
Damascus. It is important to realize that the term hypostasis can be used 
for every self-existing being, while prosopon or person is used only for living 
rational beings. This distinction generates a paradox. If we accept that it 
is the hypostasis that radiates or manifests the energies belonging to the 
en-hypostasized nature (or natures), we should conclude that every single 
hypostasis is in a state of active energetic exchange with all other hypostases 
becoming by necessity part of a ‘dialogical network.’ On the other hand, ob-
viously, every rational being can choose to communicate or not with others, 
consciously choosing a state of self-isolation. We should be therefore very 
cautious when speaking about the relational character of the human person. 
The state of rational contemplation is by definition the formal cancellation of 
any spontaneous action. Every act of consciousness or self-consciousness 
discredits all specific actions by introducing viable alternatives. Even 
Aristotle points out that every rational and sensory soul is in a certain sense 
‘part of all being’ as far as it can consciously feel and think all knowable 
phenomena.31 Rational beings can consciously ‘put themselves in the place 
of ’ other beings and ‘re-present’ them. What that means in the language 
of the teaching on the energies is that a person has the capacity and the 
ability un-spontaneously to direct, modulate, concentrate or disperse his 
own energies. This is the special way for humans ‘to take the relay.’ My 
point is that we should admit the existence of similar ways of ‘taking the 
relay’ for all other ‘formidable castles’ (‘the black boxes:’ and we know the 
black boxes are made to be open in case of emergency). We should not be 
trying to neglect them, but to seek them no matter how difficult that is. 
Otherwise, the degree of abstractness in ANT will remain too high.
As we have seen, the Byzantine trace could be highly valuable in 
solving problems within the context of the ANT. I am convinced it could 
also open new problems and new opportunities. This is a trace that is 
very delicate; neither very deep, either very sharp. But who in between 
the ANT adherent speaks of very deep and very visible traces? 
30 Ibid., 76.
31 Cf. De anima, III, 8, 431a20–23.
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arThur  TaTnall
aSpectS of the hiStory of coMputing
An Actor-Network Perspective
absTracT
This article tells the tale of two Australian computers. The first of these, 
CSIRAC, was designed and built in the late 1940s and became a success-
ful first generation computer used for scientific purposes by the CSIRO. 
CSIRAC went on to continue its life, first at the University of Melbourne 
then as an exhibit at Museum Victoria. The second tale is of the Australian 
Educational Computer, for which detailed specifications were drawn up in 
the mid-1980s, but that was never actually built. The process of drawing up 
first ‘Educational User Requirements’ and then ‘Technical Requirements’ 
was instigated by the Australian Government and involved a number of 
meetings of expert committees. The only tangible result of these was the 
production of two reports, as a decision was then taken to halt the project. 
These tales both tell of examples of technological innovation, one suc-
cessful in producing a useful product and the other producing only paper 
reports. Using an approach based on actor-network theory (ANT), the 
article discusses these two computers and investigates the networks of 
human and non-human actors involved in their design, construction and 
use. It considers the reasons why these machines were built (or not built), 
and the interactions and associations involved in this. It then looks at the 
consequences and the legacy of the use (or non-use) of these computers. 
inTroducT ion
CSIRAC (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research organisation Au-
tomatic Computer) commenced regular operation in Sydney in 1951. It was 
Australia’s first computer and is generally regarded to have been the world’s 
fourth or fifth stored-program electronic digital computer. Today, CSIRAC 
is the only surviving first-generation computer in the world and is on display 
at Museum Victoria in Melbourne.1 Unlike a number of other computing 
developments around the world at the time, CSIRAC was built as a research 
machine to perform calculations for radiophysics, particularly in relation 
to cloud-physics, and not for military purposes. Its development depended 
on Commonwealth Government involvement, the work of its two principal 
designers working with other technicians and programmers, the technology 
of the time and a need to perform a massive number of research calculations.
In the mid-1980s the growth in availability of low-cost microcom-
puters presented Australian education authorities with a wonderful 
opportunity to improve school education. It also presented them with a 
considerable problem in how to support schools in the use of such a wide 
range of computers. Australia thus investigated designing and building its 
own educational computer.2 As Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK 
had all designed and produced computers specifically for educational use 
it was thought that a similar approach would be worthwhile in Australia 
and so work began on designing the Australian Educational Computer. 
This machine was, however, never built and an investigation into this 
must relate to the two Commonwealth Government departments involved, 
State Governments, educational needs, the initial design committees, 
other educators, specifications documents, technology, the Australian 
computer industry and lack of continued funding due to a change of 
Commonwealth Government funding priorities.
cs irac  (cs ir  mK1 )
In 1926 the Australian Government set up the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR), with a charter to perform research focused on 
primary and secondary industries. Initially CSIR concentrated on agricul-
tural issues such as animal health and plant growth but later extending its 
1 Cf. Doug McCann, and Peter Thorne, The Last of the First—CSIRAC: 
Australia’s First Computer (Melbourne: The University of Melbourne, 2000).
2 Cf. Arthur Tatnall, “The Australian Educational Computer That Never 
Was,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 35/1 (2013): 35–47; Arthur 
Tatnall and Ralph Leonard, “Purpose-Built Educational Computers in the 
1980s: the Australian Experience,” in History of Computing: Learning from 
the Past, ed. Arthur Tatnall (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 101–111.
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interests into manufacturing. In 1949 it was expanded and renamed the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) 
with new interests such as radiophysics, radio-astronomy and industrial 
chemistry. Australia is a very dry continent and the Commonwealth 
Government was, at the time, interested in the possibility of inducing 
rain over important agricultural areas by cloud seeding. If it could have 
been achieved this would have revolutionised agricultural production in 
Australia.3 CSIR was thus interested in researching the related physics. 
(It is interesting to reflect that in retrospect, radio-astronomy in Australia 
turned out to be highly successful while the rain-making project did not.)
In 1946 Maston Beard and Trevor Pearcey were working at the CSIR 
Division of Radiophysics in Sydney on research in the fields of radio-
astronomy, rain-physics, cloud-physics and radio-wave propagation, each 
of which required a massive amount of computation; too much for the 
calculating machines available at the time.4 In 1947 CSIR decided to 
abandon research into radio-wave propagation, to concentrate instead on 
the development of electronic computing and to build a research computer.
The initial design of the CSIR Mk1 Automatic Computer (as it was 
known at this time) was done by Beard and Pearcey, both of whom had 
been working on radar research during World War II—Beard in Australia 
and Pearcey in the UK. They thus came to CSIR with a good knowledge 
of electronic pulse techniques and data storage using mercury-delay 
lines. Pearcey was assigned to work on the logical aspects of the design 
and Beard the electronic and engineering requirements. Work began in 
early 1947 and the logical design was complete by late 1947. Construction 
followed at once using standard components from the well-developed 
Australian radio industry.5 The CSIR Mk1 (CSIRAC6) ran its first 
simple test program in 1949, and became fully operational early in 1951. 
3 Cf. McCann and Thorne, The Last of the First.
4 Cf. Robert Pearcey, A History of Australian Computing (Melbourne: 
Chisholm Institute of Technology, 1988).
5 Cf. Arthur Tatnall, “History of Computers: Hardware and Software 
Development,” in Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, developed under 
the Auspices of the UNESCO (Paris: Eolss Publishers, 2012).
6 The machine constructed in the late 1940s was initially known as 
CSIR Mk1 and this name was used until the time the computer moved to 
Melbourne in 1955. It then became known as CSIRAC and it is known 
by this name today. To avoid confusion, in this article the name CSIRAC 
will now be used throughout.
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cs irac  TechnoloGy
CSIRAC was what we would now call a first generation computer with over 
2,000 thermionic (radio) valves that required a one-hour warm-up period 
each morning. It was a large and complex machine covering over 40m2, 
consuming around 30kW of power7 and requiring its own maintenance and 
7 Cf. Museum Victoria, “CSIRAC,” in http://museumvictoria.com.au/
discoverycentre/infosheets/csirac/, accessed July 5, 2014.
1 CSIRAC at Museum Victoria, Melbourne
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programming technicians. It was essential for efficient operation that the 
power supply be kept stable, and the story is related that on one occasion 
the computer was overloaded and crashed when someone turned on an 
electric jug in a nearby tearoom causing a power fluctuation.8
Input of both programs and data was via either a switch-panel or by 
paper tape, and CRT displays were used to monitor the machine’s opera-
tions. Main memory consisted of 32 acoustic mercury delay lines, each 
with the capacity to store 16 twenty-bit words.9 This was later upgraded 
to 32 words per tube, giving a total storage capacity of 1024 words. Mer-
cury delay lines could store data as a series of acoustic pulses and were 
developed for radar systems. They had to operate at a given temperature, 
and on hot summer days the computer sometimes needed to be switched 
off to prevent it from overheating.10 Later, drum-based and disk-based 
secondary storage units were added. CSIRAC’s logical design was less 
concerned with execution speed than with simplicity of engineering and 
programming and so with its 1024 word memory it used serial process-
ing techniques.11
ouTs ide  inFluences  on  cs irac ’s  des iGn
In the 1940s Australia was quite isolated by distance from the rest of the 
world and so while many developments in Australia paralleled those in 
Europe and the USA they were often to a considerable extent quite dif-
ferent. During the war Pearcey had worked with Douglas Hartree in the 
UK on numerical analysis and discussed with him the possibility that 
electronics might be used for high speed calculation.12 In 1945 Pearcey 
visited Harvard and was shown Howard Aitken’s Automatic Sequence 
Controlled Calculator and the Bush differential analyser at MIT, but de-
cided that machines like this were too slow to be really useful. He was not 
aware of the existence of ENIAC or of Colossus.13 There was no contact 
8 Cf. ibid.
9 Cf. University of Melbourne, “CSIRAC: Our First Computer,” in http:// 
www.csse.unimelb.edu.au/dept/about/csirac/, accessed July 5, 2014.
10 Cf. Museum Victoria, CSIRAC.
11 Cf. University of Melbourne, CSIRAC.
12 Cf. J.V. Daly, Looking Back 30 Years to CSIRAC, ed. University of Mel-
bourne (Unpublished: Melbourne, 1996).
13 Cf. Pearcey, A History of Australian Computing.
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made, either by Pearcey or anyone else at CSIR, with other computing 
groups until late 1948 when CSIRAC’s design was almost complete. It 
must then be said that the construction of CSIRAC was essentially an 
Australian undertaking with very little influence from developments 
elsewhere in the world. 
many  projecTs  and  TranslaT ion  To  a  second l i Fe  
in  melbourne
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the UK and USA began to allocate large 
quantities of resources into computing, and Australia began to lose the 
leading position it then had. Contact was made in the early 1950s with 
several Australian electronic firms to see if they were interested in com-
mercial production of computers based on the CSIRAC design, but these 
approaches came to nothing. 
Even though CSIRAC could operate almost 1,000 times faster than a 
mechanical calculator of the time it could still take many hours to com-
plete a task. While operating at the CSIRO in Sydney, CSIRAC filled 
the role of a computing service for many scientists and engineers whose 
programs were normally entered and then executed by CSIRO staff. 
Amongst other things, CSIRAC was used to simulate water behaviour 
for the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority, and in studies of car 
and air traffic congestion.14 Another feature of CSIRAC, although not a 
very practical one at the time, was the production of music. CSIRAC had 
a speaker connected to the machine as an I/O device, the main purpose 
of which was to produce ‘clicks’ for debugging purposes. In 1951, however, 
some of the enterprising programmers worked out how to make it play 
a musical melody.15
In 1955 CSIR Mk1 was de-commissioned by the CSIRO in Sydney 
and moved to the University of Melbourne where it was re-named CSIR-
AC.16 At the university it was used as a general purpose computer for over 
700 projects including simulations of the Victorian power supply system, 
pattern simulations for the arrangement of atoms in crystals, evaluation of 
forestry growth rates for the Forestry Commission of Victoria, production 
of solar position and radiation tables for Australian cities, computation of 
14 Cf. Museum Victoria. CSIRAC.
15 Cf. University of Melbourne. CSIRAC.
16 Cf. Ibid.
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radiation patterns of rhombic antennae used by the Army Signals Branch 
at Donnybrook17 and rigid-frame analysis for ‘high-rise’ buildings.18
In 1964 CSIRAC had reached the end of its useful life at the univer-
sity and was donated to Museum Victoria. For several years it was located 
in various museum stores before being put on display in the museum’s 
new buildings in Melbourne. 
The  ausTral i an  educaT ional  compuTer
The first microcomputers were developed in the late 1970s and soon a 
wide range of these machines became available for school and home use, 
presenting both a marvellous opportunity and a significant problem for 
education authorities in how to provide support for such a wide range of 
available computers. Education in Australia is the responsibility of the 
State Governments while the Commonwealth’s main role is in the co-
ordination and funding of special projects. In 1983, the Commonwealth 
Schools Commission set up the ‘National Advisory Committee on Com-
puters in Schools’ (NACCS) to plan a National Computer Education Pro-
gram. NACCS’ terms of reference were to provide advice on professional 
development, curriculum development, hardware, software, evaluation 
and support services.19 In one of its first reports, NACCS articulated a 
need for Australia to develop an educational computer system of its own: 
“To meet the long term requirements of schools computing activities in 
Australia, it is considered essential to embark on a national research and 
development project that will ensure that appropriate computer systems 
are available.”20 To do this it recommended setting up first a committee to 
prepare a set of ‘Educational User Requirements,’ then another to develop 
of a set of ‘Technical Requirements’ based on these. This would be fol-
lowed by a ‘System Concept Study’ and an ‘Australian Design Specifica-
tion’ by the Commonwealth Department of Science and Technology for 
the construction, by an Australian company, of an appropriate system.
17 One of its few military uses.
18 Cf. ibid.
19 Cf. Tatnall and Leonard, Purpose-Built Educational Computers in the 
1980s.
20 Commonwealth Schools Commission, Teaching, Learning and Com-
puters. Report of the National Advisory Committee on Computers in Schools 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Schools Commission, 1983), 44.
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An Educational User Requirement Working Party was appointed early in 
1985, and soon produced a report outlining the many and varied potential 
educational needs of computer users in schools, and the need for integra-
tion of information technology concepts into the curriculum. Their report 
saw a need for development of inquiry and problem-solving skills and an 
understanding of the concepts, symbolic terms and language involved [11]. 
It then listed learning situations in which computer use was considered 
appropriate, including: brainstorming, inquiry learning processes, ‘dialec-
tic’ problem-solving, procedural/technical problem-solving and process 
writing, and attempted to draw user requirements from each of these.21
21 Cf. Tatnall and Leonard, “Purpose-Built Educational Computers in the 
1980s.”
2 Personal and Classroom Systems and one possible 
implementation of a School-Wide System (Commonwealth 
Schools Commission, Australian School Computer Systems, 37)
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The Technical Requirements Working Party was set up in 1985 as an ‘ex-
pert’ committee with membership reflecting the range of relevant groups 
and interests from each Australian educational sector, State and territory. 
As Educational Computer Systems Analyst for the State Computer Edu-
cation Centre in Victoria, the author of this article was a member of this 
committee. The committee’s report to NACCS was published in March 
1986 and contained two main sections:22 
 – A Technical Requirement, which gave detailed coverage to: user inter-
face, input devices, output devices, processing resources, networks, 
telecommunications and system requirements, and 
 – A section dealing with possible implementations of these requirements 
to satisfy at least three types of use: Personal use, Classroom use and 
School-Wide use. The idea was that these could be catered for by a 
family of compatible systems having a common user interface, and 
that at some stage in the future the way should be left open to connect 
these systems to computing facilities at the district, regional, state or 
national levels.23
There were several stated reasons for developing an Australian Educa-
tional Computer:24
 1. So that Australian school children would have access to well-designed 
computer equipment.
 2. To reduce the problem that US-designed computers such as the Apple 
II and Commodore 64 came with the burden of imposing aspects of 
American culture.
 3. To provide a development and manufacturing opportunity for Austra-
lian industry. It was generally supposed that an Australian company 
such as Microbee, which produced a CP/M computer used in many 
Australian schools, would be a likely manufacturer.
The next steps in the process should have been setting up a System Con-
cept Study to be followed by a Development Proposal, but at this stage 
the project stopped. The three year Government funding for the National 
22 Cf. Commonwealth Schools Commission, Australian School Computer 
Systems: Technical Requirements (Canberra Commonwealth Schools Com-
mission, 1986).
23 Cf. Tatnall, “An Australian Educational Computer That Never Was.”
24 Cf. Tatnall, “The Australian Educational Computer That Never Was.”
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Computer Education Project was at an end and further development funds 
were not made available by the Department of Science and Technology. 
Work on the Australian Educational Computer then ceased25 with only 
the two Schools Commission reports to show for the effort expended. Like 
Frankenstein’s monster the Australian Educational Computer was never 
sufficiently ‘real’26 to be given a name of its own, but for the purposes of 
this article I will call it the Bunyip27.
3 Australian stamp  
showing a bunyip
cs irac , buny ip, GovernmenTs , commiTTees , ideas  and  Funds 
To be successful, technological innovation requires the adoption and 
use of the new technology involved. Innovation can be defined as “the 
alteration of what is established; something newly introduced,”28 but 
this should be distinguished from invention which is the discovery or 
creation of new ideas.29 The process of innovation thus involves getting 
25 Cf. Tatnall, “The Australian Educational Computer That Never Was;” 
Tatnall and Leonard, “Purpose-Built Educational Computers in the 1980s.”
26 Cf. Bruno Latour, ARAMIS or the Love of Technology, trans. Catherine 
Porter (Cambridge et al.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
27 A bunyip is a large creature from Aboriginal mythology that is said to 
lurk in swamps, billabongs and rivers.
28 William Little, ed., The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles, 3rd edition, reprinted with corrections and revisions (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973).
29 Cf. Carmel Maguire, Edward John Kazlauskas and Anthony D. Weir, 
Information Services for Innovative Organizations (San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press, 1994).
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new ideas accepted and new technologies adopted and used,30 and a new 
technology will only be adopted if potential users make a decision to do 
so. A major issue in research involving technological innovation is how 
to understand and handle its complexities, and innovation translation, 
informed by actor-network theory, offers a useful way to do this.
In the cases described in this article, CSIRAC was designed, built 
and used to good effect by the CSIRO and the University of Melbourne, 
but the Bunyip project was never completed. It is worthwhile now to use 
ANT to explore some of the reasons for these adoptions, translations 
and non-adoptions.
cs irac
The initial idea for building CSIRAC (or CSIR Mk1 as it then was) came 
from a need to provide the computing power for calculations related to 
research work in radio-astronomy and rain-physics. This was reinforced 
by the Commonwealth Government’s goal of assisting Australian agricul-
ture by cloud seeding to produce rain. The problematisation31 proposed 
was thus to find a means to assist with the huge number of complex 
calculations required for both radio-astronomy and rain-physics. There 
was little need for any interessement32 here as this problematisation 
was readily accepted by all parties and led quickly to their enrolment.33 
It also led to mobilisation34 in the subsequent building in Australia of 
several other first generation computers: SILLIAC at Sydney University, 
UTECOM at the University of NSW and WREDAC at the Weapons 
Research Establishment, South Australia.35 
30 Cf. Arthur Tatnall, Information Systems Research, Technological Innova-
tion and Actor-Network Theory (Melbourne: Heidelberg Press, 2011).
31 Cf. Michel Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Do-
mestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” in Power, 
Action & Belief. A New Scociology of Knowledge?, ed. John Law (London: 
Routledge & Paul Kegan, 1986), 196–229.
32 Cf. ibid.
33 Cf. ibid.
34 Cf. ibid.
35 John Deane, “Australia’s WREDAC—it was Rocket Science,” in Reflec-
tions on the History of Computing: Preserving Memories and Sharing Stories, 
ed. Arthur Tatnall (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 1–21.
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The actors that contributed to the conception, design and construction of 
CSIRAC included: Pearcey, Beard, radar technology, the Australian radio 
industry, radiophysics, rain-physics, the Commonwealth Government, 
Australian agriculture and the CSIRO. There was then little interaction 
with overseas computer scientists or governments so these could not be 
considered to be actors in this context. When CSIRAC began operation 
there would be a need to add to this list the radio valves and mercury 
delay lines as they most certainly made their presence individually felt.36 
The radio valves required sixty minutes to warm up in the morning and 
a stable power supply that could be disrupted by someone making a cup 
of tea.37 The mercury delay lines were temperature critical meaning that 
the computer needed at times to be switched off on hot days.38 Perhaps 
more than many other interactions these determined, and limited how 
CSIRAC could be operated. Another constraint on the operation of 
CSIRAC was the human programmers, technicians and operators who 
needed to be very versatile and also to be readily available when needed. 
Apart from the difficulties due to the ‘fragile’ technology it must be said 
that as a technological innovation, CSIRAC’s use at the CSIRO Division 
of Radiophysics went remarkably well.
When its useful life at CSIRO in Sydney came to an end, new ac-
tors began to enter the picture as CSIRAC moved to the University of 
Melbourne. Very little was done to update CSIRAC’s technology and it 
remained a valve operated first generation computer. This translation to 
a completely new role with new technicians, new jobs, new programs, 
academics and university students required CSIRAC (as it now became) 
to adopt new ways and adapt to a new purpose for its existence. This it 
did well and readily became an important part of the university.
After 9 years at the University of Melbourne (and 15 years after its 
construction) CSIRAC eventually did become obsolete and was retired 
when in 1964 it was donated to Museum Victoria. This move could be 
seen as another translation to a new function: to show people something 
of the progress of computing technology over the past sixty years. This 
translation, however, did not proceed quite as easily as did the previous 
36 Cf. John Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of 
Portuguese Expansion,” in The Social Constructing of Technological Systems: 
New Directions in the Sociology of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. 
Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 111–134.
37 Cf. Museum Victory, CSIRAC.
38 Cf. Museum Victoria, CSIRAC.
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as the museum had no available space to display the computer and for 
several years it was put into storage, first in one location and then in 
another. For brief periods of time CSIRAC was on display at Monash 
University and the University of Melbourne but its final translation was 
complete only when it was put on display (in a non-operating mode) in 
Museum Victoria’s new building in Melbourne. With another new set of 
human actors and a new physical location adjacent to other exhibits in 
the museum CSIRAC took on another new role as a means of showing 
school children and the public Australia’s first computer, how it worked 
and also how much computers have changed over the 60 year lifespan of 
the stored-program electronic digital computer.
The  buny ip
The development project for building the Australian Educational Com-
puter, the ‘Bunyip,’ involved the Commonwealth Government, State and 
Territory Governments, the Commonwealth Schools Commission, the 
Department of Science and Technology, other State and Commonwealth 
education authorities, committee members, reports, specifications docu-
ments, the computer industry and changes in funding priorities. Various 
interactions between these actors led to the development of the specifi-
cations for this computer, but not to its construction.39 This is an issue 
worth exploring further. 
39 Cf. Tatnall, “The Australian Educational Computer That Never Was.”
4 A (mythical) bunyip
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In ‘Aramis,’ Latour40 tells the story of a revolutionary guided-transporta-
tion system intended to become part of the Parisian Metro in the 1970s 
and investigates the parts played by both human and non-human actors 
and the associations and interactions between them. Latour argues that 
Aramis was not seen as being ‘real’ at the beginning of its development 
and nor was the Bunyip. It is difficult for an item of new technology to 
become real41 when there is nothing concrete for people to see and to 
evaluate whether this might be something they could relate to or use. 
Latour suggests that Aramis failed for a number of complex reasons that 
involved technical problems, infrastructure issues, disagreements, lack of 
political will and many other factors.42 It could be argued that the Bunyip 
also failed for a variety of complex reasons. Those of us involved in this 
project had tacitly assumed that the final version of our educational 
computer would be manufactured by an Australian company such as 
Microbee, as part of the idea of building this machine was to stimulate the 
Australian computer manufacturing industry, but this was not the case. 
Getting a technological innovation adopted, or in this case even 
manufactured, involves convincing people of its value. Convincing people 
was almost impossible in this case as, outside the committees and the 
government, very few people knew about it. This project really was a team 
exercise and no particular individuals stood out or made their presence 
felt. Perhaps this was a factor in its demise. Perhaps if one or more promi-
nent individuals had been prepared to speak out passionately for building 
the Bunyip their interessement could have assisted it in becoming real 
and its future might then have been quite different. This project was about 
technology, but technology itself had very little effect on its termination.
The problematisation by NACCS for the project was that Australia 
needed a good quality computer appropriate for use in schools, and that this 
should be built in Australia thus fostering an Australian computer industry. 
At the initial concept and design stage this seemed like a good idea to those 
of us involved and we accepted it. The difficulty was that there were only a 
small number of people involved at the beginning and interessement was 
not attempted to people outside this group. In fact, there was almost no 
information or publicity of the project to its potential principal users—
schools, teachers and students. Bunyip itself was never even problematised 
40 Cf. Latour, ARAMIS, or the Love of Technology.
41 Cf. Margery Williams, The Velveteen Rabbit, or How Toys Become Real 
(London: Heinemann, 1922), 35.
42 Cf. Tatnall, “The Australian Educational Computer That Never Was.”
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for these people. Perhaps if such interessement had been attempted then 
this group would have tried to convince the government and the computer 
industry to become enrolled and so to continue its development.
Many accounts of political interactions between Government de-
partments on matters like this highlight internal conflicts and political 
and ideological disagreements, but this does not appear to be the case 
here. The project funds came from the Commonwealth Government, but 
most of the decision-making came from representatives of State Govern-
ments who had ultimate responsibility for education in their schools43. If 
there were any internal government disagreements they may have been 
between the Commonwealth Schools Commission and the Department 
of Science and Technology which would have needed to pay for further 
development and to try to convince local industry to build it. Develop-
ment of the Bunyip was almost entirely an education exercise. The local 
computer industry was not involved in producing either the Educational 
User Requirements or the Technical Requirements documents and had 
very little involvement with the early stages of the project. Had further 
development funds been available this might have been different.
If the project had proceeded further some new actors would have ap-
peared and while some may have been supporters, others would probably 
have opposed Bunyip’s continued development and deployment. The main 
opposition would probably have come from those supporting the existing 
microcomputers. At this time a large industry existed for the sale of these 
existing (mainly) imported microcomputers. (It is likely that Microbee, the 
Australian computer company, would not have been in opposition as if 
all had gone to plan they would probably have been involved in building 
the Bunyip). The opposing actors would probably have been: the existing 
computer companies, their salesmen, the available software and the comput-
ers themselves. They would most likely have acted to oppose the building 
and introduction of the Bunyip into schools. Another group of actors who 
may potentially have opposed the Bunyip would have been made up of some 
of the teachers at those schools already using other computers—many had 
invested a lot of time into working with them. On the other hand many 
teachers would have acted to support the project had they known about it. It 
is likely that the local computer industry would also have been a supporter. 
None of this, of course, happened as the project did not proceed to this stage.
43 Australia is a Federation of six states and two territories. School educa-
tion in Australia is a State responsibility with the role of the Commonwealth 
Government being restricted to an involvement with special projects.
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Furthermore, at about this time the microcomputer technology situ-
ation changed dramatically with the entry of two new actors into the 
school market: the IBM PC and Apple Macintosh. When the project 
was dropped there was no public outcry—the public did not know about 
it. Although we all were disappointed by the decision not to proceed, in 
light of later developments we were perhaps relieved not to have created 
a white elephant like the Canadian Educational Computer—the ICON, 
which was neither PC nor Macintosh compatible and soon became obso-
lete. Today the decision Australian schools make in choosing which type 
of computer to use is between a Windows PC and a Macintosh. Although 
possibly representing a missed opportunity, the demise of the Bunyip 
had very little overall impact on computer education in Australia, but it 
was not entirely a waste of effort as the reports and the specifications 
documents published by the two working groups are still of value today. 
Would this project have helped to stimulate the Australian computer 
industry? Perhaps it would, but now we will never know.
conclus ion
This article has looked at two Australian computing innovations, one 
of which was successfully implemented while the other was not. The 
question should now be asked: what can we conclude about how these 
technological projects differed to produce this result? Both projects had 
government support. Both were, at least to some degree, exploratory in 
that they involved the creation of new technology. In each case both hu-
man and non-human actors were enlisted and in neither case were there 
strong voices in opposition.
Whereas CSIRAC was built for a quite specific purpose—to perform 
research calculations, Bunyip was designed to fulfil a need that was nei-
ther well defined nor well established. Having gained a place, CSIRAC 
was able twice to translate to new positions with the aid of a number of 
human actors. With CSIRAC, nothing like it had been built before, but 
with Bunyip there were many existing and potentially competing prod-
ucts. Perhaps the difference just comes down to government funding and 
the establishment of a need for the system. If funding had been available 
and a successful need established, would Bunyip have been successful? 
If it had been built, would Bunyip have been able to translate to a new 
form in the face of competition from the PC and Macintosh? Again, this 
is something we will never know.
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jonaThan  Tummons
curricuLuM aS accoMpLiShMent
Tracing Human and Non-Human Actors in 
the Delivery of Educational Curricula
i . inTroducT ion
One of the key theoretical components of actor-network theory (ANT) 
is the principle of symmetry: the principle that both people and objects 
have agency. Human and non-human elements can come together and be 
held together in order to accomplish the performance of a social project. 
To attempt to separate human and non-human actors would be to create 
a false dichotomy.1 In this chapter I provide an account derived from 
ethnographic research into the delivery of a teacher-training curriculum 
across a network of colleges in England. Through the use of ANT, and 
foregrounding the principle of symmetry as described, I demonstrate 
the ways in which this educational provision can only be satisfactorily 
accounted for through a consideration of both human and non-human 
elements. I conclude the chapter by arguing that any distinction between 
human and non-human actors would indeed be false, as the work done 
by both is inseparable within an actor-network.
1 Tara Fenwick and Richard Edwards, Actor-Network Theory in Educa-
tion (London: Routledge, 2010); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: an 
Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Jan Nespor, Knowledge in Motion: Space, Time and 
Curriculum in Undergraduate Physics and Management (London: Routledge-
Falmer, 1994).
i i . conTexT
Further education (FE) colleges in England are responsible primarily for 
the provision of technical and vocational education for 16–19 year olds, 
for some adult education provision (particularly relating to basic skills 
in English and Mathematics), and for a small proportion of university-
level courses (approximately 10 % of university-level provision in the UK 
is delivered in FE colleges). Teachers in further education colleges gain 
their professional teaching qualifications (as distinct from their subject-
specialist qualifications) in one of two ways. A minority of trainee teachers 
(perhaps 10 %) will study full-time for their teaching qualification at a 
university, over one academic year. During this year, they will not only 
attend university classes but also go on two or three teaching placements 
in FE colleges in order to gain practical classroom experience. Whilst 
on placement, the trainees are observed by university lecturers and also 
receive mentoring support from a designated member of college staff. 
The majority of trainee teachers study for their teaching qualification on 
a part-time basis. They commence their studies (which take two-years, 
attending either evening or weekend classes) after they have obtained 
employment. Almost all FE colleges offer part-time teacher-training 
courses such as these. That is to say, the majority of new FE teachers 
will study for their teaching qualification on a part-time basis at the col-
lege where they work. Some such part-time programmes are created and 
managed by qualifications awarding bodies (the largest and best-known 
of these is The City and Guilds of London Institute) and others are created 
and managed by universities. Colleges can choose which programme to 
offer, subject to meeting the quality standards of the awarding body or 
university in question.
All such programmes are required to follow a nationally established 
set of professional standards for teachers in the FE sector. Professional 
standards perform a number of inter-related roles.2 They make public 
expectations regarding the expected behaviours, knowledge and practices 
of those people who are suitably qualified to work in the profession in 
2 Michael Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence (Abingdon: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 1994).
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question. They work as a source of information relating to these same be-
haviours, knowledge and practices for providers of education and training 
who offer, or seek to offer, relevant qualifications. And they are used as a 
mechanism for the endorsement and quality assurance of the curricular 
and assessment processes that these same qualifications rest on.3 The 
professional standards for FE teacher-training courses were established in 
2006 by a body called Lifelong Learning UK (LLUK), replacing an earlier 
set of standards (indeed, the first such set of standards for FE teachers 
in the UK) that had been established in 1999.
One such programme for training FE teachers, based at an institu-
tion that I shall refer to here as Holgate University which is in the North 
of England, has been the focus of much of my research during the last 
seven years. The Holgate FE teacher-training programme is one of the 
larger such part-time programmes in England. At any one point there 
are approximately 1,800 part-time students and 100 lecturers (although 
not all of the lecturers will be working solely as teacher-trainers: some 
will continue to teach in other curriculum areas), delivering the pro-
gramme across approximately thirty different colleges in the North of 
England. The resources required for this programme are considerable. 
It is a complex programme, requiring an infrastructure of handbooks, 
meetings, websites, committees, academic staff and administrative staff 
in order to ensure that the programme is delivered across these many 
colleges in a broadly similar or comparable manner. Or, to put it another 
way, this teacher-training curriculum rests on a complex arrangement 
or network of both people and artefacts. My argument is that in order 
to understand properly how this curriculum is accomplished—how it 
‘gets done’—we need to draw on concepts that allow us to understand 
the relationships between the people (the lecturers and the trainee 
teachers) and the artefacts (the curriculum handbooks, course websites, 
textbooks and such like). We need to know how and why the people 
use these artefacts, what happens when somebody misuses or misplaces 
an artefact, what kinds of actions these artefacts permit, and so forth. 
An appropriate conceptual framework can be found in actor-network 
theory (ANT).
3 Imogen Taylor, Developing Learning in Professional Education (Bucking-
ham: Open University Press/Society for Research into Higher Education, 
1997).
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i i i . acTor -neTWorK  Theory  in  educaT ional  research
For educators and educational researchers examining…
learning, … ANT approaches do not afford tidy accounts 
or generalisable conclusions.4
Perhaps appropriately, bearing in mind its antecedents in post-structur-
alism, ANT defies a simple definition. It has been described in several 
ways: as a component or characteristic of ethnography (a methodology 
that will be discussed below) that is concerned with “the processes of or-
dering that generate effects such as technologies;”5 as a “way of talking … 
[that] allows us to look at identity and practice as functions of ongoing 
interactions with distant elements (animate and inanimate) of networks 
that have been mobilized along intersecting trajectories;”6 and as a “soci-
ology of the social and … [a] sociology of associations.”7 That said, ANT 
literature allows three key themes to be teased out in such a way that a 
working definition of ANT can be established. Firstly, ANT is a sociology 
of association, or of ramifying relations. It is a way of exploring how social 
projects are accomplished, in ways that can be traced, across networks 
of associations or links. Such networks can consist of concentrations of 
all sorts of stuff: stories, people, paperwork, computer simulations, rou-
tines, texts and voices. Any social project will always create and embody 
characteristic forms of representation. These objects can be varied: they 
might be routinised processes such as meetings, or particular forms of 
clothing such as a uniform, or—of particular relevance to this chapter—
text-based artefacts. ANT is not concerned with what such stories or 
routines might mean, however: rather, the focus of an ANT account is 
on what such stuff—people as well as objects—might do once they have 
been linked or associated into a network.8
4 Fenwick and Edwards, Actor-Network Theory, 39.
5 John Law, Organising Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 18.
6 Nespor, Knowledge in Motion, 12–13.
7 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 9.
8 Cf. Fenwick and Edwards, Actor-Network Theory, 8; Steve Fox, “Com-
munities of practice, Foucault and Actor-Network Theory,” Journal of 
Management Studies 36 (2000): 864.
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This emphasis, on doing rather than meaning, leads to the second key 
theme: ANT provides ways of thinking about how networks or associa-
tions both carry influence and influence each other, and foregrounds the 
ways in which people are made to do things across networks of geogra-
phy or time or across institutional boundaries—such as the boundaries 
between the different colleges where the Holgate teacher-training course 
is delivered. “How to make someone do something” is a central concern.9 
In order for a social project to be accomplished, the network (of people 
and things) needs to be brought together. A network can be established 
through persuasion, inducement, coercion, or any combination of these. 
It is important to note that ANT is not concerned to explain or justify 
such networks, but simply to account for how they might expand or 
retract, so that the project that they wish to carry through can be suc-
cessfully accomplished. A network can break down at any point or link. 
Consequently, the social project can be slowed down, misdirected or 
even lost, whether the broken link is an object (for example, a text-based 
document that has been lost or misinterpreted), or a person (for example, 
someone who has decided for whatever reason not to act in the way that 
the network requires). Both people and objects can make (or fail to make) 
other people do something; that is to say, both people and objects are 
granted agency within ANT.
ANT’s insistence on analysing people and things in the same way 
introduces the third key theme: the principle of symmetry, which states: 
“humans are not treated differently from non-humans … Humans are not 
assumed to have a privileged a priori status in the world but to be part 
of it.”10In an ANT analysis, therefore, it makes no difference whether 
the network constituents being explored are people or things. Both hu-
man and non-human elements can come together and be held together 
in order to ensure the performance of the social project in question. 
Indeed, it may be the case that both human and non-human elements 
are always present and need to be so. This is not because such a mixture 
of people and objects makes a network seem to be more sustainable. 
Rather, this is a reflection of the fact that to attempt to bifurcate people 
and things when considering how the social is enacted creates a false 
dichotomy: it is simply the case that the one cannot be without the 
other.11 If we are to apply the principle of symmetry to an investigation 
9 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 59.
10 Fenwick and Edwards, Actor-Network Theory, 3.
11 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 75–76.
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of this teacher-training programme, therefore, we would need to con-
sider the ways in which both the people (the students, the staff ) and 
the artefacts (the handbooks, the meetings, the curriculum documents 
and so forth)—or, to put it another way, the human and the non-human 
actors—work with and alongside each other, move amongst and around, 
and react to and shape each other. 
But at first look, the array of potential actors that might be worth 
exploring would seem to be overwhelming. The number of human and 
non-human actors—the resources described above—enrolled in the de-
livery of the teacher-training curriculum that is the focus of this chapter, 
is considerable. And the complexity of this arrangement is added to by 
the institutional, temporal and geographical distribution of these actors. 
The first problem for an ANT inquiry, therefore, is to find a starting 
point. But of all the many social interactions or practices that take place 
within this teacher-training course, which episodes or moments should 
be brought to the fore, and on what basis? The complexity generated by 
this richness of empirical detail is added to by the fact that overt state-
ments regarding the possible methodology of any ANT inquiry are few 
in number. ANT scholars, it might be argued, spend more time decon-
structing research methodology than they do proposing it.12 So where 
should this inquiry begin? There are two elements to the answer of this 
question: a methodological element, and a conceptual element. I shall 
briefly discuss these in turn.
For the methodological element, I propose—following other ANT 
accounts—that an ethnographic framework is best suited to such an 
inquiry. Other ANT accounts have drawn on what can be termed an 
anthropological ethnographic framework. Here, I draw on data that was 
constructed as part of a multi-sited ethnography, fieldwork for which was 
carried out from 2005–2009 across four of the FE colleges at which the 
Holgate teacher-training programme is delivered, as well as at Holgate 
University itself. Multi-sited ethnography (MSE) can be seen as being 
particularly well suited to ANT.13 This is because MSE proposes the 
12 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Rout-
ledge, 2004).
13 Cf. Mary Hamilton, “Putting words in their mouths: the alignment of 
identities with system goals through the use of individual learning plans,” 
British Educational Research Journal 35 (2009): 221–42; Christine Hine, 
“Multi-sited ethnography as a middle range methodology for contemporary 
STS,” Science, Technology and Human Values 32 (2007): 652–71.
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use of multiple sites so as to afford the researcher multiple windows 
through which complexities might be observed and explored, but never 
artificially conflated to create a single field.14 This is an approach that 
is straightforwardly aligned to ANT’s rejection of over-arching schema, 
explanatory structures or sociological frameworks that attempt to provide 
‘single’ or ‘holistic’ explanations that artificially conflate complex prac-
tices or events. A further shared concern between MSE and ANT can be 
found in the concern shared by both to problematise the ‘global’ and the 
‘local,’ through a focus on how different social spaces—made up of both 
people and artefacts—are connected—by and to other people and other 
artefacts—and thereby enrolled within networks, rather that how different 
social spaces are rendered ‘local’ or ‘global’ through the attribution of a 
priori sociological categories.15
The conceptual can be addressed by focussing on the material, on the 
objects or artefacts that the teacher-training programme rests on. Any one 
of the artefacts that are enrolled within this network provides a starting 
point, a way to begin an exploration of what Latour refers to as “scripts 
of what (artefacts) are making others—humans or non-humans—do.”16 
That is to say, by beginning our inquiry with a focus on the material, we 
can then begin to follow the network through which this teacher-training 
programme is made to happen, is accomplished. But where should the 
researcher begin? Latour suggests that the social ties that link humans 
and non-humans are only momentarily visible, but that this visibility can 
be enhanced through the researcher’s fieldwork, and thus be rendered 
more useful for the researcher, in a number of ways. I shall describe 
these briefly.
The first way for the researcher to enhance the visibility of social 
ties through fieldwork is through a focus on “accidents, breakdowns and 
14 Cf. Matei Candea, “Arbitrary Locations: in Defence of the Bounded 
Field Site,” in Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Con-
temporary Research, ed. Mark-Anthony Falzon (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 
25–46.
15 Joanna Cook, James Laidlaw and Jonathan Mair, “What If There is 
No Elephant? Towards a Conception of an Un-sited Field,” in Multi-Sited 
Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research, ed. 
Mark-Anthony Falzon (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 47–72; George Marcus, 
“Ethnography in/of the World System: the Emergence of Multi-sited Eth-
nography,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 95–117.
16 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 79.
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strikes ,”17 those moments when things go wrong or when actors deviate 
from their anticipated trajectory. This is an approach that I have used 
elsewhere when researching the ways in which the marking of trainee 
teachers’ assessment portfolios leads to unanticipated and unaccounted 
behaviours by the lecturers that are not anticipated by or responded to 
by the quality management systems that are used to evaluate the delivery 
of the teacher-training curriculum.18 A second way is through the study 
of the impact of changes or innovations in the complex and multiple 
lives that actors lead.19 This is an approach that I have used elsewhere 
when researching the ways in which lecturers and trainee teachers have 
responded (or not) to the establishment of the professional standards 
discussed above.20 In this chapter, however, I am going to focus on two 
further ways by which Latour suggests that visibility can be extended. 
Firstly, I explore actors at a distance:21 in this case, a distance generated 
through my position as an educational researcher coming into a network 
of colleges, observing the interactions between human and non-human 
actors and talking with the former in order to explore further the work 
of the latter. Secondly, I use various documents in order to reconstruct 
the histories of the non-human actors—the artefacts or objects—that are 
used within this teacher-training curriculum.22 Both of these are achieved 
through ethnographic fieldwork according to the framework that I have 
described above.
Having established the conceptual and methodological frameworks 
of my inquiry, I shall now turn to an account that rests on my empiri-
cal data, constructed through observations of specific teacher-training 
17 Ibid., 81.
18 Jonathan Tummons, “Higher Education in Further Education: an Actor-
Network Ethnography,” International Journal of Actor-Network Theory and 
Technological Innovation 1 (2009): 55–69; Jonathan Tummons, “Institutional 
Ethnography and Actor-Network Theory: a Framework for Researching 
the Assessment of Trainee teachers,” Ethnography and Education 5 (2010): 
345–57.
19 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 80.
20 Cf. Jonathan Tummons, “The Textual Representation of Professional-
ism: Problematizing Professional Standards for Teachers in the UK Life-
long Learning Sector,” Research in Post-Compulsory Education 19 (2014): 
33–44.
21 Cf. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 80.
22 Cf. ibid., 81.
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sessions, through semi-structured interviews with students, lecturers 
and course managers involved in the teacher-training curriculum, and 
through the documentary analysis of a range of curriculum, policy and 
other documents, such as student assessment portfolios, feedback sheets 
from lecturers, class handouts and such like, relevant to and derived from 
the curriculum. In this account, I focus on a specific episode of activity 
involving a variety of human and non-human actors within this teacher-
training curriculum.
i v . maK inG  sense  oF  assessmenT
Every single interview, narrative, and commentary, no 
matter how trivial it may appear, will provide the analyst 
with a bewildering array of entities to account for the 
hows and whys of any course of action.23
A common feature of this teacher-training programme—indeed, of higher 
education provision in England more generally—is the use of one or two 
classroom sessions, from time to time, to provide an explanation of the 
assessment task(s) that the students are currently working towards. This 
part-time teacher-training programme is divided into units or modules, 
one per term, and so once each term the lecturers deliver several iterations 
of what I shall refer to here as an assessment session—those sessions given 
over to providing students with advice and guidance relating to their next 
assessment task. Across the network of colleges that deliver the Holgate 
University programme, a small number of shared ways of running such 
sessions is apparent. The most common method is for lecturers to lead 
a short discussion and read-through of the assessment instructions, 
providing commentary relating to academic writing style, appropriate 
references, revision of relevant course content, common mistakes made 
by previous students and so forth.
Scarcroft College (this name is a pseudonym, as are all proper names 
used in presenting the data) is one of the larger FE colleges to deliver 
the Holgate teacher-training programme. It is a large college, situated 
in a large industrial city in the North of England, and it specialises in 
providing training for the catering and hospitality sectors, although 
23 Cf. ibid., 47.
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it also offers more general technical and vocational curricula. It has 
been delivering the Holgate teacher-training course since 1992. Ruth, 
who is one of three experienced teacher-training lecturers at Scarcroft 
College (all three have been teaching the course for at least four years), 
has designed a format for assessment sessions that she uses across the 
several different units that she teaches within the curriculum. Instead of 
simply standing at the front of the classroom and talking her students 
through what they have to do, she turns the process around and asks 
her students to take the lead in explaining the assessment tasks. She 
provides them with a handout containing a series of prompts and ques-
tions, divides her students into small groups of four, five or six (there are 
usually between fifteen and thirty students in any one teacher-training 
class), and asks each small group to draw a poster that sets out what 
a particular element of the assessment is about and what each student 
would have to do within their assessment portfolio. For example: one 
small group might be asked to explain how to compile a variety of 
teaching resources within the portfolio, and another will be asked to 
provide guidance as to relevant essay topics, whilst a third will be asked 
to focus on providing a review of which textbooks and journal articles 
should be consulted. In effect, Ruth is asking her students to explain to 
each other what is required, limiting her own role firstly to facilitating 
this exercise and subsequently to correcting any misunderstandings 
and proffering any relevant information or guidance that the students 
have not anticipated.
This exercise involves a number of different artefacts or objects, many 
of them text-based. (Here, I am using a definition of ‘text’ that refers 
to a reproducible and relatively durable representation on the page or 
screen, which can be found in many different genres of document that 
are produced by institutions, lecturers and students). Students use the 
worksheets that Ruth has written, the curriculum handbooks provided 
by Holgate University, the textbooks that are in the recommended read-
ing lists for the course, and laptop computers that can be used to access 
Holgate’s virtual learning environment. In turn, students then create and/
or manipulate other objects whilst completing the exercise that Ruth has 
given them. They scribble notes on the pages of their handbooks, draw 
posters, write notes in their diaries or in their smart phones, bookmark 
useful web pages on their laptops, and so forth.
This is at first look a simple activity: a workshop-style session that 
has been designed to help the students help themselves to an under-
standing of what they have to do for their next assessment. But it is 
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also a complex activity as well. Arguably, the ways in which the students 
complete their assessments is the single most important aspect of the 
entire teacher-training course. It is through successful assessment and 
hence successful professional accreditation that these students become 
qualified teachers and can enter the workforce.24 And in many ways, this 
initial activity of exploring what the assessment is about and how it is to 
be done foreshadows the act of assessment itself. Both the assessment 
guidance session and the act of assessment itself involve a variety of 
text-based artefacts, texts of different genres and registers: handbooks, 
posters, web pages, journal articles, textbooks, PowerPoint slides and so 
forth. Students create some of these and edit others, write onto some and 
ignore others, critically explore some and quickly scan the rest. Teach-
ers point some out and gloss over others, prefer some and ignore others, 
engage with some and dismiss others. 
Some of these texts are created as a way of recording certain student 
behaviours, attitudes and understandings: essays provide a reflection of 
the students’ theoretical understanding; reflective writing offers students 
the opportunity to write about and make sense of their own experiences 
as trainee teachers. Other texts are created by the teachers: feedback 
forms record the teachers’ academic and professional judgements, al-
lowing them to provide developmental feedback, and to pronounce the 
students ready for professional certification and full entry to the world 
of work. Through this multi-directional flow of texts and actions, one 
small part of the teacher-training curriculum can be seen to be being 
accomplished, to be being practiced in the social world. And this is not 
happening just at Scarcroft College, but at all of the other colleges that 
deliver the Holgate teacher-training programme as well. These guidance 
sessions will not be conducted in exactly the same ways; nor will they 
take place at exactly the same times. There will be any number of differ-
ent conversations about, questions asked and responses to the particular 
assessment that is being discussed. But across all of these institutional, 
organisational and geographic boundaries, all of the students and teach-
ers involved will all be talking about and coming to know about the 
same assessment process. And this happens through the use, creation 
and distribution of, and conversations around and about, a variety of 
different textual artefacts.
24 Cf. Taylor, Developing Learning, 107. 
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v. The  TexTual  med iaT ion  oF  soc ial  pracT ices
If social ordering depended on voices alone, it would be a 
very local affair. Bodies travel better than voices and they 
tend to last longer […] Texts […] have their drawbacks. 
They can be burned, lost or misinterpreted. On the other 
hand, they tend to travel well and they last well if they are 
properly looked after. So texts may have ordering effects 
that spread across time and space.25
Texts do not simply order what goes on at a local level: there is more to 
their ordering work than enrolling the students within a single classroom 
into the practices of their next assignment. And in turn, they can achieve 
more than simply (although there is nothing simple about it) ensuring 
that different student groups in different institutions are all working to 
the same assessment outline. Texts are able to do more than one thing 
at a time: that is to say, they can carry multiple meanings or intentions 
that can serve the interests of more than one actor. Through a study of 
the relationships between different texts and the ways in which one text 
rests on, relies on or otherwise supports another, a characteristic referred 
to as “intertextuality,”26 we can explore how such multiple meanings can 
be transmitted across space and time.
Let me provide a single example in order to explain and explore 
this point (mindful of Latour’s point, already quoted, that even a single 
example can raise a bewildering array of questions and issues for explora-
tion). The example begins with a brief examination of one of the docu-
ments produced by Holgate University for the students: the module guide. 
The module guide is just one of the several other curriculum documents 
that Holgate supply to students (and to teachers as well). They produce 
a module guide for each module in the programme, and they follow a 
standardised format. The module guide contains the specifications for the 
particular module in question (the learning outcomes, indicative content 
and such like), details of the assessment task that students will have to 
25 Law, Organising Modernity, 102.
26 David Barton, Literacy: an Introduction to the Ecology of the Written 
Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 62.
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complete, a recommended reading list and so forth, all laid out accord-
ing to a template that is shared across all of the module documentation. 
At the top of the specifications page, immediately underneath the 
title of the module, is a section of text that begins:
Professional body requirements: Lifelong Learning UK/Standards 
Verification UK (formerly FENTO standards), including minimum 
core requirements for language, literacy and numeracy.
Lifelong Learning UK (LLUK) was a subsidiary organisation of Standards 
Verification UK, a non-governmental organisation that was established in 
order to establish and then monitor the professional standards for teach-
ers in the lifelong learning sector—which includes FE colleges. These 
standards were published in 2007, and were designed to set out a list of 
the knowledge, attributes and competencies expected of any teacher in the 
sector. These replaced an earlier set of standards that had been produced 
by a predecessor organisation—the Further Education National Training 
Organisation (FENTO). The FENTO standards were first published in 
1999. Their revision and replacement were initiated as part of a wider 
change in education policy by the UK government. In 2004, a policy 
paper called Equipping Our Teachers For The Future was published. This 
document not only led the way for the new LLUK professional standards, 
but also for wider curriculum reforms across the vocational and technical 
curriculum more generally. These reforms included changes to assessment 
regimes, changes to existing qualification structures and the introduction 
of new qualifications for 16–19 year old students, as well as planned reform 
of the training of teachers in the sector. All FE teacher-training courses 
have to be able to demonstrate that they are aligned to these professional 
standards. The content of the course has to reflect the standards, and in 
turn it can be assumed that if the assessments completed by the students 
are sufficient to merit a pass grade, then by default the students are dem-
onstrating that they have met the required professional standard.
During the assessment session, the students and their teachers will all 
come across this reference to the LLUK professional standards in their 
module guides. So what might happen next? Some students may have come 
across the standards already, perhaps in the appendix of one of the recom-
mended textbooks, and will contribute to a discussion in class about the 
purpose and functions of such standards. Perhaps the lecturer will ask the 
students to download a pdf of the standards to refer to both now and during 
the rest of the course. Other teachers might only discuss the standards briefly, 
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on the basis that they are implicitly covered by the curriculum and do not 
need further discussion. Some lecturers might even ignore them completely 
—and thereby encourage their students to do the same. Put simply, how 
people respond to the standards, at this moment, is variable, neatly illus-
trating the relational materiality that ANT ascribes to text-based artefacts.
v i . res isT inG  overarch inG  explanaT ions
[T]he object of actor-network theory informed analyses 
is not to explain the size of any network, but rather to 
elucidate how any network grows in influence and/or 
contracts—the analytical interest is to illuminate the 
processes, rather than explain end results, such as the size 
of a network at any point in time.27
Overarching sociological and political explanations of the initial introduc-
tion of and subsequent changes to the professional standards for trainee-
teachers tend to focus on a number of themes (although we should note 
that the same arguments are used to critique processes of professionaliza-
tion in other sectors as well, such as healthcare provision). One is the ‘new 
professionalism,’ a term used to describe discourses of professionalism 
and professional conduct that are imposed on a group from the outside 
and owned by an external body, rather than generated by a professional 
group and managed internally. Another is ‘neo-liberalism,’ a term used 
to describe the imposition of free-market, private sector models of gov-
ernance on areas of activity that had previously been part of the public 
sector. A third is ‘managerialism,’ a term used to describe the growth 
of a ‘management class’ that is distinct from teachers, who cannot be 
trusted to manage themselves as autonomous professionals.28 Within this 
context, successive changes to the professional frameworks for trainee-
teachers can be seen as part of an on-going process of managerial control 
of the profession, further evidenced through the imposition of inspection 
regimes and other forms of quality assurance and management. 
27 Steve Fox, “An Actor-Network Critique of Community in Higher Edu-
cation,” Studies in Higher Education 37 (2005): 95–110: 102.
28 Denis Hayes, Toby Marshall and Alec Turner, A Lecturer’s Guide to 
Further Education (Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2007), 7.
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For the ANT researcher, however, such over-arching sociological per-
spectives are to be resisted in favour of accounts that focus instead on 
how the actors that make up a network behave in the ways that they do. 
For the researcher who draws on neo-liberalism or managerialism, the 
professional standards represent a problematic aspect of professional 
discourse: this researcher will be interested in how particular ideologies 
of professionalism might explain the discursive interpretation of the 
standards. For the ANT researcher, however, a more straightforward 
question must first be answered: how do the standards get to where they 
need to be in the first place? If these standards are going to make teachers 
in the FE sector behave in particular ways (although the extent to which 
any such set of standards can accomplish this is questionable from an 
ANT perspective),29 then we need to begin by tracing their movements.
The professional standards begin their journey as a conversation, 
at policy level, about the work done within further education colleges, a 
process that with certainty can be seen as predating the publication of the 
first set of standards by five years.30 Although not reified into a finalised 
text-based form for five years, the standards are already an actor: they 
are the focus of consultations, discussion, first drafts, trial periods and so 
forth. Once they are finally made concrete, then they can be circulated. 
But texts—for that is the form in which they are made concrete—have 
several particular properties, two of which are of interest to this analysis. 
Firstly, it is important to remember that a text has to be read in order 
to be activated. That is to say, people are needed for these text-based 
artefacts to work. People need to read them, to act on them, to discuss 
what they are about. And secondly, a text has the possibility of influ-
encing the creation of another text: intertextuality. So as people use the 
professional standards, they may also enfold them in other texts as they 
use, read and otherwise manipulate them, by quoting from them, citing 
them in an assignment or referring to them in a curriculum document.
Thus, the standards come into being at the level of political discourse, 
and in turn are reified, are made concrete, as a published document—a 
29 Cf. Hamilton, “Putting Words;” Dianne Mulcahy, “Performativity in 
Practice: an Actor-Network Account of Professional Teaching Standards,” 
International Journal of Actor-Network Theory and Technological Innovation 
3 (2011): 1–16.
30 Cf. Norman Lucas, “The ‘FENTO Fandango’: National Standards, 
Compulsory Teaching Qualifications and the Growing Regulation of FE 
Teachers,” Journal of Further and Higher Education 28 (2004): 35–51
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pdf file that can be downloaded from the internet or a hard copy that can 
be picked up at a conference or workshop. Authors sometimes include 
them as appendices in their textbooks, perhaps as a response to requests 
from publishers, perhaps as the result of an authorial decision. In order 
to ensure that their curricula meets all necessary requirements, universi-
ties and awarding bodies have to demonstrate, often through a process 
of inspection and audit, that their curricula do indeed pay attention and 
respond to the standards. So they quote them—enfold them—within 
handbooks and refer to them in their assessment documents, including the 
module guides that are written for the students, perhaps to be studied in 
an assessment session such as the workshop designed by Ruth at Scarcroft 
College that I have already described. But it is important to remember that 
this materiality—the very fact of the standards consisting of ‘stuff ’—is 
relational: the standards might get read and acted upon, or they might not.
v i i . conclus ions :  The  pr inc iple  oF  symmeTry
Humans are not differently treated from non-humans …31
As we travel along this network of actors, we can begin to list the humans 
(government ministers, lecturers, students, textbook authors, academics 
and quality assurance officers, for example) and non-humans (policy 
documents, meetings, pdf files, curriculum handbooks and PowerPoint 
slides, for example) who are enrolled in the process of translating the 
professional standards from policy initiative to topic for classroom discus-
sion and back again. And we can begin to understand the relationship that 
each has with the others. The ordering of professional standards cannot 
be accomplished solely through people and their voices: we need to use 
artefacts—texts, meetings, consultations, curriculum approval events—as 
well. In turn, none of these artefacts can work—can be—without people 
to write them, to attend to them, to discuss and sometimes dismiss them.
This process of ordering relies on humans and non-humans. It 
necessarily relies on both, but the precise ways in which each work can 
only be understood through reference to the other. Textual artefacts 
need to be read—by people. But they can only be read once they have 
been written—by people. People need to transmit their ideas, concepts, 
31 Fenwick and Edwards, Actor-Network Theory, 3.
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discussions and doubts—but voices do not travel as far as textual artefacts 
can. People need to record their responses to these texts—which will 
require the creation of new texts. And so on. The different non-humans 
and humans who are enrolled in the establishment of the professional 
standards are interlinked in equally different ways. And the establishment 
of these professional standards is only one small example of the social 
practices that these actors are engaged in. Within all of this variety and 
complexity, it is not only not surprising that the chains that bind these 
actors together sometimes break, causing aspects of the network to break 
down, but also inevitable. There is no social order, only endless attempts 
at ordering.32 There is no single, unambiguous response to such profes-
sional standards: rather, there are different responses, reacting to local 
vicissitudes, ambiguities and habits.33 Some students will read them and 
quote from them, and some will not. Some lecturers will champion them 
and point them out to their students, and others will not. 
Thus we find ourselves confronted by a complex, always imperfect, 
relational attempt at the ordering of one aspect of a teacher-training cur-
riculum. From a piece of paper lying on a student’s desk, we can travel to 
the level of government policy and back, drawing on discussions relating 
to UK national education policy, curriculum reform and the professional 
training of teachers—all from just twenty words on a module handbook. 
The only difficulty for the ANT-informed researcher is that this same 
module handbook contains a little over 3,000 words in total. And there are 
six more module handbooks after this one, following the same template. 
And after this, there are other universities and awarding bodies offering 
similar qualifications for FE teachers. Here I have followed Latour’s ad-
vice and focused on just one small episode. Where else might an account 
of the many other episodes that make up this actor-network lead us? 
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marTa  dop ieralsK i
no actor actS aLone
Some Reflections on ANT with  
Reference to the Film Set
inTroducT ion
Lorenz Engell defines the three main agencies of cinematography as film 
studio, cinema and the moving image itself.1 Film and media theory are 
predominantly concerned with the two latter branches and mostly focus 
on either the product (film) or the dispositif of perception (cinema). An 
analysis of the film studio on the other hand is bound to remain rather 
fragmentary due to very practical reasons: the production process can-
not be traced back directly from the final product, and is accessible only 
to a very limited number of participants. This is possibly why theorists 
mostly refer to the movie as the final product. There is a vast amount of 
work on film and cinema as social phenomena. One of the first is Emilie 
Altenloh’s dissertation from 1913, which, commissioned by Max Weber, 
had the title: “Zur Soziologie des Kinos. Die Kinounternehmen und die 
sozialen Schichten ihrer Besucher.”2 This scientific approach to cinema, 
1 Lorenz Engell, “Kinematographische Agenturen,” in Medien denken. 
Von der Bewegung des Begriffs zu bewegten Bildern, ed. Lorenz Engell, Jiri 
Bystricky and Katerina Krtilova (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 137–156.
2 This work is mentioned here because it is considered the first scientific 
treatise referring to cinema. Altenloh describes the cinema as a relatively 
young cultural phenomenon und canvasses the combination of its public. 
Her leading question is to find out which professions and social groups 
the cinemagoers belong to and to question their expectations of the 
cinematic experience. Cf. Emilie Altenloh, Zur Soziologie des Kinos. Die 
the world’s first, has been notoriously followed by new works with dif-
ferent thematic priorities on its cultural, aesthetic or psychological char-
acteristics that accompanied the ascent of film towards its dominating 
status in cultural and media studies. 
In 1924, Béla Balázs argued that the—at the time still silent—film 
functions as the only universal language and marks a cultural innovation 
comparable to the invention of the printing press. According to Balázs, 
film is able to give back culture a visible which before was supressed by 
terms, that is the consistency of orality and textuality. The film industry 
has been continuously growing and feeding on technical innovations 
with film theory developing correspondingly. The modalities of produc-
tion and their social coherences however seem not to have aroused much 
research interest. Whenever theories of production were undertaken they 
were, for the most part, psychologically interested and focussed on the 
relation between artist and work, especially since the beginning of the 
20th century, when the work began to be taken as an index for the mental 
condition of its creator.3 However, the discourse on Hollywood as Dream 
Factory already implies the industrial scale of this production: through 
the increasing degree of mechanization and the tight linkage of humans 
and technology, something is serially produced to satisfy a specific cus-
tomer demand. This essay therefore touches on a production theory that 
in its first step will replace the singular creator/author with the notion 
of a multi-layered structure, which simultaneously determines and is 
determined by the mode of production of this relevant cultural product. 
Of course, as no two productions are the same, universal conclusions 
are impossible. However, some suppositions about commonalities of 
such creatively working collectives can be allowed. Which dynamics are 
generated in this social situation and what are their consequences? In the 
context of this article three theses will be briefly put up for discussion. 
The first and fundamental assertion concerns the assignment of agency 
on the film set, or rather the contrary: the impossibility to do so, because, 
as I argue, nobody or nothing on the set acts alone. It is the collective 
that acts, a “set of features that, so to speak, march in step together, even 
Kinounternehmung und die sozialen Schichten ihrer Besucher (Jena: Eugen 
Diederichs, 1914).
3 James Monaco, How to Read a Film: The World of Movies, Media, and 
Multimedia: Art, Technology, Language, History, Theory, 3rd edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 32.
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though it might be composed of radically different types of entities.”4 
These types include objects, technical instruments and concepts, as well 
as other, more invisible factors that I will address later. The second as-
sumption is that these non-human entities are significantly involved in 
the hierarchization within the given social network. 
Following the explication of the first two theses, the third one com-
pletes them with a phenomenon that hypothetically appears wherever 
there is a group and there is power: the ritual. Since “no other creative 
enterprise of any kind requires anywhere near the amount of people, 
money, and organization (with their attendant risks) than filmmaking,”5 
one would think that the rigorously structured schedule of work and the 
highly efficient conditions of production should preclude processes that 
are not directly target-oriented or irrational. Upon closer examination 
however, the film set proves to be not primarily the sum of rational ap-
positions of activities, but rather a space imbued with a variety of rituals 
and irrational behavioural patterns. The third thesis therefore claims 
that the collective tends to infiltrate the working structure with irratio-
nal patterns of behaviour that acquire a kind of secondary function in 
becoming operators of interaction and communication in the examined 
workspace; a necessary body of rules that imposes a rhythm, a hierarchy 
and an internal organization within this creative process. 
acTor -neTWorK  Theory  and  The  F i lm  seT
Intuitively, approaching the process of film production with the help 
of the Actor-Network Theory appears reasonable because its terms are 
borrowed from the stage world: why not examine the network around 
actors with Actor-Network Theory? Although even the French sociolo-
gist Bruno Latour, the main proponent of the theory, has emphasized his 
critical distance to the formulation, at first glance no term seems more 
accurate in the given case. As a result of several stays on film sets and an 
interest in the phenomenon of collective creativity, the film set occurred 
4 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43.
5 Gianluca Sergi, “Film Production,” in The International Encyclopaedia 
of Communication, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), accessed July 7, 2014, doi: 10.1111/b.9781405131995.2008.x.
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to me, more even than a place or a process, as a social situation. But 
perhaps not ‘social’ in a traditional sense: it is here that the path leads 
to Latour. In his sociology, Latour tries to free the loaded term ‘society’ 
from the implications previously attributed to it in social theory. In or-
der to reflect it independently and critically, he firstly pointedly converts 
it into the term ‘collective’. The term ‘social’ for Latour applies to “an 
association between entities which are in no way recognizable as being 
social in the ordinary manner, except during the brief moment when 
they are reshuffled together.”6 Latour tries to bypass the subject-object 
dichotomy artificially created by society and to include nonhumans into 
the collective. 
Considering the enormous spectrum of networks that can be analyzed 
with ANT, this short article does not claim any degree of completion as 
an ANT-report, as established by Latour as a tool for examining social 
relationships. The film set as a collective is an exemplary and specific 
set-up for the inspection of which ANT can serve as both a tool of 
support and research language in order to split it up into its layers and 
groupings and to trace their relations to each other more clearly instead of 
generalizing it from above. But the bigger a film production is, the more 
institutions, levels and co-operations become involved and expand the 
structure. Latour views the complexity of a network with optimism and 
still claims that “instead of taking a reasonable position and imposing 
some order beforehand, ANT claims to be able to find order much better 
after having let the actors deploy the full range of controversies in which 
they are immersed.”7 The more complex a collective, the better it shows 
the hard work during the composition of the new entity.
One tool he provides us with is the concept of the black box, which 
allows for some simplification in the almost infinite rapports of entities. 
The process of blackboxing “facilitates the studying and description of 
networks as it allows the researcher or author to gloss over certain aspects 
of the network without having to detail the many nuances inside the 
black box.”8 Blackboxing thus is “the way scientific and technical work 
is made invisible by its own success. When a machine runs efficiently, 
6 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 65.
7 Ibid., 23.
8 Oli Mould, “Lights, Camera, But Where’s the Action? Actor-Network 
Theory and the Production of Robert Connolly’s Three Dollars,” in Produc-
tion Studies: Cultural Studies of Media Industries, ed. Vicki Mayer, Miranda 
J. Banks and John T. Caldwell (New York: Routledge, 2009), 203–213: 205.
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when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and 
outputs and not on its internal complexity.”9 There is a very short case 
study by Oli Mould that underlines the advantage of the use of ANT as 
a language of analysis for an Australian feature film from 2005.10 Mould 
emphasizes the project-based nature of film production and the common 
enrolment of numerous freelance workers. What he considers important 
within this approach is that “ANT describes and prioritizes action of 
production work activities and relationships over the structure of the 
industry’s institutions and economies.”11
It is a long and burdensome way from the development of the script 
to the film’s projection in cinemas. Therefore, in this article, I will only 
refer to the actual filming phase which is chronologically placed between 
pre- and postproduction and which starts after the successful handling 
of all ‘bureaucratic’ proceedings and steps during the preparation stage. 
The situation of production is determined by the following parameters: 
the script is ready and approved, artists and crew are contracted and this 
group now collectively works according to an externally dictated time-
frame in order to develop material that will become, over the course of 
editing, a movie. Each film production is unique and not entirely compa-
rable to another. It depends on numerous factors, such as nationality, ar-
tistic aspiration, budget, as well as the quantity and quality of employees. 
Before a translation of text into images even begins, of textual signs into 
film language, a translation of figures to characters and descriptions into 
décor, costumes and objects takes place. Only then these interpretations 
are brought together in filmic images, for which the recording apparatus 
becomes a fundamental agent. The making of a film can be understood 
as a multi-step process of translation in which every entity updates or 
overwrites the results of the preceding one. 
In this analysis I will call this process the film set. This term, like the 
related studio, firstly seems to give an indication of place. However, it ef-
fectively transcends this function in summarizing something that is not 
directly locatable and can take place at many different places each time.12 
9 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press 1999), 304.
10 Three Dollars, dir. Robert Conolly, Arena Films, 2005.
11 Mould, “Lights, Camera, But Where’s the Action?,” 203.
12 Even as a simple statement of place, the film set refers to the scene in 
front of and behind the camera. It includes both the decoration on set as 
well as the make-up room, exterior locations and the director’s chair. 
185Marta  Dop ieralsk i :  No  actor  acts  aloNe
I use it as a generic term, symbolically, to describe the concomitance of 
numerous diverse factors: the temporal, spatial, technical and personal 
conditions of creative film work. 
What are we analyzing if we are referring to the film set? In a first 
sense, a collective of persons of different professions, working, more 
or less involved, on the development of one final product. A complex 
framework including director, actors, sound and light technicians, as-
sistants and nervous producers as well as the so called below-the-line 
professions.13 The amount of people engaged in the production process 
in different relations to each other makes Erwin Panofsky compare the 
making of a film with the construction phase of a medieval cathedral:
It might be said that a film, called into being by a cooperative effort 
in which all contributions have the same degree of permanence, is 
the nearest modern equivalent of a medieval cathedral; the role of 
the producer corresponding, more or less, to that of the bishop or 
archbishop; that of the director to that of the architect in chief; that 
of the scenario writers to that of scholastic advisers establishing the 
iconographical program; and that of the actors, cameramen, cutters, 
sound men, makeup men, and the diverse technicians to that of those 
whose work provided the physical entity of the finished product, from 
the sculptors, glass painters, bronze casters, carpenters, and skilled 
masons down to the quarry men and woodsmen. And if you speak 
to any one of those collaborators he will tell you, with perfect bona 
fides, that his is really the most important job—which is quite true 
to the extent that it is indispensable.14
Secondly, technical installations represent another rudimental compo-
nent of the structure. The history of film and cinema in the making 
has always been a history of technology and its progress. In contrast 
13 The media and culture industry uses the above-the-line/below-the-line 
distinction in order to separate ‘creative’ from ‘technical’ labor. Cf. Matt 
Stahl, “Privilege and Distinction in Production Worlds. Copyright, Collec-
tive Bargaining, and Working Conditions in Media Making,” in Production 
Studies: Cultural Studies of Media Industries, ed. Vicki Mayer, Miranda J. 
Banks and John T. Caldwell (New York: Routledge, 2009), 54–66.
14 Erwin Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures,” in The Visual 
Turn. Classical Film Theory and Art History, ed. Angela Dalle Vacche (New 
Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 69–84: 81.
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to theatre, film is based on its technical devices in two different ways, 
one enabling the recording of moving pictures and the other one their 
transmission. The invention of film within the scope of its technical 
history might already be considered a collective enterprise and depends 
on a whole series of innovations from different inventors, literally fight-
ing about patents around the turn of the 20th century. From Edison’s 
kinetoscope, the Skladanowsky brothers’ bioscop to the cinematograph 
by the Lumière brothers, whose cinema showing went down in history 
as the birth of cinema, not due to the best-engineered technology, but 
simply because of the social situation: the projection of moving pictures 
in front of a paying audience. The priority of the projecting technology 
over the pictures becomes clear when considering that Louis Lumière 
did not consider copyright protection for the pictures, but merely kept 
the technical functions of the apparatus a secret. The film as product 
was not of the highest priority and, according to Thomas Elsaesser, only 
served to demonstrate the cinematograph’s functions and amenities.15 
The steady focus on technical aspects clearly separates the discourse 
about cinema from the one about most preceding media. In 1936/37, 
Panofsky summarized this fact very appropriately, stating that it ‘was not 
an artistic urge that gave rise to the discovery and gradual perfection of 
a new technique; it was a technical invention that gave rise to the dis-
covery and gradual perfection of a new art.’16 Continuously, in fact, there 
are new technological alterations, from sound and colour, wide screen, 
digital editing to today’s 3D-recording process. That’s why technical 
devices—camera, microphone, lighting—and objects in general—décor, 
costumes, properties—constitute a substantial component of the analyzed 
structure film set. They are integrated and variously assembled with the 
human entities in diverse working processes. 
And thirdly, there is a whole range of invisible factors. Relatively 
quickly, film ceased to be considered a succession of pictures enabled 
by an apparatus and developed into an art form and a mighty tool of 
communication: it spreads various content and can be highly political 
or soaked with ideologies. The expectations of critics and customers, 
the reactions of the public and the immense financial pressure of a film 
production are forces that cannot be ignored: 
15 Thomas Elsaesser, Filmgeschichte und frühes Kino. Archäologie eines 
Medienwandels (München: edition text+kritik, 2002), 49.
16 Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures,” 69.
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Film, because it is a very expensive art, is especially susceptible to 
the distortions caused by economic considerations. The elaborate 
economic infrastructure of film—the complex rules of production, 
distribution and consumption that underline the art—set strict 
limitations on filmmakers, a fact that is often ignored by critics.17
This heterogeneously combined collective, working on a product that 
might furthermore claim to be art under the aforementioned circum-
stances, is regarded as the basis for the following considerations. Al-
though, as James Monaco observes, when we consider all previously given 
factors, “the variety of forces that must conspire to get a film made, all 
the demanding economical, political, and technological factors (so few 
of which the individual poets, painters, or musicians need consider), it’s 
a wonder that any ‘art’ survives the arduous process of moviemaking.”18
For me, a very appropriate definition of the studio, as where the 
actual filming takes place, is given by Lorenz Engell, who describes it as 
an arrangement comparable to a laboratory, where humans and techni-
cal devices as well as expectations, reflections and habits collaborate and 
thereby produce a film in a model of authorship that is very complex and, 
until today, difficult to itemize.19 At least in German, the fact that the 
filming process is referred to as the plural form ‘Dreharbeiten’ might be 
instructive because it naturally implies a multi-layered process.
The  collecT i ve  and  i Ts  acT ions
A theoretical approach to the process of film production proves a specific 
challenge, because at the time of its distribution the film is already a mere 
trace of its own production process. Having gone through postproduction, 
it presents itself to the viewer as a selected amount of information. The 
viewer lacks the knowledge about which scene has been recorded how 
many times, which sounds are digitally added and in which cases he is 
17 Monaco, How to Read a Film, 33.
18 Ibid., 284.
19 My translation: “[E]ine Anordnung, die dem Labor vergleichbar ist, in 
der Menschen und technische Dinge, aber auch Erwartungen, Überlegun-
gen und Gewohnheiten zusammenwirken und dabei in sehr komplexer und 
bis heute schwer aufzuschlüsselnder Urheberschaft einen Film hervorbrin-
gen.” Engell, “Kinematographische Agenturen,” 139.
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actually seeing the double instead of the actor. The film positions itself 
as an entity and its making can only be indirectly guessed. Is it possible 
to subsequently disassemble its parts in order to comprehend the genesis 
of a film a little better? And why is the ‘behind’ of such interest? Because, 
as I would like to argue, it contains its very own dynamics, rules and 
problems that deserve a more detailed investigation. 
The entertainment industry seems to have reacted much more will-
ingly to the public’s interest in the process of film making than to film 
theory. In various formats such as the ‘Making Of,’ documentaries from 
film sets and even motion pictures dealing with filmmaking, it sets one’s 
sight on the production mode, partly enveloped in myths, and gives the 
viewer a glance behind the curtains of a usually hardly accessible system.20 
Latour also highlights this particularity: 
The “making of ” any enterprise—films, skyscrapers, facts, political 
meetings, initiation rituals, haute couture, cooking—offers a view that 
is sufficiently different from the official one. Not only does it lead you 
backstage and introduce you to the skills and knacks of practitioners, 
it also provides a rare glimpse of what it is for a thing to emerge out 
of inexistence by adding to any existing entity its time dimension.21
But if the public—driven by passion, curiosity or boredom—exercises 
patience and stays in their seats after the last scene, it will encounter 
a trace of the whole collective engaged in production. By the time the 
filmgoer sees the end credits in cinema, this collective has long been 
dissolved and individual groups or persons are likely already parts of 
other production collectives. The credits contain job designations such 
as ‘key’ or ‘dolly grip’ and ‘gaffer’ that might not be very informative 
to the common filmgoer, but emphasize the intricacy and versatility of 
the technology involved. The end credits reveal the groups and forces 
involved in the process, but instead of providing any predications about 
20 The format of the ‘Making Of ’ deserves a closer analysis since it has 
become an inherent part of the film industry. What in its origin was a col-
lection of material that showed the work behind the camera and possibly 
broke the illusion of the film is now creating a new one. The viewer’s look 
behind the scenes is very precisely steered. Now, mainly on DVD editions 
of films, the ‘Making Of ’ fulfills functions within the logic of the supple-
mentary.
21 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 89.
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it, they rather illustrate a hierarchy. Names are arranged in a hierarchi-
cal order and lined up with their function within the production or in 
respect to the operated apparatus. The vertical order shows director 
and actors at the top, followed by unit managers, coordinators, decora-
tors and electricians in the central portion, down to extras, set runners, 
consultants and even caterers. They constitute a community of practice. 
This definition refers to
groups of people who share similar interests and objectives. In pursu-
ing these interests and objectives, they make use of common practices, 
work with similar artifacts, and use a common language. (…)Each 
community develops a set of linguistic and interactional behaviours 
which function in somewhat different ways in other communities.22 
Within this collective, the notion of absolute authorship is automatically 
excluded, because all work stages are explicitly based on a division of 
labor.
A range of complex conditions must be fulfilled to create a movie 
that is not the result of uncoordinated actions of single persons, but the 
organic, permanent work product of one creator—the film team.23 How 
the collective creative process overshadows every independent action can 
be illustrated by the role of the cameraman. In a first sense, the camera-
man does not act alone as he is invariably recording in coordination 
with the director and stage designer. Secondly, he is characterized and 
limited by his specific schooling, his skills and the ideas of his supervi-
sors. And thirdly, he is inextricably linked with his apparatus, as it is 
with him. Here, the ‘cold war between objects and subjects’24 becomes 
22 Cf. Ana Cristina Ostermann, “Communities of Practice,” in The Inter-
national Encyclopaedia of Communication, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008), doi: 10.1111/b.9781405131995.2008.x
23 My translation: “Eine Reihe komplexer Bedingungen muss erfüllt wer-
den, unter denen ein Film geschaffen werden kann, der nicht das Resultat 
eines unkoordinierten Handelns von Einzelpersonen darstellt, sondern 
das organische, dauerhafte Produkt der Arbeit eines Schöpfers—des 
Filmteams—ist.” Andrej Moskvin and Evgenij Michajlov, “Die Rolle des 
Kameramanns bei der Produktion eines Films,” in Poetika Kino. Theorie 
und Praxis des Films im russischen Formalismus, ed. Wolfgang Beilenhoff 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005), 157–176: 158.
24 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature. How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 76.
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obsolete, because a cameraman without a camera is as worthless as a 
camera without a cameraman. Moving pictures can therefore only be cre-
ated through their interaction—a team effort, if you will. Managing this 
interplay of raised opinions, guidelines and limitations, the cameraman 
is now asked to unfold his artistic potential in dealing with the camera 
and its technical capabilities.
The role and purpose of the cameraman, to whom a number of 
technical and artistic options are available, […] lies in using them 
and blending them organically with all of the other elements of the 
film regarding pace, atmosphere and sound instead of letting them 
become an end in itself, as technology for technology’s sake […].25 
A very similar argument could be developed for the sound engineer and 
his microphone, the composer and his soundtrack suggestions, and 
several other participants on the set. In general, as Latour puts it, once 
“we enter the realm of engineers and craftsmen, no unmediated action 
is possible.”26
Although technology, or, more generally: a number of objects is 
significantly involved in the action on set, they are not automatically 
considered actors. In this context, Latour draws a distinction between 
mediators and intermediaries. While intermediaries merely transport 
their content without transformation—regardless of whether it is a force 
or a meaning—mediators “transform, translate, distort, and modify the 
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.”27 And it is their 
transforming power that should be subjected to the test and might grant 
them the status of actors. Thus according to Latour “any thing that does 
modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor—or, if it has 
no figuration yet, an actant.”28
25 My translation: “Die Rolle und Aufgabe des Kameramanns, dem eine 
ganze Reihe technischer und künstlerischer Möglichkeiten zur Verfügung 
stehen […], besteht darin, diese – ohne sie zum Selbstzweck zu machen 
(Technik um der Technik willen) – anzuwenden und sie organisch mit 
den übrigen Elementen des Films in Tempo, Atmosphäre und Ton zu 
verschmelzen […].” Moskvin and Michajlov, “Die Rolle des Kameramanns 
bei der Produktion eines Films,” 158. 
26 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 175.
27 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 39.
28 Ibid., 71.
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The term actant is crucial here, because it focusses on the relations and 
actions and refers to an occurance or event rather than a subject or object. 
If any entity therefore does modify the course of events—with or without 
intention and with or without figuration—it will be considered an actant.
The only one who at first glance appears to be beyond judgement in 
this relation is the actor himself—the true acteur. He does not have to 
operate a technical device to be at the top of the hierarchy. Unfortunately, 
this observation too is deceptive, because the actor is always already in-
strumentalized. In a sense, he is an object operated by others and led to 
action; a collective creation. Shaped by his specific acting education, he 
speaks the screenwriters’s words with the emotions required by the direc-
tor. He mirrors the visions of the costume designer and make-up artist 
right into the camera. The acting in a scene is the result of the director’s 
directives, light technicians and his own acquired techniques. He never 
speaks alone, because many voices speak through him. He functions as 
a summary and translation of several directives. And precisely because 
of this, he positions himself in the category of definition of the acteur, 
who is—or, as Latour puts it—“what is made to act by many others.”
Latour himself points out this example from the stage world:
Play-acting puts us immediately into a thick imbroglio where the 
question of who is carrying out the action has become unfathomable. 
As soon as the play starts, as Irwin Goffman has so often showed, 
nothing is certain: Is this for real? Is it fake? Does the audience’s 
reaction count? What about the lighting? What is the backstage crew 
doing? Is the playwright’s message faithfully transported or hope-
lessly bungled? Is the character carried over? And if so, by what? 
What are the partners doing? Where is the prompter? If we accept 
to unfold the metaphor, the very word actor directs our attention to a 
complete dislocation of the action, warning us that it is not a coher-
ent, controlled, well-rounded, and clean-edged affair. By definition, 
action is dislocated.29
However, this is not yet the end of translation, since the actor’s per-
formance is not presented to the audience immediately, but through a 
technical device and this device, as Walter Benjamin’s formulation ap-
propriately shows, does not necessarily “need to respect the performance 
29 Ibid., 46.
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as an integral whole. Guided by the cameraman, the camera continually 
changes its position with respect to the performance.”30
nonhumans , poWer  and  r i Tuals
In Pandora’s Hope, Latour addresses the interwoven rapports of humans 
and nonhumans using the example of a gun, confronting a materialistic 
approach with a sociological one.
According to the first perspective, the “gun acts by virtue of material 
components irreducible to the social qualities of the gunman,” while the 
second perspective focuses on the intention and will of the subject and 
determines the thing as “a tool, a medium, a neutral carrier of human will.”31 
What is important here—and particularly with regard to the film set— is not 
the dichotomy of subject and object, but the necessity of their collaboration. 
The dichotomy is resolved automatically if one concentrates on the rela-
tion that creates the basic condition for firing a gun or, more related to the 
topic at hand, for cinematic work. What becomes crucial is the hybrid actor 
that is only possible through the interplay of several entities and does not 
define action as “a property of humans” but as “an association of actants.” 32
The strong object-orientated relations on set are obvious. The final 
product can only be achieved through an interplay of heterogeneous ele-
ments. The objects therefore intensely influence the hierarchy of groups, 
arrange the collective and qualify or disqualify numerous people from 
being part of a certain work stage. Latour does not radically insist on 
equality or a symmetric arrangement of these heterogeneous entities, as 
he is often accused of in simplifying readings.33 Quite the opposite, in 
30 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 
transcribed by Andy Blunden (UCLA School of Theater, Film and Televi-
sion, 2005). Original: “Die Apparatur, die die Leistung des Filmschauspie-
lers vor das Publikum bringt, ist nicht gehalten, diese Leistung als Totalität 
zu respektieren. Sie nimmt unter Führung des Kameramannes laufend zu 
dieser Leistung Stellung.” In: Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter 
seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, with commentary by Detlev Schöttker 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2007), 26.
31 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 176.
32 Ibid., 182 (emphasis Latour).
33 At the utmost he demands an equal observation in the course of an 
analysis.
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fact: the focus of his investigations lies upon asymmetries, hierarchies 
and power relations. The composition of the collective makes everyone 
and everything an actor or actant. But what happens if, as in film produc-
tion, it is exactly the nonhumans that create the difference? Then their 
influence should be investigated more closely.
A finished film script is the starting point of the work on set. In his 
“The screenplay as a ‘structure that wants to be another structure,’” Pier 
Paolo Pasolini describes the film script as an art form in and of itself. 
The formulation of the title is quite felicitous in our context, as it liter-
ally attributes the screenplay an own will and implies its intention to 
unfold its inherent visual character. This filmic text already integrates 
the upcoming process of translation into its new form and constitutes 
itself as a structure in motion. How many layers this translation will have 
was mentioned before. The script already unites a summary of several 
different visions and work processes. The author tried to accept as few 
changes as possible, the director possibly tried to enforce as many as 
necessary. The account manager and producer wanted it structured in a 
most effective way to avoid expensive shooting breaks, the set designer his 
vision of the décor included and so forth. The existing piece of paper is a 
trace and result of many power struggles, negotiations and compromises 
by countless parties. In Walther Killy’s encyclopaedia of literature, the 
film script is described as tightly bound to its extra-literary function and 
that it is exactly this functional character that distinguishes it from every 
other literary source.34 This passage suggests that the transformation 
process between script and film should not be analysed from an isolated 
perspective because it is unthinkable without its regulating economical, 
productive and cultural factors. The worked-out screenplay is essential 
for the translation from script to film—it contains technical details and 
camera directives, the sequence of scenes and shots. Once elaborated, it 
becomes more than an organizational tool—it has power: it determines 
and regulates both human and technical powers and their temporal con-
catenation. The working screenplay, one of the most important tools on 
set, unites the visions of entities which are partly not even engaged on 
set anymore and nevertheless exercise their power. In this context Latour 
uses the term delegation. Through the production plan and the working 
script, past actions and forces still have impact on the present ones. 
34 Walther Killy, ed., Literaturlexikon. Begriffe, Realien, Methoden (Güters loh: 
Bertelsmann-Lexikon-Verlag, 1993), 192.
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Latour’s comparison with investment works very well for the transition 
between pre-production to filming phase: “a regular course of action is 
suspended, a detour is initiated via several types of actants, and the return 
is a fresh hybrid that carries past acts into present and permits its many 
investors to disappear while also remaining present.”35 But other technical 
objects or non-human entities also exercise power on the set. The pro-
ducer’s finance plan regulates the daily routine of countless persons. The 
continuously advancing recording capacity of the microphone silences the 
whole set once the recording signal lights up. The camera-control-unit—a 
combination of humans and various screens—monitors the reconciliation 
of colour, style and lightning between single shots. To be sure, we are 
not talking about a homogeneity of humans and nonhumans, but rather 
about the power of the objects to assign their human partner in action a 
place within the hierarchical structure: 
The most interesting aspect of technology […] is the influence it has 
had on the division of labor within film-making. This can be seen, 
for example, in the fact that the introduction of sound to cinema 
altered the standing of sound engineers within the film crew. Simi-
larly, the use of color film imposed new demands on photographers, 
set-designers, and others working with the external appearance of 
the film. One of the consequences of this was that the role of actors 
diminished in favour of the settings and general prise de vue of the 
film. Digital technology has, for its part, brought forth new profes-
sionals to central artistic roles, such as traditional and digital special 
effects designers. The role of the storyboard artist has expanded in 
connection with digital filmmaking.36
The more essential the technical device for the shot, the closer its opera-
tor is admitted to the occurrence. 
It is quite simple: you are what you operate. And since the role of 
technology within film production is steadily increasing, the handling of 
specific technological devices receives more attention. More and more, 
films are digitally reworked or have computerized animations inserted 
35 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 189.
36 Marjut Salokannel, “Cinema in Search of Its Authors: On the Notion 
of Film Authorship in Legal Discourse,” in Film and Authorship, ed. and 
with an introduction by Virginia Wright Wexman (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2003), 152–178: 155.
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afterwards. Hardly any fantasy or action movie can be thought without 
proceedings like keying or compositing, without the green- or bluebox 
and postproduction.37 With increasing regularity, actors act in an empty 
room and are subsequently inserted into a computerized world. The actor 
plays with and against technology, he has face-to-face interactions with 
monsters he does not see but has to imagine, which, however, determine 
his way of playing. The virtual other has to be kept in mind constantly.
Because objects play such an important role within the bonds between 
different groups on the film set, they deeply affect the dynamics of these 
temporarily constituted orders. Objects often generate ritual-like dynam-
ics. By being included in social interactions, their simple causal efficacy or 
virtue of material, as Latour calls it, is exceeded. They might even gain the 
status of a fetishized object. The clapperboard, for example, is a tool that 
is inevitably needed to guarantee synchronization of pictures and sound 
during post-production if recording takes place separately. The numbers 
of scene, shot and repetition are consistently actualized. The objects 
therefore at times also indicate the laborious recording procedure and the 
sometimes countless repetitions of one scene.38 Its structuring function 
in many German film productions is complemented by a further func-
tion: if the numbers of scene/take/no. correspond (scene 7 / take 7 / no. 7), 
it is customary for the party that ordered this repetition (director/light/
sound) to, in common parlance, buy everyone a drink. The endurance 
and clannishness of the group is rewarded and the triple constellation of 
numbers gains a quasi-magical character. Furthermore, in most—again, 
German—productions, the production plan that regulates financial orga-
nization and timing at the same time contains a ritual-like component. 
Traditionally, in the middle of production, the so called Bergfest is held 
which by now has become an inherent part of the production timetable. 
It manifests the temporality of the process and emphasizes the already 
absolved, arduous work. In a metaphorical sense, just as the name and its 
origins imply, it is supposed to work like a valve for work done, signal-
ize an end point and promote social cohesion within the group for the 
37 Both terms are derived from post production modalities and refer to 
the subsequent insertion of visual effects. ‘Compositing’ means the com-
bination and overlay of different pictures into a single new scene that did 
not previously exist. ‘Keying’ refers to the isolation of elements from the 
background for further editing.
38 One scene in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining made its way into the 
Guinness Book of Records as it was shot with 127 repetitions.
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remainder of the way. But since the film set depends on rigorous temporal 
organisations due to its complexity, this originally informal event has 
made its way into the fixed order of the production plan. 
Objects or things structure the timing and have influence upon the 
social fabric. Their weightiness especially strikes in one particular case, 
namely that of malfunction and breakdown. A broken technical device can 
no longer be considered a black-box, an entity, and while revealing its com-
plex inner life, it strongly affects the actions of the network. The process of 
a production is greatly disturbed by the malfunction of a technical device 
and because of the hegemonic slogan ‘time is money,’ such an event has 
an impact on the entire working group. Then again, the breakdown of one 
single technical element also shows how many instruments have to be op-
erational simultaneously for one take. This does not render the instruments 
social, but it can trigger something social: in some Polish productions, new 
cameras or lights are literally baptized before their first use. The camera 
does not become social, but its symbolic baptism, which is to protect the 
instrument from damage, creates a highly social situation. Through this 
borrowed ritual, the costly instrument is ‘admitted’ to the community as a 
full member and usually even given a name. The humans involved seem to 
be fully aware of their incatenation with the instruments and even if they 
maintain an ironic distance to this ceremony, it has entered the tradition 
of Polish film production and can no longer be foregone.
conclus ion
Historically, the cinema is the art form that always could be described 
with agency, in that man and instrument, human and non-human actors 
are of equal weight. This is of such importance that there has always been 
a history of technology in parallel with the history of directors and ac-
tors. But apparently, this antagonism between humans and instruments 
did not lead to questions about the balance between those elements. At 
the same time, it is this antagonism—which, somewhat simplified, can 
be seen as one between two creators (director vs. camera / light vs. op-
erator)—that prevents us from describing technology as an ensemble of 
instruments and human actors: the opposition is not between human and 
non-human entities, but between a monolithically, monocausally thought 
creative power and scenes of distributed agency. Technology is only an 
indication of such agency which results in the dispositif of the cinema in 
order to distinguish it from art forms such as painting or writing.
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A blind spot in this context, or a fundamental question that ANT does 
not want to or try to answer, concerns the talent of the human actors. 
While the object, due to its material state, always has the same abilities 
and limits, those of its human partners may vary enormously. In this 
sense, every human actor on set is a kind of black box with a very com-
plex and individual inner life. Different cameramen can clearly achieve 
results of huge qualitative differences using the same camera. In this 
case, talent reveals itself as a hybrid maximization: the exploitation of 
the full purpose-oriented potential of the technical teammate. Perhaps 
ANT does not even have to reflect this question because, returning to 
the firearm, the question whether the victim was shot in the head or the 
back does not immediately affect the question whether it was the gun or 
the gunman that shot. However, upon a reflection of the hybrid-actor in 
film production, an approach to a solution should be attempted, because 
the result does make a difference. Otherwise there would not be as many 
good films as there are bad ones.
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